Москва
+7-929-527-81-33
Вологда
+7-921-234-45-78
Вопрос юристу онлайн Юридическая компания ЛЕГАС Вконтакте

Новости от 10 августа 2018 года из блога, посвященного практике в Европейском суде по правам человека ЕСПЧ

Обновлено 11.08.2018 05:57

 

Постанова ЄСПЛ від 15 грудня 2016 року по справі "Ігнатов (Ignatov) проти України" (заява N 40583/15).

У 2015 році заявнику була надана допомога в підготовці заяви. Згодом заява була і комунікувати Україні.

У справі успішно розглянута скарга заявника, що містився в попередньому ув'язненні більше двох років до того, як його переслідування було припинено за відсутністю доказів, на незаконність і тривалість тримання його під вартою, неадекватність процедур судової перевірки. У справі допущено порушення вимог пунктів 1, 3, 4 статті 5 Конвенції про захист прав людини і основних свобод.

 

ОБСТАВИНИ СПРАВИ


21 лютого 2013 року, після винесення Постанови Європейського Суду у справі "Харченко проти України" ((Kharchenko v. Ukraine) від 10 лютого 2011 року, скарга N 40107/02, "Інформаційний бюлетень по прецедентну практику Європейського Суду з прав людини" N 138), що виявив недоліки у внутрішньодержавної системі попереднього ув'язнення, влади України представили переглянутий план дій, в якому вказали, що недоліки законодавства в основному усунені після вступу в силу нового Кримінально-процесуального кодексу 2012 року.

Комітет міністрів Ради Європи, який несе відповідальність за виконання Постанови у справі Харченко відповідно до пункту 2 статті 46 Конвенції, згодом зазначив, що, хоча новий кодекс помітно поліпшив процедуру попереднього ув'язнення, він не усунув певні порушення статті 5 Конвенції, особливо що стосується періоду від кінця слідства до початку судового розгляду (див. рішення у справі "чани проти України" (Chanyev v. Ukraine) від 9 жовтня 2014 р скарга N 46193/13, "Інформаційний бюлетень по пре цедентной практиці Європейського Суду з прав людини "N 178). Комітет міністрів наполягав на терміновому проведенні залишилися необхідних реформ законодавства і на необхідності забезпечення того, щоб суди і прокурори брали всі можливі практичні заходи для запобігання нових порушень статті 5 Конвенції щодо попереднього ув'язнення. Він як і раніше зберіг Постанова по справі Харченко під "посиленим наглядом".

У цій справі заявник, який містився в попередньому ув'язненні більше двох років до того, як його переслідування було припинено за відсутністю доказів, скаржився до Європейського Суду на незаконність і тривалість свого утримання під вартою і неадекватні процедури судової перевірки (пункти 1, 3 і 4 статті 5 Конвенції).


ПИТАННЯ ПРАВА


Європейський Суд одноголосно встановив, що у справі допущено порушення вимог пункту 1 статті 5 Конвенції (відсутність мотивування рішень внутрішньодержавних судів про продовження терміну утримання під вартою), пункту 3 статті 5 Конвенції (тривалість попереднього ув'язнення) і пункту 4 статті 5 Конвенції (ухилення від невідкладного розгляду його клопотань про звільнення).

В порядку застосування статті 46 Конвенції. Встановлені в справі заявника порушення статті 5 Конвенції можуть вважатися поширеними явищами в прецедентну практику щодо України. Дані питання вважалися що випливають із законодавчих прогалин, і владі держави-відповідача було запропоновано вжити термінових заходів для приведення свого законодавства і адміністративної практик у відповідність з висновками Європейського Суду в частині статті 5 Конвенції. Однак, як показує справжнє діло, ні нове законодавство, ні практика не виправили ситуацію (див. Також висновки Комітету міністрів Ради Європи). Виходячи з цього Європейський Суд зробив висновок, що найбільш доцільним способом усунення порушень є внесення без затримки змін до відповідного законодавства і коригування судової та адміністративної практик для забезпечення дотримання внутрішньодержавним кримінальним процесом вимог статті 5 Конвенції.


КОМПЕНСАЦІЯ


В порядку застосування статті 41 Конвенції. Європейський Суд присудив виплатити заявникові 6 000 євро в якості компенсації моральної шкоди.

 

Джерело публікації: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/662-ignatov-proti-ukraine .

 

 

Decision of the ECHR of 15 December 2016 on the case "Ignatov (Ignatov) v. Ukraine" (application No. 40583/15).

In 2015, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Ukraine.

The case successfully examined the applicant's complaint that he had been held in pre-trial detention for more than two years before his prosecution was terminated for lack of evidence, for the illegality and length of his detention, and the inadequacy of the judicial review procedures. The case was violated the requirements of Article 5, paragraphs 1, 3, 4 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE


On February 21, 2013, following the adoption of the judgment of the European Court in the case "Kharchenko v. Ukraine" of 10 February 2011, complaint No. 40107/02, "Information Bulletin on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights" N 138), which revealed shortcomings in the domestic pre-trial detention system, the Ukrainian authorities submitted a revised plan of action, which indicated that the deficiencies in the legislation were largely eliminated after the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in 2012.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is responsible for the implementation of the Kharchenko judgment in accordance with article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, subsequently noted that, although the new code significantly improved the procedure for pre-trial detention, it did not eliminate certain violations of Article 5 of the Convention, from the end of the investigation to the beginning of the trial (see Chanyev v. Ukraine, judgment of 9 October 2014, complaint no. 46193/13, "Information bulletin on the pre cognitive practice of the European Court of Human Rights "No. 178). The Committee of Ministers insisted on the urgent implementation of the remaining necessary legislative reforms and the need to ensure that the courts and prosecutors take all practicable measures to prevent further violations of Article 5 of the Convention in relation to pre-trial detention. He still retained the ruling in the Kharchenko case under "reinforced supervision."

In the present case, the applicant, who had been held in pre-trial detention for more than two years before his prosecution was stopped for lack of evidence, complained to the Court about the illegality and length of his detention and inadequate judicial review procedures (articles 1, 3 and 4 5 of the Convention).


ISSUES OF LAW


The Court unanimously found that there had been a violation of the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (lack of motivation for domestic courts to extend detention), Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (length of pretrial detention) and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (avoidance of prompt consideration of his applications for release).

In the application of Article 46 of the Convention. The violations of Article 5 of the Convention established in the applicant's case can be considered widespread in the case-law concerning Ukraine. These issues were considered to be the result of legislative gaps, and the authorities of the respondent State were asked to take urgent measures to bring their legislation and administrative practices in line with the conclusions of the Court in relation to article 5 of the Convention. However, as the present case shows, neither new legislation nor practice has corrected the situation (see also the conclusions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe). On this basis, the Court concluded that the most appropriate way to remedy violations is to introduce without delay changes in relevant legislation and adjust judicial and administrative practices to ensure compliance with the domestic criminal procedure with the requirements of Article 5 of the Convention.


COMPENSATION


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 6,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/663-ignatov-v-ukraine .

 

 

CEDU sentenza 15 dicembre 2016 sul caso "e altri Hlaifiya (Khlaifia e altri) contro l'Italia" (ricorso N 16483/12).

 

Nel 2012, i richiedenti sono stati assistiti nella preparazione della ricorso. Successivamente, la ricorso è stata e comunicata all'Italia.

