Новости от 17 июля 2018 года из блога, посвященного практике в Европейском суде по правам человека ЕСПЧ
Постанова ЄСПЛ від 25 липня 2017 року по справі "Ростовцев (Rostovtsev) проти України" (заява N 2728/16).
У 2016 році заявнику була надана допомога в підготовці заяви. Згодом заява була комунікувати Україні.
У справі успішно розглянута скарга заявника на неможливість перегляду обвинувального вироку в зв'язку з непередбачуваним застосуванням правил кримінального процесу. У справі допущено порушення вимог статті 2 Протоколу N 7 до Конвенції про захист прав людини і основних свобод.
ОБСТАВИНИ СПРАВИ
Заявник, який не користувався послугами адвоката в ході судового розгляду, був засуджений за незаконне придбання та зберігання наркотичних засобів, злочин, передбачений частиною 2 статті 309 Кримінального кодексу, і був засуджений до позбавлення волі. Він намагався оскаржити вирок на тій підставі, що йому слід було висунути обвинувачення в менш тяжкому злочині, "порушення встановлених правил обігу наркотичних засобів, психотропних речовин, їх аналогів або прекурсорів", передбаченому статтею 320 Кримінального кодексу. Однак йому було відмовлено в праві оскарження, коли апеляційний суд зазначив, що, оскільки заявник визнав обставини вчинення злочину в суді, відповідно до частини 2 статті 394 Кримінально-процесуального кодексу він не міг оскаржити вирок.
У конвенційного розгляді заявник стверджував, посилаючись на статтю 2 Протоколу N 7 до Конвенції, на те, що він був позбавлений права оскарження і, зокрема, оскарження правової кваліфікації дій, у скоєнні яких він зізнався.
ПИТАННЯ ПРАВА
З приводу дотримання статті 2 Протоколу N 7 до Конвенції. Не було оскаржено, що в принципі заявник мав право на перегляд справи за його скаргою і що він не міг це зробити, оскільки визнав обставини, на яких грунтувалося обвинувачення проти, таким чином, погодився на спрощену форму розгляду. Однак, хоча визнання заявника могло становити відмову від деяких його процесуальних прав, також не було оскаржено, що будь-який подібний відмова не охоплював право на оскарження з причин правової кваліфікації його дій. Саме такими і були підстави його скарги. Відповідно, не можна стверджувати, що заявник відмовився від свого права на оскарження. Частина друга статті 394 Кримінально-процесуального кодексу передбачає: "Судове рішення суду першої інстанції не може бути оскаржене в апеляційному порядку з підстав заперечення обставин, які ніким не оспорювалися в ході судового розгляду і дослідження яких були визнані судом недоцільними відповідно до положень частини третьої статті 349 цього Кодексу ".
Апеляційний суд прямо послався на правову кваліфікацію дій заявника як на одну з підстав, за якими рішення не підлягало оскарженню, і його висновки були схвалені Вищим спеціалізованим судом з розгляду цивільних і кримінальних справ (далі - HSC). Однак ця позиція прямо суперечила тлумаченню владою держави-відповідача застосовних внутрішньодержавних правових норм і прецедентну практику HSC, процитованої владою України, згідно з якою поняття "обставини", використане в відповідному внутрішньодержавному розгляді, поширювалося тільки на фактичні обставини справи і не включало їх кримінально-правову кваліфікацію . Крім того, сам HSC з посиланням на справжню скаргу, що знаходиться на розгляді Європейського Суду, нагадав в циркулярному листі нижчестоящим судам, що визнання фактичних обставин в суді не позбавляє підсудного права оскаржити вирок з причин неправильного застосування матеріального права. Отже, не можна було стверджувати, що заявник повинен був передбачити, що, визнаючи факти, встановлені судом в ході розгляду, він відмовляється від можливості оскарження свого обвинувального вироку, якщо він вважав правову кваліфікацію його дій неправильною.
Відповідно, тлумачення відповідних внутрішньодержавних правових норм, прийняте судами країни в справі заявника, не було "передбачуваним", і, приймаючи його, суди України порушили саму суть його права на оскарження.
