Новости от 06 сентября 2018 года из блога, посвященного практике в Европейском суде по правам человека ЕСПЧ
Gjykimi i GJEDNJ-së i 11 janarit 2018 në çështjen Sharhhi dhe të tjerët kundër Shqipërisë (ankimi nr. 10613/16).
Në vitin 2016, aplikantët u ndihmuan në përgatitjen e ankimi. Më pas, ankimi iu komunikua Shqipërisë.
Në rastin e sukses shqyrtuar ankesën e ankuesve në lidhje me dështimin e autoriteteve vendore për të ekzekutuar një urdhër të gjykatës për zbatimin e masave të përkohshme në formën e pezullimit të prishjen e pronës, si dhe autoritetet e dështuar për të siguruar zbatimin e vendimit të gjykatës për masat e përkohshme të sigurimit që e bëri të pamundur për shqyrtimin e duhur të meritave . Ajo kishte pasur shkelje të nenit 6 të kërkesave të pikës 1, të nenit 8, të nenit 13, konsiderohet në lidhje me Nenin 8 të Konventës, nenit 1 të Protokollit N 1 të Konventës, nenin 13 të Konventës për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave të Njeriut dhe Lirive Themelore, konsiderohet në lidhje me nenin 1 të Protokollit N 1 të Konventës për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave të Njeriut dhe Lirive Themelore.
RRETHANAT E RASTIT
Aplikuesit ishin pronarë të apartamenteve dhe dyqaneve në një ndërtesë banimi ku ishin dhënë me qira banesa jo-banesore. 3 nëntor 2013, pa njoftim paraprak ndërtesa ishte i rrethuar nga zyrtarët e Inspektoratit Shtetëror për zhvillimin urban dhe planifikimin me mbështetjen e policisë, i cili rrethoi ndërtesën me shirit të verdhë dhe penguar banorët për të hyrë në banesat e tyre. Aplikuesit parashtruan një ankesë në gjykatën e rrethit, i cili më 7 nëntor 2013 nxori një dekret për masat e përkohshme të përkohshme në formën e pezullimit të prishjes së një prone banesore. Më 27 nëntor 2013, Këshilli i Ministrave nxori një dekret për të marrë ndërtesën në favor të shtetit me pagesën e kompensimit për banorët. Nga 4 deri më 8 dhjetor 2013 ndërtesa u shkatërrua. Procedurat për shumën e kompensimit u pezulluan nga Gjykata Supreme në janar 2015.
Aplikantët u ankuan në Gjykatë se, si rezultat i injorimit të urdhrave nga shteti përgjegjës i autoriteteve, kishte pasur shkelje të nenit 6 § 1 të Konventës. Ankuesit apeluan, duke u mbështetur në nenin 1 të Protokollit N 1 të Konventës, me ndërhyrje në të drejtën e tyre për të respektuar pronën, dhe, duke iu referuar nenit 13 të Konventës, në mungesë të një mjeti efektiv të brendshëm.
ÇËSHTJET E LIGJIT
Neni 13 i Konventës, i shqyrtuar në lidhje me nenin 6 § 1 të Konventës. Aplikantët u ankuan që autoritetet nuk arritën të zbatojnë vendimin e gjykatës mbi masat e përkohshme të përkohshme, gjë që e bëri të pamundur shqyrtimin siç duhet të çështjes së tyre në bazë të meritave. Sundimi i ligjit që Shtetet Kontraktuese përsipër të respektojnë kur ratifikimin e Konventës, përfshin detyrën e shtetit për të siguruar që autoritetet kompetente duhet zbatuar mjetet e duhura. Gjatë periudhës që lidhet me rrethanat e rastit, nuk kishte mjete efektive juridike në Shqipëri lidhur me moszbatimin e vendimeve gjyqësore që hyri në fuqi dhe gjatësinë e gjykimit. Në rast se aktgjykimet e ekzekutueshme nuk janë zbatuar, Gjykata Kushtetuese nuk mund të ofrojë asnjë mjet për korrigjimin e situatës, përveç miratimit të një vendimi deklarativ për shkeljen. Në këto rrethana, aplikantët nuk kishin një mjet efektiv juridik në lidhje me mosrespektimin e vendimit të gjykatës për masat e përkohshme të mbrojtjes.
Lidhur me përputhjen me nenin 6, paragrafi 1, të Konventës. Ekzekutimi i vendimit të gjykatës, përfshirë vendimin e marrë në kuadrin e procedurave të sigurisë, duhet të konsiderohet si pjesë përbërëse e "gjykatës" për qëllimet e nenit 6 të Konventës. E drejta e aksesit në gjykatë, e garantuar me nenin në fjalë, do të ishte iluzion nëse sistemi ligjor i një shteti kontraktues, i dha mundësinë për të mos kryer në dëm të njërës prej palëve të hyjë në fuqi dhe gjykimit detyruese apo urdhrit të përkohshëm të bërë para se një vendim përfundimtar për këtë rast.
Ky parim është edhe më i rëndësishëm në kontekstin e procedurave administrative në lidhje me mosmarrëveshjen, rezultati i të cilave është vendimtar për të drejtat civile të palëve.