 

In caso di successo esaminato il reclamo dei ricorrenti, illegalmente migrato in un altro paese, la loro detenzione e la deportazione nel loro paese di cittadinanza. C'era stata una violazione degli obblighi di cui ai paragrafi 1, 2, 4, l'articolo 5, l'articolo 13 della Convenzione per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, in combinato disposto con l'articolo 3. In caso di violazione dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, l'articolo 4 del protocollo N 4 della Convenzione, articolo 13 della Convenzione in combinato disposto con l'articolo 4 del Protocollo n. 4 della Convenzione.

 

 

 

CIRCOSTANZE DEL CASO

 


I richiedenti, cittadini della Tunisia, nel settembre 2011, insieme a un gruppo di migranti hanno nuotato fuori dalla Tunisia in barca per raggiungere le coste dell'Italia. Dopo aver trascorso un paio d'ore in mare, queste barche di fortuna sono stati intercettati dalla guardia costiera italiana, che li ha accompagnati al porto dell'isola di Lampedusa, dove i richiedenti sono stati collocati in un centro per immigrati illegali (di seguito - CSPA). Successivamente, il centro fu bruciato durante le rivolte e le ricorrenti furono poste su navi ormeggiate nel porto di Palermo. Gli ordini di espulsione furono emessi contro i ricorrenti. Prima di atterrare su aerei che volavano in Tunisia, furono ricevuti dal Console della Tunisia, che ne stabilì la propria identità. Al loro arrivo in Tunisia, furono rilasciati. Questi eventi sono durati circa 12 giorni. Nel 2012, il giudice ha respinto le denunce di diverse associazioni in merito all'abuso di autorità e alla detenzione arbitraria.

 

Decreto del 1 settembre 2015 (vedi. "Notiziario della giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo" N 188) La Camera ha trovato una violazione dell'articolo 4 del protocollo n 4 della Convenzione a causa della mancanza di adeguate garanzie di considerazione reale e concreta della situazione individuale di ciascun il richiedente, una violazione dell'articolo 13 della Convenzione a causa della mancanza di effetto sospensivo dei rimedi applicabili, violazione dell'articolo 5 § 1 della Convenzione (l'assenza di una base giuridica per prigionia) e paragrafi 2 e 4 dell'articolo 5 della Convenzione, una violazione dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione in relazione alle condizioni di detenzione al centro e violazione dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione a causa della detenzione sulle navi, nonché una violazione dell'articolo 13, in collegamento con la mancanza di rimedi a questo proposito.

 

Il 1 ° febbraio 2016, su richiesta del governo dello Stato convenuto, la causa è stata rinviata alla grande sezione della Corte europea.

 


QUESTIONI DI LEGGE

 


Riguardo al rispetto dell'articolo 4 del Protocollo n. 4 della Convenzione. L'articolo 4 del Protocollo n. 4 non garantisce il diritto a un colloquio individuale in tutte le circostanze. I requisiti della presente disposizione può essere eseguita se ogni straniero ha una reale ed efficace possibilità di presentare le ragioni contro la sua espulsione e se questi argomenti siano debitamente considerate dalle autorità dello Stato convenuto.

 

Nel caso di specie, le ricorrenti, che potevano ragionevolmente aspettarsi di tornare in Tunisia, erano in Italia da nove a dodici giorni. Anche se assumiamo che hanno incontrato difficoltà oggettive nel CSPA o sulle navi durante questo periodo significativo sono stati in grado di attirare l'attenzione delle autorità nazionali a qualsiasi situazione che potrebbe modificare il loro status e dare loro il diritto di rimanere in Italia.

 

In primo luogo, i candidati hanno passato due controlli di identità. (a) Il primo controllo di identità, secondo il governo dello Stato convenuto, ha avuto luogo all'arrivo dei richiedenti nel centro di accoglienza e ha incluso la loro fotografia e l'acquisizione delle loro impronte digitali. Sebbene il governo convenuto non potesse fornire i fascicoli personali dei richiedenti, hanno spiegato questa lacuna con un incendio nel centro per i migranti. Per quanto riguarda la presunta mancanza di comunicazione e la comprensione tra i migranti e le autorità italiane, era ragionevole supporre che le difficoltà sono state mitigate dalla presenza di incontrastato nel centro di circa 100 operatori sociali, tra cui assistenti sociali, psicologi, e circa otto interpreti e mediatori culturali.

 

(B) La seconda verifica dell'identità ha avuto luogo prima di piantare i richiedenti sugli aerei che volano a Tunisi: sono state scattate console della Tunisia, che ha stabilito la loro identità. Anche se il controllo è stato effettuato dal rappresentante di uno Stato terzo, è possibile stabilire la nazionalità dei migranti e dare loro un'ultima possibilità di nominare le ragioni contro la loro espulsione per motivi quali l'età o nazionalità (alcuni migranti non erano in connessione con il restituita).

 

In secondo luogo, anche se gli ordini che vietano l'ingresso sono stati fatti sotto gli stessi termini e l'unica differenza era nei dati personali di ogni migrante, la natura relativamente semplice e standardizzata degli ordini potrebbe essere spiegato dal fatto che i ricorrenti non avevano documenti di viaggio validi e non si riferiscono al fatto che la paura del malato trattamento in caso di loro ritorno o che ci sono altri ostacoli legali alla loro espulsione. Così, non è irragionevole in sé che questi ordini erano motivati ​​solo i candidati di nazionalità, indicazione della attraversamento illegale delle frontiere e la mancanza di eventuali situazioni che richiesto dalla legge applicabile (in materia di asilo, status di rifugiato o l'adozione di misure di protezione temporanea per motivi umanitari) .

 

In terzo luogo, non v'è stata alcuna importanza decisiva che un gran numero di migranti dalla Tunisia sono stati inviati durante il periodo relativo ai materiali del caso, o che i tre ricorrenti sono stati inviati quasi simultaneamente. Ciò potrebbe essere spiegato dall'esito di una serie di ordini che vietano l'ingresso. Queste considerazioni sono sufficienti per distinguere il caso di specie dai casi, "Csonka contro il Belgio" ((Conka c. Belgio) (sentenza del 5 febbraio 2002, la denuncia N 51564/99, "Notiziario della giurisprudenza della Corte europea Diritti umani "N 39))," Hirsi Jamaa e altri contro Italia "((Hirsi Jamaa e altri c. Italia) (sentenza del 23 febbraio 2012, N 27765/09 appello," scheda informativa sulla giurisprudenza della europea Corte dei diritti umani "n. 149)," Georgia v. Russia (I) "((Georgia v. Russia) (I) (Post anovlenie Grande Camera del 3 luglio 2014, la denuncia N 13255/07, "Notiziario della giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo" N 176)) e "Sharifi e altri contro l'Italia e la Grecia" ((Sharifi e altri c. Italia e Grecia) (Sentenza del 21 ottobre 2014, denuncia n. 16643/09, "Libro dei libri della Corte europea dei diritti umani" n. 178)).

 

Inoltre, i rappresentanti dei ricorrenti erano in grado di fornire almeno qualche base di fatto o di diritto, che, conformemente al diritto internazionale o legge nazionale potrebbe giustificare la presenza dei loro clienti nel territorio italiano e prevenire la loro espulsione. Ciò ha messo in dubbio l'utilità delle singole interviste nel caso in esame. Di conseguenza, i candidati hanno passato due controlli di identità, la loro nazionalità è stata stabilita, e sono stati dati un'opportunità reale ed effettiva di presentare i loro argomenti contro la loro espulsione.