ПОСТАНОВА
У справі допущено порушення вимог статті 2 Протоколу N 7 до Конвенції (прийнято одноголосно).
КОМПЕНСАЦІЯ
В порядку застосування статті 41 Конвенції. Встановлення факту порушення було б достатньою справедливою компенсацією моральної шкоди, поновлення розгляду в принципі становило б найбільш доцільну форму відшкодування, доступну в законодавстві України.
Джерело публікації: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/391-rostovtsev-proti-ukraiini .
The ECHR judgment of 25 July 2017 in the case of Rostovtsev v. Ukraine (application No. 2728/16).
In 2016, the applicant was assisted in the preparation of the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Ukraine. The applicant successfully complained of the impossibility of reviewing the conviction in connection with the unpredictable application of the rules of the criminal process. The case involved violation of the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant, who did not use the services of a lawyer during the trial, was convicted of illegal acquisition and possession of narcotic drugs, the crime provided for in Part 2 of Article 309 of the Penal Code, and was sentenced to imprisonment. He tried to appeal the verdict on the grounds that he should have been charged with a less serious crime, "violation of established rules for the circulation of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, their analogues or precursors", stipulated in Article 320 of the Criminal Code. However, he was denied the right to appeal, when the Court of Appeal noted that, since the applicant recognized the circumstances of the commission of the crime in court, pursuant to part 2 of article 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he could not appeal the verdict.
In the conventional proceedings, the applicant claimed, referring to Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, that he was deprived of the right of appeal and, in particular, challenging the legal qualifications of the acts committed by him.
ISSUES OF LAW
Concerning compliance with Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. It was not contested that, in principle, the applicant had the right to review the case on his complaint and that he could not do so, because he recognized the circumstances on which the charge was based, thus he agreed to a simplified form of the proceedings. However, although the applicant's confession could amount to the waiver of some of his procedural rights, it was also not disputed that any such refusal did not cover the right to appeal for reasons of the legal qualifications of his actions. That was the reason for his complaint. Accordingly, it can not be asserted that the applicant renounced his right to appeal. The second part of Article 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "The court decision of the court of first instance can not be appealed on appeal on the grounds of objection to circumstances that were not challenged by anyone during the trial and whose investigations were declared inadmissible by the court in accordance with the provisions of part three of Article 349 of this Code. "
The Court of Appeal directly referred to the legal qualification of the applicant's actions as one of the grounds on which the decision was not subject to appeal, and his conclusions were approved by the Higher Specialized Court for the Review of Civil and Criminal Cases (hereinafter referred to as HSC). However, this position directly contradicted the interpretation by the respondent State authorities of the applicable domestic legal norms and the HSC case-law, cited by the Ukrainian authorities, according to which the concept of "circumstances" used in the relevant domestic proceedings only extended to the actual circumstances of the case and did not include their criminal legal qualifications . In addition, the HSC himself, referring to this complaint pending before the European Court, recalled in a circular letter to lower courts that the recognition of factual circumstances in the court does not deprive the defendant of the right to appeal the sentence for reasons of improper application of substantive law. Consequently, it could not be argued that the applicant should have foreseen that, in acknowledging the facts established by the court during the proceedings, he refused to appeal his conviction if he considered the legal qualification of his actions incorrect.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the relevant domestic legal norms adopted by the country's courts in the applicant's case was not "predictable", and by accepting it, the courts of Ukraine violated the very essence of his right to appeal.
DECISION
In the case there was a violation of the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention (unanimously adopted).
COMPENSATION
In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. Establishing the fact of the violation would be sufficient just compensation for moral harm, the resumption of proceedings in principle would constitute the most expedient form of compensation available in the legislation of Ukraine.
Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/392-rostovtsev-v-ukraine .
Het EHRM-arrest van 25 juli 2017 in de zaak "M. (M.) tegen Nederland" (verzoekschrift nr. 2156/10).
In 2010 werd de aanvrager geassisteerd bij het voorbereiden van de verzoekschrift. De verzoekschrift is vervolgens gecommuniceerd naar Nederland. In het geval werd de klacht van de aanvrager over beperkingen op de openbaarmaking van vertrouwelijke informatie aan zijn raadsman met succes overwogen. Er is sprake van schending van artikel 6 van het Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden.
