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Новости от 20 сентября 2018 года из блога, посвященного практике в Европейском суде по правам человека ЕСПЧ

Обновлено 20.09.2018 14:21

 

ՄԻԵԴ-ի վճիռը 2016 թ. Հոկտեմբերի 27-ին Վարդանյան եւ Նանուշյան ընդդեմ Հայաստանի դեպքում (բողոք № 8001/07):

2007-ին դիմումատուներին աջակցել են բողոքի պատրաստման հարցում: Դիմումը հետագայում փոխանցվեց Հայաստան:

Դիմումատուն հաջողությամբ դիմել էր դատավորի բացատրությանը դիմումատուների բողոքը, որ կողմի համաձայնությունը համաձայնագիրն ընդունելու մերժումը կարող է բացասաբար անդրադառնալ գործի արդյունքների վրա: Գործը ներառում էր Մարդու իրավունքների եւ հիմնարար ազատությունների պաշտպանության մասին Կոնվենցիայի 6-րդ հոդվածի 1-ին մասի եւ Կոնվենցիայի թիվ 1 արձանագրության 1-ին հոդվածի պահանջների խախտում:

 

Գործի եզրակացությունները


Առաջին դիմումատուն բողոքել է, որ ինքը կամայականորեն զրկվել է իր տնից եւ հողից, եւ հետագայում նրան հերքել են արդար դատաքննությունը: Նա, մասնավորապես, դժգոհել է, որ դատավորներից մեկը ներգրավված է իր գործի անաչառ չի եղել, քանի որ նա փորձում էր ստիպել նրան ստորագրել ղարաբաղյան հակամարտության կարգավորման համաձայնագիրը, սպառնալով նրան բացասական հետեւանքների մերժման:


ՕՐԵՆՔԻ ՀԱՐՑԵՐԸ


Կոնվենցիայի 6-րդ հոդվածի 1-ին կետին համապատասխանության վերաբերյալ: Իրավական համակարգերում չեն Մասնակից պետությունները անսովոր հարցերի, ինչպես նաեւ կողմերի, որ եթե նրանք ցանկանում են հասնել փոխադարձ համաձայնութեան, եւ բացատրելով նրանց ընթացակարգային հետեւանքները, այս ակցիային: Սա ծառայում է դատավարական տնտեսության եւ արդարության պատշաճ իրականացման շահերին: Սակայն, հաշվի առնելով կարեւորությունը սկզբունքի դատական ​​անկողմնակալության, դատավորը պարտավոր է խնդրել, որ կողմերին պատրաստակամություն մտնում կարգավորման համաձայնագրի, պետք է զգույշ լինի եւ զերծ մնան այնպիսի արտահայտություններ, որոնք, երբ օբյեկտիվ գնահատական ​​արդարացնում է օրինական մտավախությունները, որ այս դատավորը անկողմնակալ չէ.

Ներկա գործով դատավորը հրավիրեց առաջին դիմողին `քննարկելու խաղաղ համաձայնության առաջարկը: Սակայն, արտահայտությունները օգտագործվում են դատավորի ընթացքում լսումների (նա ասել է, որ դատարանը մշտապես կարեւորել է այն փաստը, մերժման կողմերին ստորագրել ողջամիտ կարգավորման համաձայնագիր, եւ որ սա վերջին հնարավորությունն է քննարկել կարգավորումը հայտատուն) կարող ակնհայտորեն առաջացնել մի օրինական վախ, որ ձախողումը առաջին դիմումատուի որոշման կարգավորման համաձայնագրի ստորագրումը կարող է բացասական ազդեցություն ունենալ գործի քննության վրա, ըստ էության: Ըստ Եվրոպական դատարանի Արդարադատության դատավորի վարքագծի չէր տարբերվում պարտադիր բաց mindedness, որը պահանջվում է սկզբունքով դատական ​​չեզոքության եւ պատճառելով օբյեկտիվորեն հիմնավորված վախ, որ նա անկողմնակալ չէ.