 


DECISIONE

 


Nel caso, i requisiti di cui all'articolo 4 del protocollo n. 4 non sono stati violati (adottati con 16 voti favorevoli, uno alla volta).

 

Riguardo all'osservanza dell'articolo 13 della Convenzione in combinato disposto con l'articolo 4 del Protocollo n. 4 della Convenzione. Nella fattispecie, il divieto di ordini di entrata dichiarava esplicitamente che queste persone potevano presentare ricorso al magistrato di Agrigento per 60 giorni.

 

Non c'erano ragioni per dubitare che, in questo contesto, il magistrato potrebbe prendere in considerazione qualsiasi denuncia circa la mancata presa in considerazione la situazione personale di un particolare migrante e quindi basata essenzialmente sulla natura della espulsione collettiva. Per quanto riguarda il fatto che la denuncia non ha avuto effetto sospensivo, un'analisi approfondita nel "De Sousa Ribeiro contro la Francia" ((De Souza Ribeiro c. Francia) (decisione della Grande Camera della Corte di giustizia europea il 13 dicembre 2012, la denuncia N 22689 / 07, "Bollettino di informazione sulla giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani" N 158) rispetto alle disposizioni dei casi summenzionati Csonka e Hirsi Jamaa e altri costretti alla Corte di trarre le seguenti conclusioni.

 

Se il richiedente non ha sostenuto che stava di fronte a una violazione dell'articolo 2 o 3 della Convenzione nel paese di destinazione, espulsione dal territorio dello Stato convenuto non esporlo alla minaccia di danno è potenzialmente irreversibile. In questi casi, la Convenzione non crea un obbligo assoluto per lo Stato di garantire rimedio sospensivo automatico, ma richiede solo che la persona interessata è stata data l'effettiva possibilità di contestare la decisione di espulsione da un attento esame della sua denuncia da parte di un'autorità nazionale indipendente e imparziale. Nel caso presente, un rimedio disponibile soddisfa questi requisiti.

 

Inoltre, il fatto che il rimedio a disposizione del richiedente, non ha avuto effetto sospensivo, non era una considerazione determinante per la conclusione nel "De Sousa Ribeiro contro la Francia." Questa conclusione si basa sulla tesi che "dimostrabile" la censura della ricorrente ai sensi dell'articolo 8 della Convenzione è stata respinta molto velocemente (la sua espulsione in Brasile è stata effettuata in meno di un'ora dopo il deposito di un ricorso presso il Tribunale amministrativo).

 


DECISIONE

 


Nel caso in combinazione con l'articolo 4 del protocollo n 4 è stata violazione della Convenzione ai requisiti di cui all'articolo 13 della Convenzione (adottato con 16 voti "per" uno - "contro").

 

Riguardo all'osservanza dell'articolo 13 della Convenzione in combinato disposto con l'articolo 4 del Protocollo n. 4 della Convenzione. Nella fattispecie, il divieto di ordini di entrata dichiarava esplicitamente che queste persone potevano presentare ricorso al magistrato di Agrigento per 60 giorni.

 

Non c'erano ragioni per dubitare che, in questo contesto, il magistrato potrebbe prendere in considerazione qualsiasi denuncia circa la mancata presa in considerazione la situazione personale di un particolare migrante e quindi basata essenzialmente sulla natura della espulsione collettiva. Per quanto riguarda il fatto che la denuncia non ha avuto effetto sospensivo, un'analisi approfondita nel "De Sousa Ribeiro contro la Francia" ((De Souza Ribeiro c. Francia) (decisione della Grande Camera della Corte di giustizia europea il 13 dicembre 2012, la denuncia N 22689 / 07, "Bollettino di informazione sulla giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani" N 158) rispetto alle disposizioni dei casi summenzionati Csonka e Hirsi Jamaa e altri costretti alla Corte di trarre le seguenti conclusioni.

 

Se il richiedente non ha sostenuto che stava di fronte a una violazione dell'articolo 2 o 3 della Convenzione nel paese di destinazione, espulsione dal territorio dello Stato convenuto non esporlo alla minaccia di danno è potenzialmente irreversibile. In questi casi, la Convenzione non crea un obbligo assoluto per lo Stato di garantire rimedio sospensivo automatico, ma richiede solo che la persona interessata è stata data l'effettiva possibilità di contestare la decisione di espulsione da un attento esame della sua denuncia da parte di un'autorità nazionale indipendente e imparziale. Nel caso presente, un rimedio disponibile soddisfa questi requisiti.

 

Inoltre, il fatto che il rimedio a disposizione del richiedente, non ha avuto effetto sospensivo, non era una considerazione determinante per la conclusione nel "De Sousa Ribeiro contro la Francia." Questa conclusione si basa sulla tesi che "dimostrabile" la censura della ricorrente ai sensi dell'articolo 8 della Convenzione è stata respinta molto velocemente (la sua espulsione in Brasile è stata effettuata in meno di un'ora dopo il deposito di un ricorso presso il Tribunale amministrativo).

 


DECISIONE

 


Nel caso in combinazione con l'articolo 4 del protocollo n 4 è stata violazione della Convenzione ai requisiti di cui all'articolo 13 della Convenzione (adottato con 16 voti "per" uno - "contro").

 

Per quanto riguarda il rispetto dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione. I ricorrenti si sono lamentati delle condizioni della loro detenzione. Ricordando che i fattori che hanno causato l'aumento l'arrivo di migranti, non possono alleviare gli Stati membri dei loro obblighi, il Tribunale ha ritenuto che sarebbe artificioso considerare i fatti del caso di fuori del contesto delle esigenze umanitarie.

 

Il 2011 è stato caratterizzato da una grave crisi migratoria. Il massiccio arrivo di migranti nordafricani (oltre 50.000 all'anno) a Lampedusa e Linosa ha indubbiamente creato difficoltà organizzative, logistiche e strutturali per le autorità italiane.

 

Oltre alla situazione generale, ci sono stati alcuni problemi specifici subito dopo l'arrivo dei richiedenti, che hanno contribuito ad aumentare le difficoltà esistenti e la creazione di alta clima tensione: turbolenze, i migranti disposte in un centro di accoglienza, centro di incendio doloso tentato, dimostrazione di 1800 migranti sulle strade Lampedusa scontri locali e gruppi stranieri che minacciavano di far esplodere serbatoi di carburante e atti di autocontrollo e vandalismo.

 

Questi dettagli indicano che lo stato si trova ad affrontare molte sfide come risultato di numero eccezionalmente elevato di migranti e le autorità sono stati gravati da un sacco di problemi come avevano fatto per garantire il benessere dei lavoratori e dei residenti locali, e per mantenere la legge e l'ordine. La decisione di concentrare l'accoglienza iniziale dei migranti a Lampedusa non può essere criticata da sola. A causa della posizione geografica dell'isola, non era irragionevole trasferire i superstiti al centro di accoglienza più vicino.

 

(a) Condizioni al centro di accoglienza. La Corte prende atto dei seguenti punti, ha concluso che le condizioni in cui si sono svolte le ricorrenti nel centro, non ha raggiunto la soglia di gravità richiesto per consentire loro di essere caratterizzato come inumano e degradante.