OMSTANDIGHEDEN VAN DE ZAAK
Verzoeker, een voormalig audio-editor en vertaler van de Algemene Inlichtingendienst en de veiligheid van Nederland (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, etc. - AIVD), werd veroordeeld voor het onthullen van staatsgeheimen. Pogingen om in beroep te gaan tegen het vonnis mislukten. Het Europees Hof voor de aanvrager, met name betoogd dat de strafzaak tegen hem in strijd met paragraaf 1 en alinea's "b" - "d" van paragraaf 3 van artikel 6 van het Verdrag, omdat de AIVD uitgevoerd, de belangrijkste controle over het bewijsmateriaal, waardoor de toegang beperken, en toegang tot de nationale rechter op de informatie in de documenten en het toezicht houden op het gebruik ervan, waardoor hij niet in overleg met de verdediger kan treden en niet effectief kan getuigen.
RECHTSSTUKKEN
Met betrekking tot de naleving van lid 1 en subparagraaf "b" van lid 3 van artikel 6 van het verdrag. De indiener van het verzoek trachtte de bevindingen van het interne onderzoek van de AIVD en de gecensureerde delen van de AIVD-documenten in het dossier bekend te maken.
(a) Intern onderzoek van de AIVD. De rechtbanken van Nederland hebben niet vastgesteld dat enige conclusie echt bestond. Het Europese Hof erkende dat de vervolging niet over een dergelijk document beschikte en dat het daarom niet aan de zaak kon worden gehecht. Voor zover verzoekster wilde aangeven dat het onderzoek de vrijspraak had kunnen verhullen, wees het Hof deze aanname af als zuiver hypothetisch.
(b) Openbaarmaking van documenten in gecensureerde vorm. De doorgestreepte informatie op zichzelf kan niet van nut zijn voor bescherming. Aangezien verzoekster ervan werd beschuldigd dat zij geheimen had onthuld aan personen die niet het recht hadden om met haar kennis te maken, was het enige probleem of deze documenten een staatsgeheim waren? Het bewijsmateriaal op basis waarvan de aanvrager werd veroordeeld, omvatte AIVD-materiaal waaruit bleek dat deze documenten staatsgeheimen vertegenwoordigden en de noodzaak uitlegden om deze te bewaren. De Nederlandse officier van justitie voor het bestrijden van terrorisme bevestigde dat het materiaal in de strafzaak in feite kopieën was van de documenten die hadden moeten worden ingediend en dat verzoekster het niet had betwist.
De resterende beschikbare informatie volstond om de autoriteiten van de respondentstaat te beschermen en maakte het mogelijk een betrouwbare beoordeling te maken van de aard van de informatie in de documenten.
BESLUIT
De vereisten van artikel 6 van het Verdrag werden niet geschonden (unaniem).
Met betrekking tot de naleving van lid 1 en subparagraaf "c" van lid 3 van artikel 6 van het verdrag. Het Europese Hof stond bepaalde beperkingen toe op de contacten van de advocaat en de cliënt in geval van terrorisme en georganiseerde misdaad. Niettemin kan de fundamentele regel van eerbiediging van de vertrouwelijkheid van advocaat-cliëntrelaties worden afgeleid in uitzonderlijke omstandigheden en op voorwaarde dat er voldoende en voldoende waarborgen tegen misbruik zijn. De procedure waarmee de vervolgende partij probeert het belang van verborgen informatie voor bescherming te beoordelen en deze te vergelijken met openbare belangen bij het bewaren van gevoelige informatie, kan niet voldoen aan de vereisten van artikel 6, § 1 van het Verdrag.