Nuk u diskutua nga palët se Neni 6 § 1 i Konventës ishte i zbatueshëm për një procedurë të siguruar gjyqësore. Një urdhër sigurie i gjykatës, drejtuar çdo autoriteti shtetëror, është lëshuar për të parandaluar rrënimin e mundshëm të ndërtesës që i përket aplikantëve dhe duhet të mbetet në fuqi deri në marrjen e një vendimi përfundimtar për rastin. Para se gjykatat vendase të merrnin vendim përfundimtar për rastin, Këshilli i Ministrave vendosi që ndërtesa të ishte konfiskuar në favor të shtetit dhe të shkatërrohej. Prandaj, ekzekutimi i vendimit mbi masat e përkohshme të sigurisë u bë i panevojshëm. Gjykatat e brendshme në të gjitha nivelet vunë re se autoritetet shqiptare nuk pajtoheshin me vendimin e gjykatës për masat e përkohshme të përkohshme. Autoritetet e shtetit të paditur në praktikë nuk arritën të zbatojnë vendimin e gjykatës mbi masat e përkohshme të përkohshme, duke privuar kështu nenin 6 paragrafi 1 të Konventës për çdo efekt të rëndësishëm.
Lidhur me përputhjen me nenin 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës (sekuestrimin e ndërtesës). Aplikantëve u është mohuar aksesi në pronën e tyre për një muaj dhe, në përputhje me rrethanat, me të vërtetë ka humbur kontrollin e plotë mbi pronën e tyre dhe aftësinë për ta përdorur dhe shkatërruar atë. Vazhdimi mohimi i qasjes në ndërtesë dhe prishjen e tij të mëvonshëm arriti në ndërhyrje në të drejtën e ankuesve për respektimin e pasurisë së tyre, e cila nuk ishte e ligjshme sipas ligjeve të Shqipërisë, pasi autoritetet kanë injoruar gjykata lëshoi një dekret mbi masat e përkohshme të sigurimit.
Lidhur me përputhjen me nenin 13 të Konventës në lidhje me nenin 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 (konfiskimi i ndërtesës). Gjykatat e brendshme nuk i dhanë kompensim aplikuesve për heqjen e ndërtesës, prandaj kërkuesit nuk kishin një mjet efektiv juridik për qëllimet e nenit 13 të Konventës.
Lidhur me përputhjen me nenin 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës (heqja dhe prishja e ndërtesës). Demolimi i ndërtesës i privonte aplikuesit nga çdo mundësi për të përdorur pronën e tyre në të ardhmen. Në rrethana të tilla, ka pasur një ndërhyrje në të drejtat pronësore të ankuesve në formën e "heqjes" e pronës në kuptimin e fjalisë së dytë të paragrafit të parë të nenit 1 të Protokollit N 1 të Konventës. mënyrë të natyrshme ka dyshime në natyrën e duhur të procedurës me të cilën autoritetet mund të në një periudhë kaq të shkurtër kohe për të vendosur për të tërhequr pronën e ankuesve në favor të shtetit dhe menjëherë të vazhdojë për prishjen e pronës. Në vendimet e tyre, gjykatat vendase konkluduan se autoritetet nuk arritën të zbatojnë vendimin e gjykatës për masat e përkohshme të përkohshme dhe prishja e ndërtesës ishte e paligjshme. E gjithë procedura për kapjen e pronës së aplikantëve u krye shumë shpejt dhe me shkelje të dukshme të së drejtës së brendshme.
Lidhur me përputhjen me nenin 13 të Konventës në lidhje me nenin 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës (heqja dhe prishja e ndërtesës). Rasti i shumës së kompensimit është konsideruar nga Gjykata Supreme që nga viti 2014. Në janar të vitit 2015, Gjykata Supreme pezulloi procedurën në këtë rast pa ndonjë shpjegim. Vonesa prej katër vjetësh me pagesën e kompensimit për aplikuesit që humbën shtëpitë e tyre dhe pronën personale nuk mund të konsideroheshin efektive. Kështu, aplikantët u privuan nga një mjet efektiv në lidhje me shkeljen e pretenduar të të drejtave të tyre të garantuara me nenin 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës.
VENDIM
Shkelja e kërkesave të paragrafit 1 të nenit 6 të Konventës (njëzëri) është kryer.
Shkelja e kërkesave të nenit 13 të Konventës (njëzëri) është kryer në këtë rast.
Rasti përfshinte shkeljen e kërkesave të nenit 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës (sekuestrimin e ndërtesës) (miratuar njëzëri).
Në rast të shkeljes së nenit 13 të Konventës, konsiderohet në lidhje me nenin 1 të Protokollit N 1 të Konventës (kapjen e ndërtesës) (unanimisht).
Në rastin e shkeljes së kërkesave të nenit 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës (heqja dhe prishja e ndërtesës) (miratuar njëzëri).
Rasti ka përfshirë shkeljen e kërkesave të nenit 13 të Konventës, të shqyrtuar në lidhje me nenin 1 të Protokollit nr. 1 të Konventës (heqja dhe prishja) (njëzëri).
KOMPENSIMI
Në nenin 41 të Konventës, Gjykata i dha për 7800 euro aplikuesit e parë dhe kërkuesit e dytë dhe 13 000 euro për secilin nga 17 kandidatëve të mbetur në dëmin jopasuror. Përveç kësaj, Gjykata Evropiane i dha të gjithë aplikantëve së bashku 13,089,600 euro në lidhje me dëmin material.
Gjykata gjithashtu konstatoi se ka pasur shkelje të nenit 8 të Konventës në lidhje me të drejtën e ankuesit për respektimin e shtëpitë e tyre në lidhje me sekuestrimin dhe mjedisit të ndërtesës dhe të nenit 13 në lidhje me nenin 8 të Konventës për shkak të mungesës së një mjeti efektiv në lidhje me shkeljen e mësipërme.
Burimi i botimit: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/822-sharhhi-dhe-te-tjeret-kunder-shqiperise .