 

(I) Mentre alcune delle relazioni delle commissioni parlamentari e organizzazioni non governative per i diritti umani indicano centro sovraffollamento, nonché le condizioni inadeguate di pratiche igieniche, la privacy e contatti esterni, le loro conclusioni sono, tuttavia, controbilanciati dalla relazione del Consiglio d'Europa, Assemblea parlamentare per il periodo vicino al il tempo di residenza dei ricorrenti, pertanto, queste condizioni non potevano essere confrontate con quelle che hanno portato alla creazione da parte della Corte europea di una violazione dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione in altri casi ah.

 

(Ii) Anche se non è stato stabilito il numero di metri quadrati per persona al centro e le camere, anche se si assume che la capacità massima del centro è stato superato del 15 - 75%, la libertà di movimento di cui godono i richiedenti nel centro, è stato quello di rimediare a queste carenze.

 

(Iii) Nonostante il fatto che i ricorrenti erano stati indeboliti da un viaggio pericoloso attraverso il mare, sono particolarmente vulnerabili (non erano richiedenti asilo non sono sosteneva di avere esperienze traumatiche nel loro paese di origine, non apparteneva alla categoria degli anziani o minori di persone e non soffrono da qualsiasi malattia).

 

(iv) Non erano soggetti a restrizioni in cibo, acqua o cure mediche e non erano esposti a condizioni atmosferiche anomale.

 

(v) Data la breve durata del loro soggiorno (da tre a quattro giorni), la mancanza di contatto con il mondo esterno non ha avuto serie conseguenze individuali.

 

(Vi) Mentre le autorità hanno l'obbligo di adottare misure per trovare altre strutture di accoglienza soddisfacenti con sufficiente spazio e passare a un numero sufficiente di lavoratori, nel caso di specie, la Corte non ha esaminato se è stato adempiuto tale obbligo, dal momento che solo due giorni dopo l'arrivo degli ultimi due richiedenti, la CSPA a Lampedusa fu distrutta da un incendio durante le rivolte.

 

(Vii) In generale, la situazione che la Corte ha riconosciuto l'volte violano l'articolo 3 della Convenzione, erano più intense o prolungate.

 


DECISIONE

 


I requisiti dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione non sono stati violati (all'unanimità).

 

(b) Condizioni a bordo di due navi. La soglia di gravità del trattamento non è stata raggiunta anche durante il soggiorno sulle navi.

 

In primo luogo, le ricorrenti non hanno fornito documenti o di terzi che indicano i segni del presunto maltrattamento o di supporto la loro versione dei fatti (la sovrappopolazione, abuso, mancanza di igiene), quindi non c'era alcun motivo per il recepimento della dell'onere della prova.

 

In secondo luogo, al contrario, possiamo vedere che le navi in ​​visita membri del Parlamento e che ha visto dalla sentenza (sulla base di notizie e, in assenza di ragionevole dubbio nel fatto che è stato rilasciato con le garanzie procedurali necessarie) che i migranti sono stati tenuti in una soddisfacente condizioni.

 


DECISIONE

 


I requisiti dell'articolo 3 della Convenzione non sono stati violati (all'unanimità).

 

La Corte ha anche unanimemente rilevato che vi era stata una violazione dell'articolo 5 § 1 della Convenzione (e, di conseguenza, paragrafi 2 e 4 dell'articolo 5 della Convenzione), in assenza di una base giuridica per la privazione del richiedente della libertà. La loro detenzione effettivo in assenza di una decisione formale li ha privati ​​delle loro garanzie costituzionali di habeas corpus, forniti alle persone detenute nel centro di accoglienza, e anche nel contesto della crisi migratoria questo potrebbe non essere compatibile con la finalità dell'articolo 5 della Convenzione. Inoltre, vi è stata una violazione dell'articolo 13 della Convenzione, in combinato disposto con l'articolo 3 della Convenzione, relativo alle condizioni di detenzione.

 


COMPENSAZIONE

 


Nell'applicazione dell'articolo 41 della Convenzione. La Corte ha assegnato 2.500 euro a ciascuno dei richiedenti per quanto riguarda il danno non patrimoniale.

 

 

 

Fonte di pubblicazione: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/664-khlaifia-e-altri-contro-l-italia .

 

 

 

 

 

Decision of the ECHR of 15 December 2016 in the case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (application no. 16483/12).

 

In 2012, the applicants were assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was and communicated to Italy.

 

The case successfully examined the complaint of the applicants who illegally migrated to another state, to detain them and expel citizenship. There have been violations of the requirements of Article 5, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and Article 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in conjunction with Article 3. There have been no violations of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 4 of the Protocol N 4 to the Convention, Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

 

 

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

 


The applicants, citizens of Tunisia, in September 2011, together with a group of migrants swam out of Tunisia in boats to reach the shores of Italy. After spending several hours at sea, these self-made boats were intercepted by the Italian Coast Guard, which escorted them to the port of Lampedusa, where the applicants were placed in the center for illegal migrants (hereinafter referred to as CSPA). Subsequently, the center was burned during the riots, and the applicants were placed on ships moored in the harbor of Palermo. The deportation orders were issued against the applicants. Before landing on planes flying to Tunisia, they were received by the Consul of Tunisia, who established their identity. Upon their arrival in Tunisia, they were released. These events lasted approximately 12 days. In 2012, the judge dismissed complaints from several associations about abuse of authority and arbitrary detention.

 

The judgment of 1 September 2015 (see "Fact Sheet on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights" No. 188), the Chamber of the European Court found a violation of the requirements of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention regarding the lack of adequate guarantees for a real and specific consideration of the individual situation of each violation of the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention because of the absence of a suspensive force of applicable remedies, a breach of the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (lack of a legal basis for deprivation of liberty) and Article 5 §§ 2 and 4 of the Convention, a violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention in relation to the conditions of detention in the center and the absence of a violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention as a result of detention on board marine vessels, as well as a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in with the lack of remedies in this regard.

 

On 1 February 2016, at the request of the Government of the respondent State, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court.

 


ISSUES OF LAW

 


Concerning compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 does not guarantee the right to an individual interview in all circumstances. The requirements of this provision can be fulfilled if every foreigner has a real and effective opportunity to present arguments against his expulsion and if these arguments are duly considered by the authorities of the respondent State.

 

In the present case, the applicants, who could reasonably have expected to return to Tunisia, were in Italy from nine to 12 days. Even assuming that they faced objective difficulties in CSPA or on ships, during this significant period they had the opportunity to draw the attention of the domestic authorities to any circumstances that could affect their status and give them the right to stay in Italy.

 

First, the applicants passed two identity checks. (a) The first identity check, according to the Government of the respondent State, took place upon the applicants' arrival at the reception center and included their photographing and obtaining their fingerprints. Although the respondent Government could not provide the applicants' personal files, they explained this shortcoming by a fire in the center for migrants. As for the alleged lack of communication and understanding between migrants and the Italian authorities, it was reasonable to assume that the difficulties were mitigated by the unchallenged presence at the center of some 100 social operators, including social workers, psychologists and about eight translators and cultural mediators.

 

(b) The second identity check took place prior to the applicants' landing on aircraft flying to Tunisia: they were accepted by the consul of Tunisia, who established their identity. Even though the verification was carried out by a representative of a third state, it allowed the citizenship of migrants to be established and granted them the last chance to argue against their expulsion on such grounds as age or nationality (some migrants were not returned in this regard).