Aan verzoeker werd geen toegang tot het bewijs van de vervolging ontzegd: hem werd bevolen zijn raadsman niet te onthullen voor feitelijke informatie voor gebruik bij zijn verdediging. Er was geen inbreuk op de vertrouwelijkheid van verzoekers relatie met zijn advocaat. Bovendien was er geen onafhankelijk toezicht op de informatie die werd overgedragen tussen de aanvrager en zijn raadsman en werd de aanvrager met intimidatie bedreigd in het geval van overdracht van gerubriceerde informatie aan de raadsman. Het is belangrijk dat de communicatie tussen de aanvrager en zijn raadsman niet vrij en onbeperkt inhoudelijk is, zoals meestal wordt aangenomen door de vereisten van een eerlijk proces. Het Hof heeft erkend dat in het algemeen in de procedure geheim regels werden toegepast en dat er geen fundamentele redenen voor hun niet-gebruik in het geval van de vervolging van de Geheime Dienst voor misdrijven die verband houden met hun service. Het Europese Hof moest onderzoeken hoe het verbod op de verspreiding van gerubriceerde informatie van invloed was op de rechten van de verdachte die beschermd moet worden in verband met zijn contacten met zijn advocaten en met betrekking tot het proces. De advocaat-generaal had een verplichting van de aanvrager niet te vervolgen wegens schending van de geheimhoudingsplicht, indien een dergelijke inbreuk gerechtvaardigd door de bescherming van de door artikel 6 van het Verdrag van de rechten.
Het voorgaande is in handen van de aanvrager, bij het ontbreken van raadpleging van een advocaat, de last van de beslissing, of de feiten is nog niet bekendgemaakt in de materialen van de zaak te melden, en terwijl hij verdere vervolging riskeerde, zoals de advocaat-generaal onderhouden volledige zeggenschap over de kwestie. Het Hof oordeelde dat de verdachte van een ernstige zaak niet in de afwezigheid van professioneel advies vergelijken van de voordelen van de volledige openbaarmaking van de zaak naar zijn advocaat te verwachten op voorwaarde dat de dreiging van vervolging voor het. In dergelijke omstandigheden werd de eerlijkheid van de procedure onherroepelijk verminderd door inmenging in de communicatie tussen de aanvrager en zijn raadsman.
BESLUIT
De schending van de vereisten van artikel 6 van het Verdrag (unaniem) is gepleegd.
Betreffende de naleving van lid 1 en alinea "d" van lid 3 van artikel 6 van het verdrag. De verdediging werd de mogelijkheid van een kruisverhoor van de getuigen van vervolging niet ontzegd om de getuigenis die zij eerder tijdens de procedure hadden gegeven, te verifiëren. De aanvrager kreeg geen toegang tot informatie die beschikbaar was voor medewerkers van de AIVD en die zijn schuldgevoelens in twijfel kon trekken.
Een volkomen legitieme strategie voor de verdediging van strafzaken is om twijfel te zaaien over het onderwerp van het misdrijf door te bewijzen dat het misdrijf door iemand anders had kunnen worden gepleegd. Ze heeft de verdachte echter niet het recht gegeven om informatieclaims in te dienen in de hoop dat er een alternatieve verklaring zou kunnen verschijnen. De gegevens op basis waarvan de nationale rechters de veroordeling hebben uitgesproken, omvatten de gegevens die verzoekster rechtstreeks hebben gekoppeld aan het lekken van documenten en aan onbevoegde ontvangers van wie zij zijn gevonden. Onder dergelijke omstandigheden kan niet worden gesteld dat nationale rechtbanken onredelijk of willekeurig hebben gehandeld, zonder dat verzoeker getuigen mocht oproepen of geloofde dat zijn verweer wezenlijk werd geschonden door de omstandigheden waaronder de niet-veroordeelde getuigen werden ondervraagd.
BESLUIT
De vereisten van artikel 6 van het Verdrag werden niet geschonden (unaniem).
COMPENSATIE
Bij de toepassing van artikel 41 van het verdrag. Als er een claim van een aanvrager is, zal een nieuwe rechtszaak of de hervatting van binnenlandse procedures een adequate schadevergoeding zijn, de vaststelling van een overtreding vormde een voldoende billijke vergoeding voor niet-geldelijke schade.
Bron van publicatie: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/393-m-tegen-nederland .
The ECHR judgment of 25 July 2017 in the case "M. (M.) v. The Netherlands" (application no. 2156/10).