ՈՐՈՇՈՒՄ


Կոնվենցիայի 6-րդ հոդվածի պահանջների խախտում (միաձայն) կատարվեց:

Դատարանը նաեւ միաձայն գտել է, որ եղել են խախտում է 6-րդ հոդվածի 1-Կոնվենցիայի սկզբունքների իրավական որոշակիության եւ հավասարության կողմերի, եւ որ եղել է խախտում րդ հոդվածի 1-ին Արձանագրության թիվ 1 Կոնվենցիայի:


ԸՆԹԱՑԱԿԱՐԳ


Կոնվենցիայի 41-րդ հոդվածի կիրառման մեջ: Հարցը պատրաստ չէ քննարկմանը:

 

Հրատարակման աղբյուրը. http://espchhelp.ru/blog/881-vardanyan-yev-nanushyan-ynddem-hayastani .

 

 

The ECHR judgment of 27 October 2016 in the case of Vardanyan and Nanushyan v. Armenia (application No. 8001/07).

In 2007, the applicants were assisted in preparing the application. The application was subsequently communicated to Armenia.

The complaint successfully considered the complaint of the applicants for an explanation of the judge that the party's refusal to accept the amicable agreement in the domestic proceedings could have a negative impact on the outcome of the case. The case involved violations of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE


The first applicant complained that he was arbitrarily deprived of his home and land and that subsequently he was denied a fair trial. He complained in particular that one of the judges involved in his case was not impartial, as he was trying to force him to sign the settlement agreement, threatening him with the negative consequences of the refusal.


ISSUES OF LAW


Concerning compliance with article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. In the legal systems of the participating States, it is not unusual for the parties to ask whether they want to conclude an amicable agreement and explain to them the procedural consequences of this action. This serves the interests of procedural economy and proper administration of justice. However, in view of the importance of the principle of judicial impartiality, judges who seek to conclude an amicable agreement with the parties should exercise caution and refrain from using expressions that, if objectively evaluated, justify legitimate fears that the judge has no impartiality.

In the present case, the judge invited the first applicant to consider the proposal for an amicable settlement. However, the expressions used by the judge at the time of the hearing (he said that the court always attached importance to the fact that the party refused to sign a reasonable settlement agreement and that this was the last opportunity for the complainant to discuss the settlement) clearly could legitimately fear that the first applicant's refusal to accept of the settlement agreement may have a negative impact on the consideration of his case on the merits. In the Court's opinion, the conduct of the judge was not distinguished by the necessary open-mindedness required by the principle of judicial neutrality, and caused an objectively justified fear that he did not have impartiality.


DECISION


The violation of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (unanimously) was committed.

The Court also unanimously found that there had been a violation of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the principles of legal certainty and equality of parties and that there had been a violation of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


COMPENSATION


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The question is not ready for consideration.

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/882-vardanyan-and-nanushyan-v-armenia .

 

 

Η απόφαση του ΕΔΔΑ της 27ης Οκτωβρίου 2016 στην υπόθεση Kanaginis κατά Ελλάδας (καταγγελία αριθ. 27662/09).

 

Το 2009, ο αιτών επικουρήθηκε κατά την προετοιμασία της καταγγελίας. Στη συνέχεια, η καταγγελία κοινοποιήθηκε στην Ελλάδα.

 

Στην προκειμένη περίπτωση, η καταγγελία του αιτούντος θεωρήθηκε με επιτυχία ότι το ποσό που έπρεπε να επιστρέψει για την επιστροφή της γης δεν ήταν εύλογα ανάλογο με το ποσό που έλαβε ως αποζημίωση για απαλλοτρίωση. Η υπόθεση αφορούσε παραβίαση των απαιτήσεων του άρθρου 1 του Πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 της Σύμβασης για την Προστασία των Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου και των Θεμελιωδών Ελευθεριών.

 

 

 

Επί της περιπτώσεως

 


Το 1976, το οικόπεδο που ανήκε στον αιτούντα απαλλοτριώθηκε. Ωστόσο, μετά από αίτηση του αιτούντος διέταξε η απαλλοτρίωση ακυρώθηκε από το Συμβούλιο Επικρατείας το 2002, όπως το σκοπό του δημοσίου συμφέροντος, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι η γη απαλλοτριώθηκε δεν έχει υλοποιηθεί. Ενώ ο αιτών έχει λάβει περίπου 23.000 ευρώ ως αποζημίωση για την απαλλοτρίωση, η κυβέρνηση διευκρίνισε ότι το ποσό σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 12 του Νόμου Ν 2882/2001, σύμφωνα με τον ετήσιο δείκτη των μέσων τιμών καταναλωτή, και του ζήτησε να επιστρέψει περίπου 602.000 ευρώ για τη γη του. Στη συνέχεια, ο αιτητής προσέφυγε στο Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας για το ζήτημα της ακύρωσης αυτής της απόφασης, αλλά η καταγγελία του ακυρώθηκε.