 

Secondly, although orders for prohibition of entry were made in similar terms and the only difference was the personal data of each migrant, the relatively simple and standardized nature of orders could be explained by the fact that the applicants did not have valid travel documents and did not refer to the fact that they were afraid of the cruel treatment in the event of their return or that there are other legal obstacles to their expulsion. Thus, it was not unreasonable in itself that these orders were motivated only by the citizenship of the applicants, by an indication of their illegal crossing of the border and by the absence of any situations provided for by applicable law (political asylum, granting refugee status or taking temporary protective measures on humanitarian grounds) .

 

Thirdly, it was not crucial that a large number of migrants from Tunisia were expelled during the period relevant to the case file, or that the three applicants were expelled almost simultaneously. This could be explained by the outcome of a series of orders prohibiting entry. These considerations are sufficient to distinguish the present case from the cases of "Chonka v. Belgium" (Conka v. Belgium) (Judgment of 5 February 2002, application no. 51564/99, "Information Bulletin on the Court's case-law on Human Rights "No. 39)," Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy "(Judgment of 23 February 2012, application no. 27765/09," European case-study case sheet " Human Rights Court "No. 149)," Georgia v. Russia (I) "((Georgia v. Russia) (I) (Post an anouncement of the Grand Chamber of July 3, 2014, complaint No. 13255/07, "Fact sheet on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights" No. 176)) and "Sharifi and Others v. Italy" and Greece) (Judgment of 21 October 2014, complaint No. 16643/09, "European Court of Human Rights case-book" No. 178)).

 

In addition, the applicants' representatives were unable to indicate at least some factual or legal basis which, in accordance with international law or domestic law, could justify the presence of their clients on Italian territory and prevent their expulsion. This questioned the usefulness of individual interviews in the present case. As a result, the applicants passed two identity checks, their nationality was established, and they were given a real and effective opportunity to put forward their arguments against their expulsion.

 


DECISION

 


In the case, the requirements of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 were not violated (adopted by 16 votes in favor, one at a time).

 

Concerning compliance with Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. In the present case, the prohibition of entry orders explicitly stated that these persons could appeal to Magistrate Agrigento for 60 days.

 

There was no reason to doubt that, in this context, the justice of the peace could have considered any complaint of failure to take into account the personal situation of a particular migrant and therefore based essentially on the collective nature of expulsion. Regarding the fact that this complaint had no suspensive effect, an in-depth analysis in the case of De Souza Ribeiro v. France (Decree of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 13 December 2012, complaint No. 22689 / 07, "Factsheet on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights" No. 158), in comparison with the judgments in the above cases, Chonki and Hirsi Jamaa and others, compelled the Court to draw the following conclusions.

 

If the applicant did not claim that he would encounter a violation of the requirements of Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in the country of destination, expulsion from the territory of the respondent State would not endanger him from causing damage of a potentially irreversible nature. In such cases, the Convention does not create an absolute obligation for the State to guarantee an automatically discontinuing remedy, but only requires that the person concerned be given an effective opportunity to challenge the expulsion decision by carefully examining his complaints by an independent and impartial domestic authority. In the present case, an available remedy satisfies these requirements.

 

Moreover, the fact that the remedy available to the applicant did not have a suspensive effect was not a decisive consideration for the conclusion made in the case of Di Soza Ribeiro v. France. This conclusion was based on the argument that the "provable" complaint of the applicant under Article 8 of the Convention was rejected very hastily (his expulsion to Brazil was effected within less than an hour after the complaint was filed with the administrative court).

 


DECISION

 


In the case, the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in interrelation with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 were not violated (adopted by 16 votes in favor, one at a time).

 

Concerning compliance with Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. In the present case, the prohibition of entry orders explicitly stated that these persons could appeal to Magistrate Agrigento for 60 days.

 

There was no reason to doubt that, in this context, the justice of the peace could have considered any complaint of failure to take into account the personal situation of a particular migrant and therefore based essentially on the collective nature of expulsion. Regarding the fact that this complaint had no suspensive effect, an in-depth analysis in the case of De Souza Ribeiro v. France (Decree of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 13 December 2012, complaint No. 22689 / 07, "Factsheet on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights" No. 158), in comparison with the judgments in the above cases, Chonki and Hirsi Jamaa and others, compelled the Court to draw the following conclusions.

 

If the applicant did not claim that he would encounter a violation of the requirements of Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in the country of destination, expulsion from the territory of the respondent State would not endanger him from causing damage of a potentially irreversible nature. In such cases, the Convention does not create an absolute obligation for the State to guarantee an automatically discontinuing remedy, but only requires that the person concerned be given an effective opportunity to challenge the expulsion decision by carefully examining his complaints by an independent and impartial domestic authority. In the present case, an available remedy satisfies these requirements.

 

Moreover, the fact that the remedy available to the applicant did not have a suspensive effect was not a decisive consideration for the conclusion made in the case of Di Soza Ribeiro v. France. This conclusion was based on the argument that the "provable" complaint of the applicant under Article 8 of the Convention was rejected very hastily (his expulsion to Brazil was effected within less than an hour after the complaint was filed with the administrative court).

 


DECISION

 


In the case, the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in interrelation with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 were not violated (adopted by 16 votes in favor, one at a time).

 

Concerning compliance with Article 3 of the Convention. The applicants complained about the conditions of their detention. Recalling that factors that entailed an increase in the arrival of migrants can not absolve Member States from their obligations, the Court considered that it would be unnatural to consider the facts of the case outside the context of humanitarian necessity.

 

2011 was marked by a major migration crisis. The massive arrival of North African migrants (more than 50,000 per year) to Lampedusa and Linosa undoubtedly created organizational, logistical and structural difficulties for the Italian authorities.

 

In addition to the general situation, there were some specific problems immediately after the applicants arrived, which contributed to increasing existing difficulties and creating a climate of heightened tension: unrest organized by migrants at the reception center, an attempt to set fire to the center, a demonstration of 1,800 migrants in the streets of Lampedusa, clashes between local residents and groups foreigners who threatened to blow up fuel tanks, and acts of self-control and vandalism.

 

These details demonstrate that the state faced many problems as a result of an exceptionally large number of migrants and that the authorities were burdened with a multitude of tasks, since they had to ensure the well-being of migrants and local residents and support law and order. The decision to concentrate the initial reception of migrants in Lampedusa can not by itself be criticized. Due to the geographical location of the island, it was not unreasonable to transfer the survivors to the nearest reception center.

 

(a) Conditions at the reception center. The Court, having noted the following paragraphs, concluded that the conditions in which the applicants were held at the center did not reach the threshold of severity required in order that they could be characterized as inhuman or degrading.

 

(i) While some reports of parliamentary committees or non-governmental human rights organizations indicate overcrowding in the center, as well as inadequate conditions for hygiene, privacy and external contacts, their conclusions, however, have been counterbalanced by the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for a period close to the time of residence of the applicants there, therefore, these conditions could not be compared with those that led to the establishment by the European Court of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in other cases Oh.

 

(ii) Even though the number of square meters per person in the center's rooms was not established and even assuming that the maximum capacity of the center was exceeded by 15 to 75%, the freedom of movement used by applicants in the center had to compensate for these shortcomings.