The ECHR judgment of 11 January 2018 in the case of Sharhhi and Others v. Albania (application No. 10613/16).
In 2016, the applicants were assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Albania.
In the case, the applicants successfully complained about the inability of the domestic authorities to enforce the court's decision on the application of interim measures in the form of suspension of the demolition of the property, and also that the authorities failed to enforce the court decision on interim measures of protection, which made it impossible to properly examine their case on the merits . The case involved violations of the requirements of article 6, paragraph 1, article 8, article 13, taken in conjunction with article 8 of the Convention, article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, article 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, examined in conjunction with Article 1 of the Protocol N 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicants were owners of apartments and shops in a residential building where non-residential premises were leased. On November 3, 2013, without prior notice, the building was surrounded by employees of the State Inspectorate for Urban Construction and Planning with the support of police officers who cordoned off the building with a yellow ribbon and prevented residents from entering their apartments. The applicants lodged a complaint with the district court, which on November 7, 2013 issued a decree on temporary interim measures in the form of suspension of the demolition of a residential property. On November 27, 2013, the Council of Ministers issued a decree to seize the building in favor of the state with payment of compensation to residents. From 4 to 8 December 2013 the building was demolished. The proceedings on the amount of compensation were suspended by the Supreme Court in January 2015.
The applicants complained to the Court that, as a result of the authorities' ignoring of the injunction by the respondent State, there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicants also appealed, invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, interfering with their right to respect for property, and, referring to Article 13 of the Convention, to the lack of an effective domestic remedy.
ISSUES OF LAW
Article 13 of the Convention, examined in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicants complained that the authorities failed to enforce the court decision on provisional interim measures, which made it impossible to properly examine their case on the merits. The principle of the rule of law, which the Contracting States undertook to comply with after the ratification of the Convention, implies the duty of the State to ensure that the competent authorities will ensure the application of an appropriate remedy. During the period relevant to the circumstances of the case, there were no effective remedies in Albania regarding the non-enforcement of the court decisions that came into force and the length of the trial. In the event that the enforceable judgments have not been enforced, the Constitutional Court could not provide any remedy to remedy the situation, except for the adoption of a declarative decision on the violation. In the circumstances, the applicants did not have an effective remedy in connection with the failure to comply with the court decision on interim measures of protection.
Concerning compliance with article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. Execution of the court decision, including the decision made in the framework of the security proceedings, should be considered as an integral part of the "court" for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. The right of access to a court guaranteed by the said article would be illusory if the legal system of a Contracting State allowed not to execute at the expense of one of the parties an enforceable and binding judgment or an interim ruling rendered before the final decision on the case was taken.
This principle is even more important in the context of administrative proceedings relating to the dispute, the outcome of which is decisive for the civil rights of the parties.
It was not disputed by the parties that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable to a secured judicial proceeding. A security order of the court, addressed to any state authority, was issued in order to prevent possible demolition of the building belonging to the applicants and should remain in force until a final decision on the case was made. Before the domestic courts could take a final decision on the case, the Council of Ministers decided that the building should have been seized in favor of the state and demolished. Accordingly, the execution of the decision on interim measures of security became unnecessary. The domestic courts at all levels noted that the Albanian authorities did not comply with the court's decision on provisional interim measures. The authorities of the respondent State in practice failed to comply with the court decision on provisional interim measures, thus depriving article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention of any significant effect.
Concerning compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (seizure of the building). The applicants were denied access to their property for one month and, accordingly, did indeed lose full control over their property and the ability to use and dispose of it. The continued denial of access to the building and its subsequent demolition constituted an interference with the applicants' right to respect for their property, which was not legal under the laws of Albania, as the authorities ignored the court's decision on provisional interim measures.
Concerning compliance with Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (seizure of the building). The domestic courts did not award the applicants compensation for the removal of the building, therefore, the applicants did not have an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention.
Concerning compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (removal and demolition of the building). Demolition of the building deprived the applicants of any opportunity to use their property in the future. In such circumstances, there was an interference with the property rights of the applicants in the form of "deprivation" of property within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In a natural way, there are doubts as to the proper nature of the procedure by which the authorities have been able, within such a short period of time, to decide to withdraw the applicants' property in favor of the state and immediately proceed with the demolition of this property. In their decisions, the domestic courts concluded that the authorities failed to comply with the court's decision on temporary interim measures and the demolition of the building was illegal. The entire procedure for seizing the applicants' property was carried out too quickly and with obvious violations of domestic law.
Concerning compliance with Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (removal and demolition of the building). The case of the amount of compensation was considered by the Supreme Court since 2014. In January 2015, the Supreme Court suspended proceedings on the case without any explanation. The delay of four years with the payment of compensation to applicants who lost their homes and personal property could not be considered effective. Thus, the applicants were deprived of an effective remedy in connection with the alleged violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
DECISION
The violation of the requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Convention (unanimously) was committed.
The violation of the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention (unanimously) was committed in the case.
The case involved violation of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (seizure of the building) (unanimously adopted).
The case involved violation of the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, considered in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (seizure of the building) (unanimously adopted).
In the case there was a violation of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (removal and demolition of the building) (unanimously adopted).
The case involved violation of the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, considered in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (removal and demolition) (unanimously).
COMPENSATION
In application of Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awarded EUR 7,800 to the first applicant and the second applicant and EUR 13,000 to each of the remaining 17 applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In addition, the European Court awarded all applicants jointly EUR 13,089,600 in respect of pecuniary damage.
The Court also found that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the applicants' right to respect for their home in connection with the seizure and encirclement of the building and Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention because of the lack of an effective remedy for the violation.
Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/823-sharhhi-and-others-v-albania .
Urteil des EGMR vom 9. Januar 2018 gilt die „Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus (GRA) (GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus) gegen die Schweiz“ (Beschwerde N 18597/13).
Im Jahr 2013 wurde die Nicht-Regierungsorganisation, die Antragsteller bei der Erstellung der Beschwerde unterstützt. Anschließend wurde die Beschwerde der Schweiz mitgeteilt.
Im Falle einer erfolgreich überprüft die Beschwerde Nichtregierungsorganisation auf die Verletzung ihres Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung durch die Pflicht des Gerichts auf der Website der veröffentlichten Informationen zu entfernen, die es Politik auf Demonstrationen zitiert, und seine Worte wurden als „verbale Rassismus“ beschrieben. Im Fall eines Verstoßes gegen Artikel 10 der Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten.
UMSTÄNDE DES FALLES
Im November 2009 hielt der Jugendflügel der Schweizerischen Volkspartei eine Demonstration zur öffentlichen Initiative zur Unterstützung des Minarettverbotes in der Schweiz ab. Nach der Demonstration des Antragstellers, eine nichtstaatliche Organisation, Toleranz fördern und alle Formen der Rassendiskriminierung verurteilt, veröffentlichte auf ihrer Website Informationen, dass die jungen Politiker Rede auf der Demonstration zitiert wurden, und seine Worte wurden als „verbaler Rassismus“ beschrieben. Dieser Politiker reichte eine Beschwerde über den Schutz seiner persönlichen Rechte ein. Der Oberste Gerichtshof entschied, dass die Rede nicht rassistisch war, und beschloss, die betreffende Information von der Website des Beschwerdeführers zu entfernen und durch eine Gerichtsentscheidung zu ersetzen. Die Beschwerde der antragstellenden Organisation war erfolglos.
Im Europäischen Gerichtshof hat die antragstellende Organisation insbesondere geltend gemacht, dass Zivilgerichte ihr Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung verletzt hätten.
Fragen des Gesetzes
In Bezug auf die Einhaltung der Anforderungen von Artikel 10 des Übereinkommens. Die Entscheidungen innerstaatlicher Gerichte, die die antragstellende Organisation nicht befürworteten, beeinträchtigten ihr Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung. Der Eingriff war gesetzlich vorgeschrieben und verfolgte ein legitimes Ziel. Die Frage ist, ob es "in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft notwendig" sei.
Bei der Beurteilung der beanstandeten Aussagen ist es wichtig, den allgemeinen Kontext der politischen Debatte zu berücksichtigen, in der die Erklärung abgegeben wurde. Und es ist Politik und Kunst Organisationen des Antragstellers auf die Frage genannt, der Gegenstand von hitziger öffentlicher Debatte in der Schweiz zur maßgeblichen Zeit war: die Volksinitiative gegen den Bau von Minaretten weit von den nationalen und internationalen Medien bedeckt war. Als Ergebnis wurde die Initiative am 29. November 2009 in einem Referendum angenommen und das entsprechende Verbot in die Verfassung der Schweiz aufgenommen.
Im vorliegenden Fall wurde der betreffende Politiker zum Vorsitzenden der Ortsgruppe des Jugendflügels der wichtigsten politischen Partei in der Schweiz gewählt. Seine Rede war bedingungslos politisch und wurde zur Unterstützung seiner politischen Ziele ausgesprochen, die zur Zeit darauf abzielten, die Verbotsinitiative zu unterstützen. Folglich hat der Politiker seine politischen Äußerungen freiwillig der Öffentlichkeit vorgelegt und musste daher eine größere Toleranz gegenüber möglichen Kritikpunkten an seinen Äußerungen zeigen, wenn diese seine Ansichten nicht teilen. Die antragstellende Organisation hat die Rede des Politikers, die bereits auf der Internetseite der Partei veröffentlicht wurde, reproduziert und sie als "verbalen Rassismus" bezeichnet. Das Bundesgericht entschied, dass die Einstufung der Rede als "verbaler Rassismus" ein unbestimmtes Urteil ohne sachliche Grundlage sei, da es nicht rassistisch sei. Insbesondere stellte der BGH fest, dass die kontroversen Äußerungen für den gewöhnlichen Leser nicht als Herabsetzung der Muslime, sondern als Verteidigung des Christentums und der Schweizer Kultur erschienen.
Es ist notwendig, zwischen der Darstellung von Fakten und Werturteilen zu unterscheiden. Das Erfordernis, die Wahrheit des Werturteils zu beweisen, sei undurchführbar und verletze die Meinungsfreiheit, die ein wesentlicher Teil des in Artikel 10 der Konvention garantierten Rechts sei. Handelt es sich bei der Erklärung um eine Würdigung, so kann die Verhältnismäßigkeit eines etwaigen Eingriffs davon abhängen, ob für das betreffende Urteil ausreichende "sachliche Begründungen" vorlagen. Um zwischen den Fakten und Werturteile zu unterscheiden, war es notwendig, zu berücksichtigen, die Umstände des Falles und der allgemeine Ton der Aussagen gegeben, dass die Kommentare über Angelegenheiten von öffentlichem Interesse auf dieses Werturteil stützen könnte, anstatt die Fakten.