 

Ο αιτητής παραπονέθηκε ότι το ποσό που έπρεπε να αποζημιώσει για την επιστροφή της γης δεν είναι λογικά ανάλογη λάβει ως αποζημίωση για την απαλλοτρίωση. Επισημαίνει ότι επιβλήθηκε δυσανάλογο και υπερβολικό βάρος στο κράτος, το οποίο δεν μπορούσε να δικαιολογηθεί από γενικότερο λόγο γενικού συμφέροντος.

 


ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΥ

 


Όσον αφορά τη συμμόρφωση με το άρθρο 1 του Πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 της Σύμβασης. α) Εφαρμογή της καταγγελίας. Η ελληνική νομοθεσία επιτρέπει την κατάργηση της απαλλοτρίωσης, με την προϋπόθεση αποζημίωση για τον ιδιοκτήτη καταβάλλεται αποζημίωση, προσδιορίζοντας το ύψος και το Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας ανέτρεψε την αποτυχία των αρχών να ακυρώσετε την απαλλοτρίωση αφού διαπίστωσε ότι ο σκοπός της απαλλοτρίωσης είχε χαθεί. Κατά συνέπεια, ο προσφεύγων είχε σημαντικό συμφέρον που αναγνωρίστηκε σύμφωνα με το ελληνικό δίκαιο και προστατεύτηκε σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 του Πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 της Σύμβασης.

 

β) Επί της ουσίας. Επέμβαση στο δικαίωμα του προσφεύγοντος για σεβασμό της περιουσίας του είναι η ανικανότητα να επιστρέψει απαλλοτριωθεί γη μετά την κατάργηση της απόφασης απαλλοτρίωσης του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας με την αιτιολογία ότι δεν είχε πετύχει το στόχο της, λόγω της φερόμενης ως υπερβολική τιμή που έπρεπε να καταβάλει στο κράτος. Δεν αμφισβητείται ότι η παρέμβαση προβλεπόταν από το νόμο και ότι επιδιώκει θεμιτό σκοπό, δηλαδή για να εξασφαλιστεί ότι η εξαγορά της γης από τον αιτούντα δεν προκαλεί βλάβη στα οικονομικά συμφέροντα του κράτους.

 

Σύμφωνα με την απόφαση του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας ο αιτών έχει υποβάλει την κατάργηση της απαλλοτρίωσης της γης, ο ιδιοκτήτης της οποίας ήταν να του δώσει τουλάχιστον μια νόμιμη προσδοκία της επιστροφής της περιουσίας του. Ωστόσο, δεν θα μπορούσε να του επιτραπεί να ανακτήσει τη γη με τρόπο που θα έβλαπτε το δημόσιο συμφέρον. Έτσι, δεδομένου ότι η πλήρης καταβολή σ 'αυτόν, όταν τη γη του απαλλοτριώθηκε για το κράτος δεν ήταν παράλογο 30 χρόνια μετά, πληρώθηκε για να χρησιμοποιήσετε το εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο για να καθορίσετε το ποσό που έλαβε από αυτό. Formula επανυπολογισμό που προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 12 του Νόμου Ν 2882/2001, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της εξίσωσης, σύμφωνα με την οποία αποζημίωση για την απαλλοτρίωση, η οποία ελήφθη από τον ενδιαφερόμενο, πολλαπλασιάζεται επί τον λόγο του μέσου δείκτη τιμών καταναλωτή για το έτος για τη δημιουργία αποζημίωση για την επιστροφή του ακινήτου και για το έτος για να λάβει αποζημίωση για την απαλλοτρίωση.