 

(iii) Although the applicants were weakened by a dangerous sea voyage, they were not particularly vulnerable (they were not seekers of asylum, did not claim to have traumatic experience in the country of origin, did not belong to the category of elderly or underage people and did not suffer from any diseases).

 

(iv) They were not restricted in food, water or medical care and were not exposed to abnormal weather conditions.

 

(v) Given the short duration of their stay (three to four days), the lack of contact with the outside world did not have serious individual consequences.

 

(vi) While the authorities had an obligation to take measures to find other satisfactory reception facilities of sufficient size and to transfer there a sufficient number of migrants, in the present case the Court could not consider whether this obligation was fulfilled, since only two days later after the arrival of the last two applicants, CSPA in Lampedusa was destroyed by fire during the riots.

 

(vii) In general, the situations that the European Court sometimes found to be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention were more intense or protracted.

 


DECISION

 


The requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were not violated (unanimously).

 

(b) Conditions aboard two ships. The threshold of severity of treatment was not reached also during the stay on ships.

 

Firstly, the applicants did not provide documents or testimony from third parties indicating signs of alleged ill-treatment or confirming their version of the facts (overcrowding, insults, lack of hygiene), so there was no reason to transfer the burden of proof.

 

Secondly, on the contrary, from a judicial decision (based on the information agency's message and in the absence of grounds for doubting that it was rendered with the requisite procedural guarantees), one can see that the members of parliament visited the ships and he saw that the migrants were kept in satisfactory conditions.

 


DECISION

 


The requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were not violated (unanimously).

 

The Court also unanimously noted that there had been a violation of the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (and therefore paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 5 of the Convention) in connection with the lack of a legal basis for the deprivation of liberty of the applicants. Their actual detention in the absence of any formal decision deprived them of their constitutional guarantees of habeas corpus granted to persons held at the reception center, and even in the context of the migration crisis, this could not be compatible with the purpose of Article 5 of the Convention. In addition, there was a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, regarding conditions of detention.

 

 

 

COMPENSATION

 


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded EUR 2,500 to each of the applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

 

 

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/665-khlaifia-and-others-v-italy .

 

 

arrêt de la CEDH du 13 Décembre 2016 le cas "Paposhvili (Paposhvili) contre la Belgique" (requite N 41738/10).

 

En 2010, le requérant a été assisté dans la préparation de la requite. Par la suite, la requite a été transmise à la Belgique.

 

Dans le cas de succès examiné la plainte relative à l'expulsion présumée d'une personne souffrant d'une maladie grave dans son pays d'origine en cas de doute quant à la disponibilité des soins médicaux en elle. Dans le cas d'une violation des articles 3 et 8 de la Convention pour la protection des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales.

 

 

 

CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE

 


Le requérant, ressortissant de la Géorgie, est arrivé en Belgique en Italie accompagné de sa femme et son enfant de six ans dernière en Novembre 1998. Plus tard, ils ont eu deux enfants. Le requérant à plusieurs reprises condamné à la prison pour vol. Il a souffert de la tuberculose, l'hépatite C et de la leucémie lymphocytaire chronique (CLL). Demande de demandeur d'asile et sa femme a été rejetée en Juin 1999. Dans la littérature, il fait référence au bureau ou le Bureau des étrangers pour le demandeur a présenté un certain nombre de pétitions à régulariser leur statut de résidence, mais ils ont été rejetés par l'Autorité pour les étrangers. En ce qui concerne le requérant et son épouse plus tard, plusieurs ordres d'expulsion ont été émis, y compris en Juillet 2010.

 

23 juillet 2010 en se référant à l'article 2, 3 et 8 de la Convention, le requérant introduisit un recours devant la Cour européenne de justice d'une demande de mesures provisoires, conformément au Règlement de la Cour, l'article 39, en déclarant qu'en cas de déplacement en Géorgie, il ne sera plus l'accès aux soins de santé les services dont il avait besoin, et que, compte tenu de son espérance de vie est très faible, il pourrait mourir avant que loin de sa famille. 28 juillet 2010, la Cour a accordé sa demande.

 

Validité de l'ordre de quitter le territoire de la Belgique a été étendue au 28 Février, 2011 Autorité compétente pour les étrangers 18 Février, 2012 a émis un ordre de quitter le pays «qui est en vigueur immédiatement, » le ministère après l'ordre d'expulsion le 16 Août, 2007.

 

Un certificat médical délivré en Septembre 2012, a déclaré que le fait que le demandeur pour traiter l'hépatite B et les maladies pulmonaires pourrait causer des dommages aux organes et une invalidité importante, et d'éviter le traitement de la leucémie (CLL), pourrait causer la mort du requérant. Retour à la Géorgie à un patient soumis à un traitement inhumain et dégradant. Le demandeur a été invité à contacter l'organisme de services de santé pour les étrangers 24 Septembre 2012, pour un examen médical et se soumettre aux autorités belges une occasion « pour répondre aux questions de la Cour. » En se référant à l'arrêt de la Grande Chambre de la Cour européenne de justice le 27 mai 2008 dans l'affaire « contre N. Le Royaume-Uni » (Royaume-Uni N. c.), La plainte N 26565/05, « Bulletin de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme » 108 N), l'autorité des étrangers a noté dans son rapport que les rapports médicaux ne permettent pas de conclure que le seuil de gravité a été tel que requis par l'article 3 de la Convention. la vie du requérant ne relevait pas de menace directe, et non nécessaire d'avoir une surveillance médicale permanente pour assurer sa survie. De plus, dans cette période de sa maladie ne pouvait être considérée comme étant la dernière étape.

 

29 Juillet 2010 de l'épouse du requérant et trois de ses enfants ont été permis de séjour pour une durée indéterminée. Le requérant est décédé en juin 2016.

 


QUESTIONS DE DROIT

 


Question préliminaire Après la mort du requérant, ses parents ont exprimé le désir de poursuivre la procédure. La Cour a tenu compte du fait que dans la présente affaire soulève une question importante, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'interprétation de la jurisprudence en ce qui concerne l'expulsion des étrangers gravement malades.

 

Ainsi, l'importance de cette affaire est allée au-delà de la situation particulière du demandeur. En conséquence, les circonstances particulières affectant le respect des droits de l'homme tels qu'ils sont définis dans la Convention et ses Protocoles, la Cour européenne ont demandé la poursuite de la plainte conformément au paragraphe 1 de l'article 37 de la Convention, in fine.

 

Concernant le respect de l'article 3 de la Convention. Dans le cas de « N. Le Royaume-Uni », la Cour a souligné que, outre les situations visées dans le décret « D. contre le Royaume-Uni » (D. c. Royaume-Uni) (le 2 mai 1997, la plainte N 30240/96 ), où la mort des requérants est imminente, il peut y avoir d'autres cas très exceptionnels où les considérations humanitaires qui l'emportent sur l'expulsion lient également. Examen de la jurisprudence qui a surgi après la procédure « contre N. Le Royaume-Uni », ne montre pas ces exemples. Application de l'article 3 de la Convention que dans les cas où une personne est menacée par l'expulsion, est en train de mourir, privé des étrangers gravement malades dans un état moins critique, les avantages de cette disposition.