In 2010, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. The application was subsequently communicated to the Netherlands. In the case, the applicant's complaint on restrictions on the disclosure of confidential information to his defense counsel was successfully considered. There has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant, former audio editor and translator of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, further - AIVD), was convicted of divulging state secrets. Attempts to appeal the verdict failed. In the Court, in particular, the applicant argued that the criminal proceedings against him violated article 6, paragraph 1 (b) and (d), of the Convention, since AIVD carried out the main control over the evidence, thereby limiting its access and access to the courts of the country to the information contained in the documents, and monitoring its use, preventing him from consulting with the defender and effectively giving evidence.
ISSUES OF LAW
Concerning compliance with paragraph 1 and subparagraph "b" of paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant sought to disclose the findings of the internal investigation of the AIVD and the censored parts of the AIVD documents contained in the case file.
(a) Internal investigation of AIVD. The courts of the Netherlands did not find it established that any conclusion really existed. The European Court recognized that the prosecution did not have such a document and that, accordingly, it could not be attached to the case. As far as the applicant wished to indicate that the investigation could have hidden the acquittal, the Court dismissed this assumption as purely hypothetical.
(b) Disclosure of documents in censored form. The crossed out information in itself could not be of use for protection. Since the applicant was accused of disclosing state secrets to persons who did not have the right to get acquainted with her, the only issue was whether these documents were a state secret? The evidence on the basis of which the applicant was convicted included AIVD materials indicating that these documents represented state secrets and explaining the need to preserve it. The Dutch prosecutor for countering terrorism confirmed that the materials contained in the criminal case were in fact copies of the documents that should have been submitted and that the applicant had not disputed it.
The remaining available information was sufficient to protect the authorities of the respondent State and made it possible to make a reliable assessment of the nature of the information in the documents.
DECISION
The requirements of Article 6 of the Convention were not violated (unanimously).
Concerning compliance with paragraph 1 and subparagraph "c" of paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Convention. The European Court allowed certain restrictions placed on the contacts of the lawyer and the client in cases of terrorism and organized crime. Nevertheless, the fundamental rule of respect for the confidentiality of attorney-client relationships can be derived in exceptional circumstances and on the condition that there are adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse. The procedure by which the prosecution party tries to assess the importance of hidden information for protection and compare it with public interest in preserving sensitive information can not meet the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The applicant was not denied access to the evidence of the prosecution: he was ordered not to disclose to his counsel for factual information for use in his defense. There was no interference with the confidentiality of the applicant's relationship with his lawyer. In addition, there was no independent monitoring of information transmitted between the applicant and his counsel and the applicant was threatened with harassment in the event of the transfer of classified information to the defense counsel. It is important that the communication between the applicant and his counsel was not free and unlimited in content, as is usually assumed by the requirements of a fair trial. The European Court recognized that in general the rules of secrecy were applied in the proceedings and that there were no principal reasons for their non-application in case of harassment of members of the secret service for crimes related to their service. The European Court was required to consider how the prohibition of the dissemination of classified information affected the rights of the suspect to be protected in connection with his contacts with his lawyers and in relation to the trial. The General Counsel had an obligation not to prosecute the applicant for breach of the duty of secrecy, if such a violation was justified by the protection rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.
The abovementioned imparted to the applicant, in the absence of a lawyer's advice, the burden of deciding whether to report facts not yet disclosed in the case file, and at the same time risking further prosecution, since the general counsel retained full discretion in this regard. The Court decided that the accused in a serious case could not be expected, in the absence of professional advice, to compare the advantages of fully disclosing the case to his lawyer, provided there was a threat of prosecution for it. In such circumstances, the fairness of the proceedings was irretrievably diminished by interference in the communication between the applicant and his counsel.
DECISION
The violation of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (unanimously) was committed.
Concerning compliance with paragraph 1 and subparagraph "d" of paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Convention. The defense was not denied the possibility of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses in order to verify the testimony they had given earlier during the proceedings. The applicant was denied access to information that was available to AIVD employees and which could cast doubt on his guilt.
A completely legitimate strategy for the defense of criminal cases is to create doubts in the subject of the crime by proving that the crime could have been committed by someone else. However, she did not grant the suspect the right to file information claims in the hope that an alternative explanation might appear. The data on the basis of which the domestic courts rendered the conviction included those that linked the applicant directly to the leakage of documents and to unauthorized recipients from whom they had been found. Under such circumstances, it could not be argued that domestic courts acted unreasonably or arbitrarily, without allowing the applicant to call witnesses or believing that his defense was materially violated by the conditions under which the unconvicted witnesses were questioned.