Der Europäische Gerichtshof kam zu dem Schluss, dass die Einstufung der Politik der Politik durch die antragstellende Organisation als "verbaler Rassismus" ein Werturteil sei, da sie die Äußerungen der Organisation zu seiner Rede enthielt. Sie können nicht behaupten, dass die Einstufung der Rede als „verbaler Rassismus“, wenn es zur Unterstützung der Initiative gemacht wurde, bereits von verschiedenen Organisationen von diskriminierenden, fremdenfeindlichen oder rassistischer genannt, könnte als ohne jede sachliche Grundlage angesehen werden. (Siehe zB Bericht der Europäischen Kommission gegen Rassismus im Jahr 2009 in der Schweiz und der Bericht des Ausschusses der Vereinten Nationen für die Beseitigung der Rassendiskriminierung im Jahr 2014). Die antragstellende Organisation habe nie behauptet, dass die Äußerungen des Politikers im Bereich einer Straftat in Form von Rassendiskriminierung nach dem Schweizer Strafgesetzbuch liegen würden. In der Tat, betonte in seinen Aussagen zu den Behörden des betroffenen Staates beim Europäischen Gerichtshof, die antragstellende Organisation der Notwendigkeit für einen möglichen Aufruf ein individuelle rassistische sagen, keine verbindliche strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit impliziert.
Eine umstrittene Aussage kann nicht als ungerechtfertigter persönlicher Angriff oder Beleidigung eines Politikers angesehen werden. Die antragstellende Organisation bezog sich nicht auf das persönliche oder familiäre Leben des Politikers, sondern auf die Reihenfolge der Wahrnehmung seiner Rede. Als Politiker, der sich öffentlich zu einer äußerst heiklen Frage äußerte, hätte er wissen müssen, dass seine Rede bei seinen politischen Gegnern Kritik hervorrufen konnte. Vor diesem Hintergrund hätte sich die beanstandete Einordnung von Grundsatzerklärungen als "verbaler Rassismus" kaum negativ auf sein Privat- oder Berufsleben auswirken können. Das Vorstehende, wie mild es auch sein mag, hätte eine "kühlende Wirkung" auf die Ausübung der Meinungsfreiheit der antragstellenden Organisation haben können, da sie die Absichten der Organisation zur Verfolgung ihrer legitimen Ziele geschwächt und politische Erklärungen und Handlungen in der Zukunft kritisiert hätte.
Die innerstaatlichen Gerichte haben die in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs festgelegten Grundsätze und Kriterien nicht angemessen berücksichtigt, um das Recht auf Achtung des Privatlebens und das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung auszugleichen. Sie gingen damit über die Grenzen ihres Ermessens hinaus und begründeten kein angemessenes Verhältnis zwischen den Maßnahmen, die das Recht der Klägerin auf freie Meinungsäußerung und dem legitimen Ziel beschränkten.
ENTSCHEIDUNG
Im Falle eines Verstoßes gegen die Anforderungen von Artikel 10 des Übereinkommens (einstimmig angenommen).
Entschädigung
In Anwendung von Artikel 41 der Konvention hat der Gerichtshof der antragstellenden Organisation einen immateriellen Schaden in Höhe von 5.000 Euro gewährt.
Quelle der Veröffentlichung: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/824-gra-stiftung-gegen-rassismus-und-antisemitismus-gegen-die-schweiz .
ECHR judgment of 09 January 2018 in the case of the Fund Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (GRA) (GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus) v. Switzerland "( application No. 18597/13).
In 2013, the applicant's non-governmental organization was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the complaint was communicated to Switzerland.
In the case, the application of a non-governmental organization on violation of her right to freedom of expression was successfully examined by obliging her to remove the information posted on the website, in which the politician was quoted as demonstrating, and his words were described as "verbal racism". The case involved a violation of the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
In November 2009, the youth wing of the Swiss People's Party held a demonstration dedicated to the public initiative to support the ban on the construction of minarets in Switzerland. After the demonstration, the applicant organization, a non-governmental organization that promoted tolerance and condemned all forms of racial discrimination, posted on its website information citing the young politician's speech at the demonstration, and his words were described as "verbal racism". This politician filed a complaint about the protection of his personal rights. The Supreme Court decided that the speech was not racist in nature, and decided to remove the information in question from the applicant's website and replace it with a court decision. The complaint of the applicant organization was unsuccessful.
In the European Court, the applicant organization alleged in particular that civil courts violated her right to freedom of expression.
ISSUES OF LAW
Concerning compliance with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention. The decisions of domestic courts that were not in favor of the applicant organization were an interference with her right to freedom of expression. The interference was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim. The question is whether it was "necessary in a democratic society".
Assessing the complained statements, it is important to take into account the general context of the political debate in which the statement was made. Both the speech policy and the article of the applicant organization concerned the issue that was the subject of heated public disputes in Switzerland at the time under consideration: the popular initiative against the construction of minarets was widely covered in state and international media. As a result, the initiative was approved in a referendum on November 29, 2009, and the corresponding prohibition was included in the Constitution of Switzerland.
In the present case, the politician in question was elected chairman of the local branch of the youth wing of the main political party in Switzerland. His speech was unconditionally political and was uttered in support of his political goals, which at the time being were aimed at supporting the ban initiative. Consequently, the politician voluntarily submitted his political statements to the public and therefore had to show a greater degree of tolerance for possible criticism of his statements by those who did not share his views. The applicant organization reproduced the speech of the politician, which was already published on the party's website, calling it "verbal racism". The Federal Supreme Court ruled that the classification of speech as "verbal racism" was an indefinite judgment that had no factual basis, since it was not racist. In particular, the Federal Supreme Court noted that for the ordinary reader, the controversial statements did not look like a disparagement of Muslims, but as a defense of Christianity and Swiss culture.