 

Η εφαρμογή αυτού του τύπου έχει απελευθερωθεί από την αρμόδια αρχή να λάβει υπόψη άλλες αναλογεί πραγματικά αναγκαία στοιχεία για να εξασφαλιστεί η ορθή υπολογισμό του ποσού που πρέπει να επιστραφεί στο κράτος, όπως είναι η εμπορική αξία της γης στην περίοδο που σχετίζονται με τις περιστάσεις της υπόθεσης και την αξία των παρακείμενων εκτάσεων ή την άλλη στην ίδια περιοχή, η οποία είχαν απαλλοτριωθεί την εποχή εκείνη. Στην πραγματικότητα, σύμφωνα με το διάταγμα του τμήματος μείζονος συνθέσεως του Δικαστηρίου των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων «Gizo-Γαλλής κατά της Ιταλίας» (δίκαιη ικανοποίηση) (Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy) της Ευρωπαϊκής στις 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2009, η καταγγελία Ν 58858/00, αποζημίωση για την απαλλοτρίωση της οικοδομήσιμης γης πρέπει να συμμορφώνονται εμπορική αξία της γης. Για να εκτιμηθεί η αναλογικότητα μεταξύ του υπολογιστούν εκ νέου την αποζημίωση και την πραγματική αξία της περιουσίας του αιτούντος θα πρέπει να λαμβάνει υπόψη ελληνική τάσεις της αγοράς ακινήτων και για μια διάρκεια 17 ετών της διαδικασίας επιστροφής. Υπήρξε μια σημαντική διαφορά μεταξύ του ποσού που απαιτείται από το κράτος και της πραγματικής αξίας της γης που αναφέρεται στα υλικά που υποβλήθηκαν στο Δικαστήριο. Εν προκειμένω, η διαφορά αυτή δεν μπορεί να θεωρηθεί εύλογη.

 

Επιπλέον, σύμφωνα με τη νέα διατύπωση του άρθρου 12 του νόμου Ν 2882/2001 διοικητική αρχή ή από ανεξάρτητο εμπειρογνώμονα που έπρεπε να λάβει υπόψη διάφορους παράγοντες κατά την αξιολόγηση της αναλογεί αξία του ακινήτου, όπως η αξία των γειτονικών ή παρόμοιων γη και τα πιθανά έσοδα από την ανάπτυξη γης. Επιπλέον, σε περίπτωση διαφωνίας, το κράτος και το πρόσωπο για την οφειλόμενη αποζημίωση, τα αρμόδια δικαστήρια για την επίλυση της διαφοράς της απουσίας νομικής απαίτησης σχετικά με την εφαρμογή ορισμένων κριτηρίων, όπως ο μέσος ετήσιος δείκτης τιμών καταναλωτή.

 

Επιπλέον, εξακολουθούν να ισχύουν δύο διοικητικές αποφάσεις, σύμφωνα με τις οποίες η αρμόδια αρχή έχει καθορίσει το ποσό που πρέπει να καταβληθεί κατά την επιστροφή της γης. Οι αρχές έχουν απεριόριστη διακριτική ευχέρεια να υπολογίσει εκ νέου το ποσό της αποζημίωσης σε περίπτωση που ασκήθηκε εναντίον τους από τον αιτούντα πρόσθετες απαιτήσεις στο θέμα αυτό. Η τρέχουσα αξία της γης, υπολογιζόμενη από τη φορολογική αρχή, ήταν πολύ χαμηλότερη από εκείνη που καθορίστηκε σύμφωνα με τη διοικητική απόφαση. Ως εκ τούτου, είναι προφανές ότι ο αιτητής βρισκόταν σε αδιέξοδο λόγω της πραγματικής αδυναμίας επιστροφής της περιουσίας του.