 

La plupart de la Chambre européenne de la Cour a établi en l'espèce, que les « autres cas très exceptionnels » qui pourraient donner lieu à une question en vertu de l'article 3 de la Convention, doivent être comprises comme faisant référence aux situations couvertes par le mouvement des personnes lourdement malades, où il y avait des motifs sérieux de croire qu'il mais pas sous la menace immédiate de la mort, il pourrait subir une menace réelle en l'absence de traitement intentionnel dans le pays d'accueil ou le manque d'accès à un tel traitement, sérieux , La détérioration rapide et irréversible de l'état de santé attire une souffrance intense ou une réduction significative de l'espérance de vie. Ces situations correspondaient au seuil élevé d'application de l'article 3 de la Convention dans les affaires concernant la circulation des étrangers souffrant d'une maladie grave.

 

Les candidats sont tenus de présenter des preuves qu'il y avait des motifs sérieux de croire que, en cas de mise en œuvre de la mesure contestée, ils auraient été soumis à un risque réel de traitement contraire à l'article 3 de la Convention. Si des preuves sont présentées, les autorités de l’État de retour dans le cadre des procédures nationales devraient éliminer tous les doutes. doit être soigneusement contrôlé le risque estimé, dans lequel la puissance de retour à l'Etat sont tenus de prendre en compte les conséquences prévisibles des mouvements de la personne dans l'Etat d'accueil, compte tenu de la situation générale et la situation personnelle de la personne.

 

L'impact de l'expulsion d'une personne donnée devrait être évalué en comparant son état de santé avant l'expulsion et la manière dont elle changera après avoir déménagé dans l'État d'accueil.

 

Dans chaque cas, il est nécessaire de vérifier si des soins adéquats et appropriés est généralement disponible dans le pays d'accueil, dans la pratique du traitement de la maladie du requérant, afin d'éviter la possibilité de lui être soumis à des traitements contraires à l'article 3 de la Convention.

 

Les autorités devaient également tenir compte des limites dans lesquelles cette personne avait réellement accès aux soins et aux possibilités appropriés dans le pays d'accueil.

 

Si, après avoir examiné l'information attribuable étaient de sérieux doutes quant à l'impact de l'expulsion sur ces personnes, retourne l'Etat devait obtenir une assurance sur mesure et suffisantes de l'Etat d'accueil comme condition préalable à l'expulsion, que le traitement approprié sera disponible et possible pour ces personnes, qui ne sont pas en situation contraire à l’article 3 de la Convention.

 

Le requérant souffrait d’une maladie très grave et son état de santé mettait sa vie en danger. Cependant, son état est devenu stable suite à un traitement reçu en Belgique et visant à lui permettre de subir une transplantation de donneur. Si le traitement fourni au demandeur était terminé, son espérance de vie basée sur la moyenne serait inférieure à six mois.

 

Ni le traitement que le demandeur a reçu en Belgique ni la greffe de donneur n'étaient disponibles en Géorgie. En ce qui concerne les autres formes de traitement de la leucémie disponibles dans ce dernier pays, rien ne garantissait que le requérant y aurait accès, en raison de lacunes dans le système de sécurité sociale géorgien.

 

Les conclusions du médecin-conseil à l'Autorité des étrangers sur l'état de santé du demandeur, sur la base de leur fournir des certificats médicaux n'ont pas été considérés comme Autorité pour les étrangers ou d'appel Bureau des étrangers conformément à l'article 3 de la Convention dans la procédure relative à la légalisation du demandeur pour des raisons médicales.

 

De même, l'état de santé du requérant n'a pas été examiné dans le cadre de la procédure relative à son expulsion. Le fait que l'évaluation pourrait être effectuée immédiatement avant l'exécution des mesures d'expulsion n'a pas éliminé ces préoccupations en l'absence d'indications sur les limites d'une telle évaluation et son impact sur le caractère contraignant de l'expulsion du pays.

 

Par conséquent, en l'absence d'évaluation du risque interne des autorités, qui faisait face au demandeur, et la disponibilité d'un traitement approprié en Géorgie, les informations disponibles à ces organismes ne suffisait pas de conclure que si elle était renvoyée en Géorgie ne sera pas soumis à un risque réel et concret de traitement contraire article 3 de la Convention.

 


DECISION

 


L’expulsion du requérant constituerait une violation de l’article 3 de la Convention (unanimité).

 

Concernant le respect de l'article 8 de la Convention. Il n'a pas été contesté que le requérant, sa femme et ses enfants nés en Belgique avaient une vie familiale. Ainsi, l'affaire a été considérée du point de vue de la "vie familiale" en raison des obligations positives des autorités belges.

 

Étant donné que les autorités belges avaient pas examiné les données médicales du demandeur et l'impact de l'expulsion sur sa santé dans une procédure, la Grande Chambre de la Cour européenne a conclu que l'affaire serait une violation de l'article 3 de la Convention si le demandeur sera envoyé à la Géorgie sans cette évaluation .

 

En outre, les autorités belges ne sont pas dûment pris en compte conformément à l'article 8 de la Convention, le degré de dépendance du candidat de sa famille en raison de la détérioration de son état de santé. Dans le cadre de la procédure de légalisation pour des raisons médicales de bureau d'appel pour les étrangers vraiment rejeté la plainte du requérant conformément à l'article 8 de la Convention au motif que la décision de refuser le séjour n'a pas été accompagnée par l'adoption de mesures d'expulsion.

 

Si les autorités belges ont finalement conclu que l'article 3 de la Convention dans l'interprétation ci-dessus ne fait pas obstacle à l'expulsion du requérant à la Géorgie, de se conformer à l'article 8 de la Convention, les autorités belges devaient examiner plus si l'on pouvait raisonnablement attendre de la famille, en tenant compte de la situation spécifique du demandeur au moment de l'expulsion qu'elle le suivre à la Géorgie, ou, à défaut, que ce soit d'exiger le respect du droit du requérant au respect de sa vie familiale, il a été autorisé à rester en Belgique pour une durée de vie.

 


DECISION

 


L'expulsion du requérant constituerait une violation de l'article 8 de la Convention (unanimité).

 


COMPENSATION

 


Dans l'application de l'article 41 de la Convention. Demande de réparation du préjudice matériel est rejeté, le constat d'une violation constitue une satisfaction équitable suffisante pour le dommage moral. Voir aussi l'arrêt de la Grande Chambre de l'affaire européenne « Saadi c » (Saadi c. Italie) le 28 Février 2008, la plainte N 37201/06.

 

 

 

Source de publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/666-paposhvili-contre-la-belgique .

 

 

 

 

 

ECHR Decree of 13 December 2016 in the case of Paposhvili v. Belgium (aplication No. 41738/10).

 

In 2010, the applicant was assisted in preparing the aplication. Subsequently, the aplication was and communicated to Belgium.

 

In the case, the complaint on the alleged expulsion of a person suffering from a serious illness to the country of his origin in the presence of doubts about the availability of medical care was successfully considered. The case involved violation of the requirements of articles 3 and 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

 

 

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

 


The applicant, a Georgian national, arrived in Belgium via Italy in November 1998, accompanied by his wife and a six-year-old child. Later they had two children. The applicant was repeatedly sentenced to imprisonment for robbery. He suffered from tuberculosis, hepatitis C and chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL). The application for asylum of the applicant and his wife was rejected in June 1999. In the literature it is called an office or an office for foreigners. The applicant filed a number of motions to legalize his residence status, but they were rejected by the Aliens Authority. In respect of the applicant and his wife, several orders were subsequently issued for expulsion from the country, including in July 2010.