It is necessary to distinguish between the presentation of facts and value judgments. The requirement to prove the truth of the value judgment was impracticable and violated freedom of expression, which is a fundamental part of the right guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. If the statement is an appraisal proposition, the proportionality of any intervention may depend on whether there were sufficient "factual justifications" for the judgment in question. In order to distinguish between the statement of facts and the value judgment, it was necessary to take into account the circumstances of the case and the general tone of the statements, bearing in mind that comments on issues of public interest could on this basis be value judgments rather than a statement of facts.
The European Court concluded that the classification by the applicant organization of the policy of the policy as "verbal racism" was a value judgment, as it contained comments by the organization itself regarding his speech. It can not be asserted that the classification of speech as "verbal racism" when it was expressed in support of an initiative that has already been called by various organizations discriminatory, xenophobic or racist, could be considered to be devoid of any factual basis (See, for example, the European Commission's report on combating racism in 2009 in Switzerland and the report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2014). The applicant organization had never claimed that the statements of the politician would be in the area of a criminal offense in the form of racial discrimination under the Swiss Penal Code. In fact, in its statements before the Government of the respondent State at the Court, the applicant organization underlined the need for having the opportunity to refer to an individual's statements as racist without implying compulsory criminal liability.
A controversial statement can not be regarded as an unjustified personal attack or an insult to a politician. The applicant organization did not refer to the personal or family life of the politician, but to the order of perception of his speech. As a politician who publicly expressed his opinion on an extremely delicate matter, he should have known that his speech could provoke criticism among his political opponents. In view of the foregoing, the complained classification of policy statements as "verbal racism" could hardly have had a negative impact on his personal or professional life. The foregoing, however mild, could have had a "cooling effect" on the applicant organization's exercise of its freedom of expression, as it could have weakened the organization's intentions to pursue its legitimate aims and criticize political statements and actions in the future.
The domestic courts did not properly consider the principles and criteria established in the European Court's case-law to balance the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression. Thus, they went beyond the limits of their discretion and did not establish a reasonable proportional balance between the measures that limited the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the legitimate aim.
DECISION
In the case there was a violation of the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention (unanimously adopted).
COMPENSATION
In application of Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant organization EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/825-fund-against-racism-and-anti-semitism-gra-v-switzerland .
Urteil des EGMR vom 9. Januar 2018 gilt die „Kadushich (Kadušić) gegen die Schweiz“ (Beschwerde N 43977/13).
Im Jahr 2013 wurde die Klägerin bei der Vorbereitung der Beschwerde unterstützt. Anschließend wurde die Beschwerde der Schweiz mitgeteilt.
Im Fall der erfolgreich die Klägerin Anspruch auf Ersatz seines zugeordneten Gerichtsurteil in einem Strafverfahren eine Haftstrafe für die Wartung in einem psychiatrischen Krankenhaus für einen Zeitraum von mehr als der Freiheitsstrafe überprüft in der Entscheidung angegeben, die Umsetzung der Art der Strafe auf der Grundlage einer ärztlichen Untersuchung zu ändern durchgeführt in Verletzung Timing und ohne seine Übersetzung in einer geeigneten medizinischen Einrichtung.
UMSTÄNDE DES FALLES
Im Jahr 2005 wurde der Beschwerdeführer zu acht Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt. Im Jahr 2007 hat das Gericht der zweiten Instanz das Urteil unverändert gelassen. Im Jahr 2012 wurde nach der Überprüfung des Urteils wegen der psychischen Gesundheitsprobleme des Antragstellers die Vollstreckung der restlichen Strafe ausgesetzt und durch "therapeutische Maßnahmen im Krankenhaus" ersetzt. Der Beschwerdeführer lehnte wiederholt die psychiatrische Behandlung ab. Er behauptete, dass (i) seine Haft außerhalb der festgelegten Satzes Zeit war illegal, (ii), die nachträglich eine schwerere Strafe (soweit angewandt wurde, dass es Maßnahmen war Rechtsgrundlage Strafgesetzbuch beschwerten anzuwenden, erlassen in 2007), und dass (iii) die Revision des Urteils den Grundsatz ne bis in idem verletzt hat.
Ne bis in idem (lat.) - Verbot der wiederholten Bestrafung für dasselbe Verbrechen.
Fragen des Gesetzes
Zur Einhaltung von Artikel 4 des Protokolls Nr. 7 zum Übereinkommen. Artikel 4 des Protokolls Nr. 7 zum Übereinkommen bekräftigt ausdrücklich, dass es die Wiederaufnahme des Falls nicht verhindert, "wenn neue oder neu entdeckte" Umstände das Ergebnis des Falles beeinflussen könnten.
Das Bundesgericht stellte fest, dass die vom Beschwerdeführer erlittene schwere psychische Erkrankung bereits eingetreten sei, jedoch zum Zeitpunkt des ersten Urteils noch nicht diagnostiziert worden sei. In solchen Fällen kann in Übereinstimmung mit dem Strafgesetzbuch eine therapeutische Maßnahme durch Überprüfung des ursprünglichen Gerichtsbeschlusses ernannt werden.
Es gab keinen Grund zu bezweifeln, dass es sich bei der psychischen Erkrankung des Beschwerdeführers um einen neu entdeckten Umstand handelte oder dass die Überprüfung der Strafe dem schweizerischen Gesetz und dem Strafprozessrecht entsprach.
Zur Einhaltung von Artikel 5 Absatz 1 des Übereinkommens. Zunächst einmal ausgeschlossen das Gericht der Anwendung des Absatz „c“ von Absatz 1 des Artikels 5 des Übereinkommens sowie für die Prüfung in der Sache eines Verstoßes gegen die Unterabsatz „a“ und „e“ von Absatz 1 des Artikels 5 des Übereinkommens über die folgenden Gründe für unzulässig erklärt.