 

Επιπλέον, το Συμβούλιο Δημόσιας Διοίκησης καθόρισε χωρίς να εξηγεί τους λόγους για τους οποίους δεν παραβιάστηκε το δικαίωμα του αιτούντος να σεβαστεί την περιουσία του. Επομένως, ο προσφεύγων δεν είχε καμία πραγματική ευκαιρία να αμφισβητήσει αποτελεσματικά τα μέτρα που παραβίασαν το δικαίωμά του που εγγυάται το άρθρο 1 του πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 στο δικαστήριο. Εν όψει των ανωτέρω, ο τύπος που χρησιμοποιείται στην περίπτωση του προσφεύγοντος για την περίοδο σχετικά με τις περιστάσεις της υπόθεσης, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 12 του Νόμου Ν 2882/2001 και το κίνητρο του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας με την απόφασή του παραβίασε τη δίκαιη ισορροπία που πρέπει να βρεθεί μεταξύ των απαιτήσεων του δημοσίου συμφέροντος και των επιταγών προστασία του δικαιώματος του αιτούντος να σεβαστεί την περιουσία του.

 


ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ

 


Η υπόθεση αφορούσε παραβίαση των απαιτήσεων του άρθρου 1 του Πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 (που εγκρίθηκε ομόφωνα).

 


ΑΠΟΖΗΜΙΩΣΗ

 


Κατά την εφαρμογή του άρθρου 41 της Σύμβασης. Η ερώτηση δεν είναι έτοιμη προς εξέταση.

 

 

 

Πηγή δημοσίευσης: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/883-kanaginis-kata-elladas .

 

 

 

 

 

The ECHR judgment of 27 October 2016 in the case of Kanaginis v. Greece (application No. 27662/09).

 

In 2009, the applicant was assisted in the preparation of the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Greece.

 

In the case, the applicant's complaint was successfully considered that the amount he had to reimburse for the return of the land was not reasonably proportional to that received as compensation for expropriation. The case involved a violation of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

 

 

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

 


In 1976, the land plot belonging to the applicant was expropriated. However, at the request of the applicant, the expropriation order was abolished by the State Council in 2002, since the public interest purpose, taking into account which the land was expropriated, was not realized. While the applicant received approximately 23,000 euros in compensation for expropriation, the authorities specified this amount in accordance with article 12 of Law No. 2882/2001 in accordance with the annual average consumer price index and offered him to reimburse about 602,000 euros for his land. Then the applicant appealed to the State Council on the question of the cancellation of this decision, but his complaint was canceled.

 

The applicant complained that the amount he had to reimburse for the return of the land was not reasonably proportional to that received as compensation for expropriation. He pointed out that a disproportionate and excessive burden was imposed on the state, which could not be justified by any general cause of public interest.

 


ISSUES OF LAW

 


Concerning compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. (a) Applicability of the complaint. Greek law allowed the abolition of expropriation provided that the landlord compensated the compensation paid with the amount specified, and the State Council abolished the authorities' refusal to abolish expropriation after establishing that the purpose of expropriation had been lost. Consequently, the applicant had material interest which was recognized under Greek law and protected in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

 

(b) Merits. The interference with the applicant's right to respect for his property consisted in the impossibility of returning the expropriated land after the expropriation had been canceled by the decision of the State Council on the grounds that it had not achieved its goal because of the allegedly excessive price that he had to pay to the State. It was not disputed that the interference was prescribed by law and that it pursued a legitimate aim, namely ensuring that the applicant's redemption of the land did not damage the financial interests of the state.

 

According to the decision of the State Council, the applicant obtained the cancellation of the expropriation of the land he owned, which gave him, at least, a legitimate expectation of the return of his property. However, he could not be allowed to regain land in a manner detrimental to public interest. Thus, since he was paid full compensation, when his land was expropriated, it was not unreasonable for the state 30 years later to use the applicable law to clarify the amount he had received. The recalculation formula provided for in Article 12 of Law No. 2882/2001 included the equation according to which the compensation for expropriation received by the interested person was multiplied by the ratio of the average annual consumer price index for the year of establishing compensation for the return of property and for the year of receiving compensation for expropriation.

 

The application of this formula has exempted the competent authority from accounting for other relevant, really necessary factors to ensure proper calculation of the amount to be reimbursed to the state, such as the commercial value of land in the period relevant to the circumstances of the case and the value of neighboring land plots or others in the same area that were expropriated at the time. In fact, according to the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court in the case of Guizo-Gallisay v. Italy (Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy) of 22 December 2009, complaint No. 58858/00, compensation for the expropriation of the construction land must be in accordance with commercial value of land. In order to assess the proportionality between the re-calculated compensation and the real value of the applicant's property, it is necessary to take into account the tendencies of the Greek real estate market and the approximately 17-year duration of the return procedure. There was a significant difference between the amount required by the state and the real value of the land indicated in the materials submitted to the Court. In the present case, this difference could not be considered reasonable.