DECISION
The requirements of Article 6 of the Convention were not violated (unanimously).
COMPENSATION
In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. If there is an applicant's claim, a new trial or the resumption of domestic proceedings will be an adequate compensation, the finding of a violation constituted sufficient fair compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/394-m-v-the-netherlands .
O acórdão do TEDH, de 25 de julho de 2017, no caso Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais contra Portugal (queixa n.º 17484/15).
Em 2015, o candidato foi auxiliado na preparação da queixa. Posteriormente, a queixa foi comunicada a Portugal. O caso examinou com sucesso a queixa do requerente sobre as razões dadas pelo tribunal para reduzir o montante da indemnização eo facto de o tribunal não ter em conta a importância da sexualidade para ela tanto para a mulher como para a idade do requerente. Houve uma violação do artigo 14 da Convenção para a Proteção dos Direitos Humanos e Liberdades Fundamentais.
CIRCUNSTÂNCIAS DO CASO
O requerente, que foi diagnosticado com uma doença ginecológica, instaurou uma ação civil contra o hospital em conexão com negligência médica feita após sua operação. O tribunal administrativo decidiu a seu favor e concedeu-lhe uma indemnização. Ao analisar a queixa, o Supremo Tribunal Administrativo confirmou a decisão do tribunal de primeira instância, mas reduziu o montante da indemnização por danos.
No processo convencional, a recorrente queixou-se de que a decisão do Supremo Tribunal Administrativo a discriminava com base no sexo e na idade dela. Ela, em particular, queixou-se das razões dadas pelo tribunal para reduzir o montante da indenização e do fato de que a corte não levou em conta a importância da sexualidade para ela como mulher.
QUESTÕES DE DIREITO
Quanto ao cumprimento do artigo 14 da Convenção, em conjunção com o artigo 8 da Convenção. A disseminação da idéia de igualdade de gênero é um objetivo importante dos Estados membros do Conselho da Europa, e são necessárias muito boas razões para que a diferença de tratamento seja considerada compatível com a Convenção. Em particular, referências a tradições, suposições gerais ou abordagens sociais predominantes em um determinado país são justificativas insuficientes para a diferença no tratamento com base no sexo. O problema dos estereótipos de certo grupo na sociedade está enraizado no fato de que proíbe uma situação individualizada de suas capacidades e necessidades.
O Supremo Tribunal Administrativo confirmou as conclusões do tribunal de primeira instância, mas decidiu que o sofrimento físico e moral do requerente havia sido exacerbado pela operação que ela havia realizado, e não admitiu que eles estavam relacionados apenas aos ferimentos sofridos durante a operação. O Supremo Tribunal Administrativo partiu dos factos de que a recorrente tinha "quase 50 anos na altura da operação, tinha dois filhos, ou seja, estava na idade em que a sexualidade não é tão importante como na juventude e o seu significado diminui com a idade "e que a candidata" só precisa cuidar do marido ", levando em conta a idade de seus filhos.
Esta questão não estava relacionada a considerações de idade ou sexo, mas era uma suposição de que a sexualidade não é tão importante para uma mulher de 50 anos e mãe de dois filhos do que para uma mulher mais jovem. Essa suposição refletia a noção tradicional de sexualidade feminina como relacionada principalmente aos objetivos da procriação e, portanto, ignorava seu significado físico e psicológico para a auto-realização das mulheres como indivíduos. Além do categórico, esse argumento não levou em consideração outras dimensões da sexualidade feminina no caso particular do solicitante. Em outras palavras, o Supremo Tribunal Administrativo fez uma suposição geral, não tentando considerar sua aplicabilidade em um caso particular. A redacção da decisão do Supremo Tribunal Administrativo não podia ser considerada uma expressão infeliz. A idade e o sexo do candidato, aparentemente, foram fatores decisivos na tomada da decisão final, introduzindo uma diferença de tratamento com base nesses motivos.