Im Jahr 2005 wurde in der Verurteilung des Beschwerdeführers nicht auf die Notwendigkeit von therapeutischen Maßnahmen ambulant oder stationär hingewiesen. In dem Umfang, in dem das Urteil 2012 das ursprüngliche Urteil ersetzt oder zumindest ausgesetzt hat, waren die Bestimmungen des ursprünglichen Urteils für die Haft des Beschwerdeführers ab dem 22. August 2012 in der Besserungsanstalt nicht mehr anwendbar.
Nach schweizerischem Recht könnte die therapeutische Behandlung im Krankenhaus durch Überprüfung des ursprünglichen Satzes unter neuen Umständen erfolgen. Der Gerichtshof war grundsätzlich bereit zu akzeptieren, dass das Verfahren zur Überprüfung des ursprünglichen Satzes, in dem sich die beanstandete Maßnahme befand, die Ursache für die Verbindung zwischen dieser Maßnahme und der ursprünglichen Strafe sein konnte. Diese Verbindung könnte jedoch möglicherweise unterbrochen werden, wenn die fortdauernde Inhaftierung einer Person auf Gründe zurückzuführen ist, die mit den ursprünglichen Zwecken des Urteils nicht vereinbar sind. Deshalb, um zu prüfen, ob die streitige Freiheitsberaubung willkürlich war, im vorliegenden Fall ist es notwendig, die Faktoren zu berücksichtigen, die im Rahmen des Buchstabens „e“ von Absatz 1 des Artikels 5 des Übereinkommens fallen erscheinen.
Erstens, obwohl die Reihenfolge der Ereignisse und der Vergangenheit in sich selbst viel Zeit kein entscheidendes Element ist, stellte der Gerichtshof fest, dass die fragliche Maßnahme war fast sieben Jahre nach der Entscheidung des ersten Urteil im Fall des Antragstellers und sieben Monate vor der geplanten Fertigstellung ernannt des Antragstellers Satz zu dienen.
Zweitens wurde die fragliche Maßnahme durch das Gericht der zweiten Instanz in fast drei Jahren und 11 Monaten nach der Herstellung im Jahr 2008 von dem ersten medizinischen Bericht bestellt, die über die zur Verfügung des Antragstellers psychischer Probleme und nach zwei Jahren und zwei Monaten angegeben, nachdem Sie zusätzliche Erkenntnisse in 2010. Diese Zeit scheint übertrieben (später die Antwort auf den zweiten Experten vom Gericht zweiter Instanz im Jahr 2012, einige Monate vor dem Termine der Maßnahmen zu Beschränkungen für die Ausgabe im Zusammenhang, war für die Antragsteller Institutionen Wert für diese Angelegenheit nicht geeignet).
Drittens wies in ihrer Antwort auf den zweiten Sachverständigen aus zwei Besserungsanstalten, die therapeutische Behandlung im Sinne des betreffenden Artikels des Strafgesetzbuches zur Verfügung stellen kann. Allerdings hatte die Klägerin nicht auf diese Orte übertragen worden ist, und in der ursprünglichen JVA verlassen. Somit wurde die Klägerin nicht unter geeigneten Bedingungen die Behandlung unterzogen, trotz der Tatsache, dass das Recht des Staates, des Beklagt angedeutet, dass, wenn eine geeignete Institution kann nicht gefunden werden, die Anwendung der Maßnahmen eingestellt werden soll. Die Tatsache, dass die Klägerin psychiatrische Behandlung verweigert hat, nicht rechtfertigte ihr Inhalt nicht zu seinem Institut seit mehreren Jahren angepasst ist.
Als Ergebnis beklagte das Maß, das verwendet wurde, als der Antragsteller war bald komplette Portion Strafe im ersten Satz, und die bis heute in Kraft bleibt, hat nicht genügend rechtzeitige Gutachten basiert und führte zu der Tatsache, dass die Klägerin für mehr als vier und ein festgehalten wurde einhalb Jahre nach Ablauf der Strafe auf ihn für ihre Strafe in einer Anstalt auferlegt, das mit dem Zustand seiner Gesundheit eindeutig nicht im Einklang steht.
Dementsprechend kann, da die Freiheitsentziehung des Beschwerdeführers auf der Grundlage des Satzes im Jahr 2012 es unvereinbar mit den Zielen des ursprünglichen Satzes, konnte es nicht auf die Bestimmungen des Buchstabens „a“ von Absatz 1 des Artikels 5 des Übereinkommens.
Zur Einhaltung von Artikel 7 des Übereinkommens. Im vorliegenden Fall stellte das Bundesgericht in der Schweiz, dass selbst unter der Annahme, dass die therapeutische Behandlung in einem Krankenhaus als eine Strafe früher in Kraft (die zum Zeitpunkt des Antragstellers unerlaubter Handlungen) als etablierte Gesetzgebung Maßnahme so streng war durch neue Gesetzgebung vorgeschrieben zu sehen ist (die in Kraft getreten am 1. Januar 2007), denn selbst wenn das zuständige Gericht das Recht hatte, einen Auftrag zur Unterbringung in einem psychiatrischen Krankenhaus Sträfling zu erteilen, was se Eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Sicherheit anderer.
Die Klägerin hat nicht zwingende Gründe dargestellt, die diese Schlussfolgerung zweifeln könnten erlauben, und es wird behauptet, dass die Revision des ursprünglichen Satzes unmöglich unter dem früheren Regeln durch die kantonale Recht vorgeschrieben gewesen wäre.