 

In addition, according to the new wording of article 12 of Law No. 2882/2001, the administrative authority or the independent expert had to take into account several relevant factors in assessing the value of the property, such as the value of adjacent or similar land plots and the potential income from land development. In addition, in case of disagreement between the state and the person about the compensation due, the competent courts could settle the dispute in the absence of a legislative requirement to apply criteria such as the annual average consumer price index.

 

In addition, two administrative decisions, according to which the competent authority has determined the amount to be paid upon return of land, are still in effect. The authorities had unlimited discretion in the recalculation of the compensation to be paid in the event that the applicant presented additional claims on this matter. The current value of land, calculated by the tax authority, was much lower than that established in accordance with the administrative decision. Accordingly, it is obvious that the applicant was in a deadlock situation of the actual impossibility of returning his property.

 

In addition, the State Council established without explaining the reasons that the applicant's right to respect for his property was not violated. Thus, the applicant had no real opportunity to effectively challenge measures that violated his right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the court. In view of the foregoing considerations, the formula used in the applicant's case during the period relevant to the circumstances of the case in accordance with article 12 of Law No. 2882/2001 and the reasoning of the Council of State in its decision violated the fair balance that had to be established between the requirements of public interest and imperatives protection of the applicant's right to respect for his property.

 


DECISION

 


The case involved a violation of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (unanimously adopted).

 


COMPENSATION

 


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The question is not ready for consideration.

 

 

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/884-kanaginis-v-greece .

 

 

Presuda Europskog suda od 20. listopada 2016. godine u predmetu Mursic v. Croatia (zahtjeva br. 7334/13).

 

Tijekom 2013. godine, podnositelj zahtjeva je pomagao u pripremi zahtjeve. Nakon toga, zahtjeva je priopćen Hrvatskoj.

 

U tom je slučaju uspješno razmatran prigovor podnositelja zahtjeva o nedostatku osobnog prostora u zatvorskoj ćeliji. Slučaj je uključivao kršenje zahtjeva članka 3. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda u odnosu na razdoblje kada je podnositelj zahtjeva imao manje od 3 četvorna metra. m osobnog prostora, u pogledu preostalih neusporedivih razdoblja, nisu prekršeni zahtjevi članka 3. Konvencije.

 

 

 

OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA

 


U svojoj tužbi Europskom sudu podnositelj zahtjeva žalio na nedostatak osobnog prostora u zatvoru, što je povremeno nije dosegla Q3. m.

 

U svojoj Rezoluciji od 12. ožujka 2015. godine u Europskom vijeću Suda, sa šest glasova „za” jedan - „protiv”, odlučio sam da je u slučaju iz članka 3. Konvencije nisu bila povrijeđena. Konkretno, istaknuo je da su uvjeti podnositelja zahtjeva u pritvoru, iako ne uvijek adekvatna, nije do težini prag potreban za karakterizaciju tretman kao neljudski ili ponižavajući u smislu članka 3. Konvencije.

 

Dana 7. srpnja 2015., na zahtjev podnositelja zahtjeva, predmet je prebačen na veliko vijeće Europskog suda.

 


PITANJA PRAVA

 


Što se tiče poštivanja članka 3. Konvencije. Ocjena Suda da li je došlo do povrede članka 3. Konvencije, ne može se svesti na obračun kvadrata na raspolaganju zatvorenika. Ovaj pristup zanemaruje činjenicu da praktički samo sveobuhvatan pristup specifičnim uvjetima u pritvoru može dati točnu sliku o stvarnom životu zatvorenika.

 

Međutim, ako osobni prostor na raspolaganju zatvoreniku ne doseže 3 kvadratna km. m površine u pretrpanim zatvorskih ćelija, nedostatak osobnog prostora smatra se tako žestoko da postoji jaka pretpostavka povrede članka 3. Konvencije.