O Tribunal observou o contraste entre o caso do recorrente e a abordagem adoptada pelo Supremo Tribunal em dois acórdãos de 2008 e 2014 nos quais dois doentes idosos com idades entre os 55 e os 59 anos referiram respectivamente a alegada negligência cometida pelo pessoal médico. Nessas decisões, a Suprema Corte observou que o fato de as pessoas não poderem mais ter relações sexuais normais afetava sua autoestima e elas experimentavam "um tremendo choque" e "um forte choque mental". Ao avaliar a extensão do dano, ele levou em conta o fato de que os homens não poderiam ter relações sexuais e suas consequências para eles, independentemente de sua idade, a presença ou ausência de seus filhos ou outros fatores.
DECISÃO
A violação dos requisitos do Artigo 14 da Convenção (aceita por cinco votos "para" com quatro contra) foi cometida no caso.
COMPENSAÇÃO
Na aplicação do artigo 41 da Convenção. O Tribunal atribuiu ao recorrente EUR 3.250 a título de dano moral.
Fonte de publicação: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/395-carvalho-pinto-de-sousa-morais-contra-portugal .
The ECHR judgment of 25 July 2017 in the case of Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal (application no. 17484/15).
In 2015, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Portugal. The case successfully examined the applicant's complaint about the reasons given by the court for reducing the amount of compensation and the fact that the court did not take into account the importance of sexuality for her both for the woman and the applicant's age. There has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant, who was diagnosed with a gynecological disease, instituted a civil case against the hospital in connection with medical negligence made after her operation. The administrative court ruled in her favor and awarded her compensation. While reviewing the complaint, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the first instance court, but reduced the amount of compensation for damages.
In the conventional proceedings, the applicant complained that the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and age. She, in particular, complained about the reasons given by the court for reducing the amount of compensation and the fact that the court did not take into account the importance of sexuality for her as a woman.
ISSUES OF LAW
Concerning compliance with Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The dissemination of the idea of gender equality is an important objective of the member states of the Council of Europe, and very good reasons are required for the difference in treatment to be regarded as compatible with the Convention. In particular, references to traditions, general assumptions or prevailing social approaches in a particular country are insufficient justification for the difference in treatment based on sex. The problem of stereotypes of a certain group in society is rooted in the fact that it prohibits an individualized situation of their capabilities and needs.
The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the findings of the trial court, but decided that the physical and moral suffering of the applicant had been exacerbated by the operation she had performed, and did not admit that they were solely related to injuries sustained during the operation. The Supreme Administrative Court proceeded from the facts that the applicant was "almost 50 years old at the time of the operation, she had two children, that is, she was at the age when sexuality is not as important as in the young years, and her significance decreases with age "and that the applicant" may only need to take care of her husband ", taking into account the age of her children.
This issue was not related to age or gender considerations, but was an assumption that sexuality is not so important for a 50-year-old woman and a mother of two children than for a younger woman. This assumption reflected the traditional notion of female sexuality as related mainly to the goals of procreation, and therefore ignored its physical and psychological significance for the self-realization of women as individuals. In addition to categorical, this argument did not take into account other dimensions of female sexuality in the particular case of the applicant. In other words, the Supreme Administrative Court made a general assumption, not trying to consider its applicability in a particular case. The wording of the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court could not be considered an unfortunate expression. The applicant's age and sex, apparently, were decisive factors in making the final decision, introducing a difference in treatment on these grounds.
The Court noted the contrast between the applicant's case and the approach taken by the Supreme Court in two judgments in 2008 and 2014 in which two elderly patients aged 55 and 59 respectively referred to the alleged negligence committed by medical personnel. In these decisions, the Supreme Court noted that the fact that people can no longer have normal sexual relations affected their self-esteem, and they experienced "a tremendous shock" and "a strong mental shock." In assessing the extent of damage, he took into account the fact that men could not have sexual relations, and its consequences for them, regardless of their age, the presence or absence of their children or other factors.
DECISION
The violation of the requirements of Article 14 of the Convention (accepted by five votes "for" with four against) was committed in the case.
COMPENSATION
In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 3,250 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/396-carvalho-pinto-de-sousa-morais-v-portugal .