ENTSCHEIDUNG
Im Fall von den Vorschriften des Absatzes „a“ von Absatz 1 des Artikels 5 des Übereinkommens wurde nicht (einstimmig) verletzt.
Die Anforderungen von Artikel 7 der Konvention wurden nicht verletzt (einstimmig).
Entschädigung
In Artikel 41 der Konvention hat das Gericht der Klägerin 20.000 Euro in der immateriellen Schaden.
Quelle der Veröffentlichung: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/826-kadusic-gegen-die-schweiz .
The ECHR judgment of 09 January 2018 in the case of Kadusic v. Switzerland (application No. 43977/13).
In 2013, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Switzerland.
In the case, the applicant successfully complained about the substitution of a sentencing sentence for a criminal case in the form of deprivation of liberty for detention in a psychiatric hospital for a period exceeding the term of imprisonment specified in the sentence, the replacement of the type of punishment on the basis of a medical examination conducted in violation terms, and without his transfer to a proper medical institution.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
In 2005, the applicant was sentenced to eight years in prison. In 2007, the court of second instance left the verdict unchanged. In 2012, after reviewing the sentence, the execution of the remaining sentence was suspended and replaced with "therapeutic measures in the hospital" because of the mental health problems the applicant had. The applicant repeatedly refused to undergo the prescribed psychiatric treatment. He argued that (i) his detention outside the sentencing period was unlawful, (ii) that retrospectively a more severe penalty was imposed (to the extent that the legal basis for the application of the measure complained was the Penal Code enacted in 2007), and that (iii) the revision of the verdict violated the principle of ne bis in idem.
Ne bis in idem (lat.) - prohibition of repeated punishment for the same crime.
ISSUES OF LAW
Concerning compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention expressly affirms that it does not prevent the resumption of the case, "if new or newly discovered" circumstances may affect the outcome of the case.
The Federal Supreme Court noted that the serious mental illness suffered by the applicant had already occurred, but had not been diagnosed at the time of the first verdict in the case. In accordance with the Criminal Code in such cases, a therapeutic measure can be appointed by reviewing the original court decision.
There was no reason to doubt that the applicant's mental illness was a newly discovered circumstance or that the review of the sentence was in accordance with Swiss law and criminal procedure law.
Concerning compliance with article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention. First of all, the European Court excluded the application of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, and also found it inadmissible to examine on the merits the complaint on violation of Article 5 § 1 (a) and (e) of the Convention on the following grounds.
In 2005, the conviction of the applicant's case did not mention the need for any therapeutic measures either in-patient or out-patient. To the extent that the sentence of 2012 replaced the initial sentence or at least suspended it, the provisions of the original sentence were no longer applicable to the applicant's detention in the correctional institution from 22 August 2012.
According to Swiss law, therapeutic treatment in the hospital could be applied by reviewing the original sentence if new circumstances arose. The Court was prepared in principle to accept that the proceedings to review the initial sentence in which the measure complained of could have been the cause linking that measure and the original sentence. However, this link could eventually be interrupted if the continued detention of a person was due to grounds incompatible with the original purposes of the sentence. Therefore, in order to verify whether the complained deprivation of liberty was arbitrary, in the present case it is necessary to take into account the factors that seem to fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention.
First, although the order of events and the considerable time that had passed were not in themselves decisive elements, the Court noted that the measure in question was appointed almost seven years after the first verdict in the applicant's case and seven months before the planned completion of the applicant's sentence.
Secondly, the measure in question was appointed by the court of second instance almost three years and 11 months after the first medical report was drawn up in 2008, which indicated that the applicant had mental health problems and two years and two months after drawing up an additional report in 2010. This period appears to be excessive (a later response of the second expert for the second instance court in 2012, a few months before the appointment of the measure concerning the limited issue of suitable institutions for the applicant, did not matter in this respect).
Third, in his response, the second expert indicated two correctional facilities that could provide therapeutic treatment within the meaning of the relevant article of the Penal Code. However, the applicant was not transferred to these places, but left in the original correctional facility. Thus, the applicant was not treated in appropriate conditions, despite the fact that the legislation of the respondent State implied that if a suitable institution could not be found, the application of the measure should have been discontinued. The fact that the applicant refused to undergo any psychiatric treatment did not justify his detention in an institution that was not adapted to him for several years.
As a result, the measure complained of, which was applied when the applicant was due to complete the sentence on the first verdict soon and which is still valid, was based on insufficiently timely expert assessments and led to the fact that the applicant was kept for more than four half years after the expiration of the sentence sentenced to him by the verdict in the institution, which obviously did not correspond to his state of health.
Accordingly, since the applicant's deprivation of liberty on the basis of the 2012 sentence was incompatible with the purposes of the initial sentence, the provisions of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention could not be applied to him.
Concerning compliance with Article 7 of the Convention. In the present case, the Swiss Federal Court noted that, even if it were to be presumed that therapeutic treatment in a hospital could be regarded as a punishment provided for by the law earlier in effect (at the time when the applicant committed unlawful acts), the measure was as strict as that established by the new legislation (which came into force on January 1, 2007), since even then the competent court had the right to issue a resolution on placing a convict in a psychiatric hospital who represented A serious threat to the safety of others.
The applicant did not provide convincing reasons that could cast doubt on this finding, nor did he argue that a review of the original sentence would be impossible in accordance with the previously valid cantonal law provisions.
DECISION
In the case of the requirement of subparagraph "a" of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention were not violated (unanimously).
The requirements of Article 7 of the Convention were not violated (unanimously).
COMPENSATION
In application of Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/827-kadusic-v-switzerland .