 

Teret dokaza o tužene države, što bi moglo opovrgnuti pretpostavku dokazujući da postoje faktori koji može adekvatno nadoknaditi nedostatak osobnog prostora. Ozbiljni poremećaji pretpostavka može obično biti odbijen samo ako sve sljedeće čimbenike: smanjenje minimalno potrebnih osobni prostor u Q3. m je kratak, casual i beznačajno, to smanjenje je u pratnji dovoljan slobodu kretanja izvan komore i odgovarajuće aktivnosti izvan svojih ćelija, podnositelj zahtjeva je održan u mjestu koje od općeg stajališta je prikladno mjesto pritvora, i nema drugih otežavajuće aspekti uvjetima pritvora.

 

U slučajevima kada je riječ o osobnom prostoru zatvorske ćelije od 3-4 četvornih metara. m po zatvoreniku, prostor je ostao važan čimbenik za procjenu primjerenosti uvjeta pritvora od strane Europskog suda.

 

U takvim slučajevima, do povrede članka 3. zahtjevima Konvencije utvrđuju, ako je faktor koji imaju osobni prostor je složen po drugim aspektima neprikladnih fizičkih uvjeta pritvora, a osobito pristup do šetnje, prirodno osvjetljenje i provjetravanje, dostupnost ventilacije, adekvatne sobnoj temperaturi, mogućnost privatnost prilikom korištenja WC i poštivanje osnovnih zahtjeva za higijenskim i sanitarnim uvjetima.

 

U slučajevima gdje je zatvorenik imao više od 4 četvornih metara. metara osobnog prostora u zatvoru više stanica, i tako je pitanje osobnog prostora ne dolazi, procijeniti primjerenost uvjeta suda pritvor podnositelja zahtjeva imao vrijednost druge aspekte fizičkih uvjeta pritvora.

 

Podnositelj zahtjeva ponekad je držao u stanicama koje nisu dostigle površinu od 3 m². m, stoga postoji ozbiljna pretpostavka o kršenju zahtjeva članka 3. Konvencije.

 

Što se tiče jednog takvog slučaja koji traje 27 dana, pretpostavka povrede nije mogla biti dovedena u pitanje. Uvjeti pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva u tom razdoblju bila njegova patnja, nadilaze neizbježnu razinu trpljenja inherentnu lišenju slobode, i zato je žalba, ponižavajuće postupanje zabranjeno člankom 3. Konvencije. Što se tiče preostalih razdoblja, kada je podnositelj zahtjeva imao manje od 3 četvorna metra. m osobnog prostora, tužena država je odbila postojanje ozbiljne pretpostavke o kršenju. Podnositelj uglavnom čuvaju u odgovarajućim uvjetima, nedosljedne razdoblja može se smatrati kratkim i blagim padom osobnog prostora, a za to vrijeme je imao na raspolaganju dovoljno slobode kretanja i aktivnosti izvan stanice, dakle, odlučeno je da se takva razdoblja ne iznosi ponižavajućeg postupanja zabranjenog Članak 3. Konvencije.

 

Uvjeti pritvora podnositelja zahtjeva tijekom razdoblja kada je imao površinu od 3 do 4 kvadratna metra. m osobnog prostora, ne predstavljaju nečovječno ili ponižavajuće postupanje.

 


ODLUKA

 


U slučaju povrede članka 3. Konvencije, koja se odnosi na razdoblje od 26 dana, podnositelj zahtjeva je manje od 3 kvadrata. m osobni prostor (jednoglasno) u odnosu na ostale ne-uzastopnih razdoblja u kojima je podnositelj je manje od 3 kV. metara osobnog prostora zahtjevima članka 3. Konvencije nisu bila povrijeđena (usvojen od 10 glasova „za” sedam - „protiv”), u slučaju povrijeđeno nisu bili zahtjevi iz članka 3. Konvencije u odnosu na razdoblje tijekom kojeg je podnositelj zahtjeva je u veličini od 3 do 4 metara kvadratnih. m osobnog prostora (uzeto za 13 glasova "za" s četiri - "protiv").

 


NAKNADA

 

 

 

U primjeni članka 41. Konvencije. Sud je podnositelju zahtjeva nagrađivao 1.000 EUR na ime nematerijalne štete.

 

Vidi također Ananyev i ostali protiv Rusije, presuda od 10. siječnja 2012., zahtjeve N 42525/07 i 60800/08.