 

On 23 July 2010, with reference to Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant applied to the Court with a request for provisional measures in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, arguing that, if relocated to Georgia, he would no longer have access to medical the services he needed, and that, given his very small expected life expectancy, he could die even earlier away from his family. On 28 July 2010, the European Court granted his application.

 

The validity of the order to leave the territory of Belgium was extended until February 28, 2011. The relevant foreign affairs body issued an order on 18 February 2012 to leave the country "immediately in force" following the ministry's order for expulsion of 16 August 2007.

 

A medical certificate issued in September 2012 indicated that evasion of the applicant's treatment of hepatitis and lung disease could result in organ damage and significant disability, and avoidance of leukemia (CLL) treatment could lead to the death of the applicant. Returning to Georgia would subject the patient to inhuman and degrading treatment. The applicant was requested to apply to the medical service of the Aliens Authority on 24 September 2012 for a medical examination and to allow the Belgian authorities to "answer the questions of the European Court of Justice". With reference to the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 27 May 2008 in the case N. v. The United Kingdom, complaint No. 26565/05, "Information Bulletin on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights" No. 108), the Aliens Authority noted in its report that the medical documents did not support the conclusion that the threshold of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention had been reached. The applicant's life was not under direct threat, and there was no need for constant medical supervision to ensure his survival. In addition, at this time his illness could not be considered as being in the last stage.

 

On 29 July 2010, the applicant's wife and her three children were granted residence permits for an indefinite period. The applicant died in June 2016.

 


ISSUES OF LAW

 


Preliminary question. After the applicant's death, his relatives expressed their desire to continue the proceedings. The Court notes that in the present case, important issues have been raised, especially concerning the interpretation of case-law on the expulsion of severely ill foreigners.

 

Thus, the significance of this case went beyond the specific situation of the applicant. Accordingly, special circumstances affecting the observance of human rights defined in the Convention and its Protocols required the European Court to continue its examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 37 § 1 of the Convention, in fine.

 

Concerning compliance with Article 3 of the Convention. In the case of N. v. The United Kingdom, the Court stated that, in addition to the situations referred to in the judgment of D. v. The United Kingdom (of 2 May 1997, complaint No. 30240/96 ), in which the death of the applicants is imminent, there are other very exceptional cases where humanitarian considerations that outweigh the expulsion are also binding. Consideration of the case-law following the case "N. v. United Kingdom" did not reveal such examples. The application of Article 3 of the Convention only in cases where the person facing expulsion is at death has deprived severely ill foreigners in less critical condition of the advantages of this provision.

 

The Grand Chamber of the European Court found in the present case that "the other very exceptional cases" that could give rise to the issue under Article 3 of the Convention should be understood as referring to situations involving the movement of a seriously ill person in which there were substantial grounds for believing that he , although not under the immediate threat of death, could be threatened by a lack of appropriate treatment in the host country or inadequate access to such treatment, a serious , Rapid and irreversible deterioration of the health condition is drawing intense suffering or significant reduction of life expectancy. These situations corresponded to the high threshold for the application of Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning the movement of foreigners suffering from a serious illness.

 

The applicants were required to provide evidence that there were substantial grounds for believing that, if the impugned measure had been implemented, they would have faced a real threat of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. If evidence is submitted, the authorities of the returning State in the context of domestic procedures should eliminate all doubts that arise. The assumed risk must be carefully monitored, during which the authorities of the returning State are obliged to consider the predictable consequences of the transfer of the person to the receiving State, taking into account the general situation and the personal circumstances of the individual.

 

The impact of the expulsion of a given person should be assessed by comparing his state of health prior to expulsion and how it will change after moving to the receiving state.

 

In each particular case, it is necessary to ascertain whether the care normally available in the receiving State is sufficient and appropriate in the treatment of the applicant's illness in order to prevent the possibility of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

 

The authorities also had to consider the limits in which this person really had access to proper care and opportunities in the host state.

 

If, after reviewing the relevant information, serious doubts remained about the impact of expulsion on these persons, the returning State should have received individual and sufficient assurances from the host State as a prerequisite for expulsion, that appropriate treatment would be available and possible for those individuals not to be in situation contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

 

The applicant suffered from a very serious illness, and his condition was life-threatening. However, his condition became stable as a result of treatment received in Belgium and aimed at allowing him to undergo a donor transplant. If the treatment provided to the applicant were terminated, his life expectancy based on the average would be less than six months.

 

Neither the treatment that the applicant received in Belgium nor the donor transplant were available in Georgia. With regard to other forms of leukemia treatment available in the latter country, there was no guarantee that the applicant would have access to them, due to shortcomings in the Georgian social insurance system.

 

The findings of the medical adviser of the Aliens Authority regarding the applicant's health status, based on the medical certificates provided to him, were not examined by the Aliens or Appeals Office for Aliens in the light of Article 3 of the Convention in the proceedings concerning the applicant's legalization on medical grounds.

 

Similarly, the applicant's medical condition was not examined in the context of the proceedings concerning his expulsion. The fact that this assessment could be carried out just before the expulsion measure did not remove these concerns in the absence of an indication of the limits of such an assessment and its impact on the mandatory nature of the expulsion order from the country.

 

Consequently, in the absence of an assessment by the domestic authorities of the risks faced by the applicant and the availability of appropriate treatment in Georgia, the information available to these authorities was insufficient to conclude that the applicant, if returned to Georgia, would not be exposed to a real and specific risk of treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention.

 


DECISION

 


The expulsion of the applicant would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (unanimously).

 

Concerning compliance with Article 8 of the Convention. It was not disputed that the applicant, his wife and children born in Belgium had a family life. Thus, the case was considered from the point of view of "family life" because of the positive obligations of the Belgian authorities.

 

Considering that the Belgian authorities did not consider the applicant's medical data and the effect of expulsion on his state of health in any proceedings, the Grand Chamber of the European Court concluded that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant was sent to Georgia without such an assessment .

 

Furthermore, the Belgian authorities did not properly consider, in accordance with article 8 of the Convention, the applicant's dependency on his family as a result of his deteriorating health status. In the context of the legalization proceedings on medical grounds, the Aliens Appeals Office indeed rejected the applicant's complaint under Article 8 of the Convention on the grounds that the decision to refuse stay was not accompanied by the adoption of measures for expulsion.

 

If the Belgian authorities eventually concluded that Article 3 of the Convention in the above interpretation was not an obstacle to the expulsion of the applicant to Georgia, the Belgian authorities should have further examined whether Article 8 of the Convention could be expected if it could reasonably be expected from the family, taking into account the particular situation of the applicant at the time of expulsion that she would follow him to Georgia, or, if not, whether the applicant's right to respect for his family life was required so that he was allowed to stay in Belgium for the rest of his life.

 

 

 

DECISION

 


The expulsion of the applicant would constitute a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (unanimously).

 


COMPENSATION

 


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The claim for compensation for pecuniary damage was rejected, establishing the fact of a violation of the Convention is sufficient fair compensation for non-pecuniary damage. See also the decision of the European Grand Chamber in the case of Saadi v. Italy of 28 February 2008, complaint No. 37201/06.

 

 

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/667-paposhvili-v-belgium .