 

 

 

Izvor publikacije: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/885-mursic-protiv-hrvatske .

 

 

 

 

 

The ECHR judgment of 20 October 2016 in the case of Mursic v. Croatia (application No. 7334/13).

 

In 2013, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Croatia.

 

In the case, the applicant's complaint on the lack of personal space in the prison cell was successfully considered. The case involved a violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with respect to the period when the applicant had less than 3 square meters. m of personal space, in respect of the remaining non-consecutive periods, the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention have not been violated.

 

 

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

 


In his application to the European Court, the applicant complained about the lack of personal space in the prison, which did not periodically reach 3 square meters. m.

 

In the judgment of 12 March 2015 the Chamber of the European Court decided, by six votes in favor, "against", that the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were not violated in the case. In particular, she stated that the conditions of the applicant's detention, although not always adequate, did not reach the threshold of severity required to characterize treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

 

On July 7, 2015, at the applicant's request, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the European Court for review.

 


ISSUES OF LAW

 


Concerning compliance with Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of the European Court whether there was a violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention can not be reduced to the calculation of the square meters that the prisoner has. This approach does not take into account the fact that practically only a comprehensive approach to specific conditions of detention can provide an accurate picture of the real life of prisoners.

 

However, if the personal space available to the prisoner does not reach 3 sq. Km. m of floor space in crowded prison cells, the lack of personal space is considered to be so severe that a strong presumption of violation of Article 3 of the Convention arises.

 

The burden of proof was placed on the respondent State, which could refute this presumption, proving that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the lack of personal space. A serious presumption of a violation can usually be refuted only if there are a combination of the following factors: a reduction in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. Km. m was brief, incidental and insignificant, these reductions were accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate activities outside the cells, the applicant was detained in a place that from the general point of view was an appropriate place of detention and there were no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his detention.

 

In cases where it was a question of the personal space of the prison cell of 3-4 square meters. m per prisoner, the space remained an important factor for assessing the adequacy of the conditions of detention by the European Court.

 

In such cases, the violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention was established if the factor of the presence of personal space was aggravated by other aspects of inadequate physical conditions of detention, in particular, access to walks, natural lighting or ventilation, accessibility of ventilation, adequacy of the temperature in the room, the possibility of privacy when using the toilet and compliance with basic sanitation and hygiene requirements.

 

In cases where the prisoner had more than 4 square meters. m of personal space in the prison's multi-prison cell, and therefore the issue of personal space did not arise, other aspects of the physical conditions of detention mattered for the assessment by the Court of the adequacy of the applicant's detention conditions.

 

The applicant was sometimes held in cells that did not reach the 3 sq. m, therefore there was a serious presumption of violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.

 

As for one such case lasting 27 days, the presumption of the violation could not be called into question. The conditions of the applicant's detention at that time affected him beyond the inevitable level of suffering inherent in detention and were therefore an appeal constituting degrading treatment prohibited by article 3 of the Convention. As for the remaining periods, when the applicant had less than 3 square meters. m of personal space, the respondent State denied the existence of a serious presumption of violation. The applicant was generally held in appropriate circumstances, inconsistent periods could be regarded as brief and insignificant reductions in personal space during which he had sufficient freedom of movement and activities outside the cell, and the Court therefore decided that the periods in question were not degrading treatment prohibited Article 3 of the Convention.

 

The conditions of detention of the applicant during the period when he had an area of ​​3 to 4 square meters. m of personal space, did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment.

 


DECISION

 


The case involved a violation of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, as for the period of 26 days when the applicant had less than 3 square meters. (unanimously), in respect of the remaining non-consecutive periods in which the applicant had less than 3 square meters of personal space. m of the personal space, the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were not violated (taken by 10 votes in favor at seven against), the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were not violated in the case, as regards the periods in which the applicant had an area of ​​3 to 4 square meters. m of personal space (taken by 13 votes "for" with four - "against").

 


COMPENSATION

 

 

 

In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

 

See also Ananyev and Others v. Russia, judgment of 10 January 2012, applications N 42525/07 and 60800/08.

 

 

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/886-mursic-v-croatia .