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Новости от 20 июля 2018 года из блога, посвященного практике в Европейском суде по правам человека ЕСПЧ

Обновлено 20.07.2018 05:43

 

ESLJP presuda od 27. lipnja 2017. o slučaju „Ramlyak (Ramljak) protiv Hrvatske” (zahtjeva N 5856/13).

Tijekom 2013. godine, podnositelj zahtjeva je pomagao u zahtjevi pritužbe. Nakon toga, zahtjeva je priopćen Hrvatskoj.

U slučaju uspješno pregledali prigovora podnositelja zahtjeva da je uskraćen pristup na pravično suđenje pred neovisnim i nepristranim sudom, jer je jedan od sudaca u prigovoru, je bio otac pripravnika koji rade u uredu dva odvjetnika koji zastupaju drugu stranu. U slučaju povrede članka 6. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda.

 

OKOLNOSTI PREDMETA


Odluka u korist podnositelja zahtjeva u parničnom postupku ukinuta je po žalbi. Podnositelj je podnio tužbu Vrhovnom sudu, navodeći da je zabranjen pristup na pravično suđenje pred neovisnim i nepristranim sudom, jer je jedan od sudaca u prigovoru, je bio otac pripravnika koji rade u uredu dva odvjetnika koji zastupaju drugu stranu. Žalba podnositelja zahtjeva Vrhovnom sudu odbacena je, a njezina se žalba proglasila nedopuštenom za ustavnu tužbu kao ustavnosudski postupak.

Na Sudu se podnositelj zahtjeva žalio na povredu njezinog prava na pravično suđenje, kako je predviđeno člankom 6. Konvencije.


PITANJA PRAVA


Nije bilo podataka o osobnoj pristranosti suca žalbenog postupka. Dakle, slučaj treba ispitati sa stajališta objektivne nepristranosti, a posebno je pitanje koliko je mogao sumnja podnositelja zahtjeva koji proizlaze iz posebnih okolnosti, može smatrati objektivno opravdanim.

Priroda osobne komunikacije tijekom suđenja bila je važna u određivanju je li strah podnositelja zahtjeva objektivno opravdan. Nije bilo ničega što bi ukazivalo na činjenicu da sudac nije znao da njegov sin radi u odvjetničkoj tvrtki koja je zastupala stranku u postupku. Međutim, iz materijala iz predmeta ne proizlazi da je obavijestio predsjednika suda o ovoj okolnosti. Ako je to učinio, sva pitanja o sudjelovanju svoga sina u slučaju mogla bi se riješiti prije ispitivanja slučaja. Činjenica da je takva bliski rođak, sin saslušanje građanskog slučaj u žalbenoj fazi, imali takve bliske veze s odvjetnicima koji zastupaju neprijatelja podnositelja zahtjeva kao jedan od stranaka u parničnom postupku, iako on nije bio uključen u slučaj i da je s njima u odnosima podređenosti, ugrožavao nepristranost suda i dopustio da to pitanje. Nije bilo moguće utvrditi točan utjecaj suca na ishod žalbenog postupka, jer je odlučeno tijekom zatvorenog sastanka. Međutim, treba napomenuti da je rekao predsjednik vijeća u sastavu Prizivnog suda od tri suca, stoga, podnositelj zahtjeva imao razloga vjerovati da je igrao važnu ulogu u odluci protiv nje, pa nepristranost može biti ispitani.

Sud je utvrdio da, iako viši sudovi imaju ovlasti za poništenje odluke suda na temelju toga što je predsjednik žalbenog osoblja nije bio nepristran, oni nisu učinili.


ODLUKA


Tu je došlo do povrede članka 6. Konvencije (usvojena sa šest glasova „za”, jedan - „protiv”).


NAKNADA


U primjeni članka 41. Konvencije. Sud je podnositelju zahtjeva dodijelio 3.500 EUR na ime nematerijalne štete.

 

Izvor publikacije: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/410-ramljak-protiv-hrvatske .

 

 

ECHR judgment of 27 June 2017 in the case of Ramljak v. Croatia (application No. 5856/13).

In 2013, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to Croatia.

The case successfully examined the applicant's complaint that she was denied access to a fair trial by an independent and impartial court, since one of the judges who considered the complaint was the father of an intern who worked at the office of two lawyers representing the other party. There has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE


The decision in favor of the applicant in the civil proceedings was quashed on appeal. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court stating that she was denied access to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, because one of the judges who considered the complaint was the father of an intern who worked at the office of two lawyers representing the other party. The applicant's complaint to the Supreme Court was dismissed, and her complaint was declared inadmissible for constitutional review as constitutional proceedings.

At the Court, the applicant complained of a violation of her right to a fair trial, as provided for in Article 6 of the Convention.


ISSUES OF LAW


There were no data on the personal bias of the judge of the appellate instance. Thus, the case must be examined in terms of objective impartiality and specifically the question of whether the applicant's doubts arising from special circumstances could be regarded as objectively justified.

The nature of personal communication during the trial was important in determining whether the applicant's fears were objectively justified. There was nothing to indicate that the judge did not know that his son was working in a law firm that represented the party in the proceedings. However, it does not follow from the materials of the case that he informed the president of the court about this circumstance. If he did, then all questions about his son's participation in the case could be resolved before the case is examined. The fact that such a close relative as the son of a judge who is considering a civil case on an appeal stage had such close ties with lawyers representing the applicant's opponent as one of the parties to this civil proceedings, although he was not involved in the case and that he was with them in the relations of subordination, compromised the impartiality of the court and allowed to question it. It was impossible to determine the exact influence of the judge on the outcome of the appeal proceedings, because it was decided during a closed meeting. At the same time, it should be noted that the said judge presided over the composition of the appellate court of three judges, therefore, the applicant had reasons to believe that he played an important role in passing a decision against her, so that the impartiality of the court could be questioned.

The Court noted that, although higher courts had the authority to overturn a court decision on the grounds that the chairman of the appeal staff was not impartial, they did not do so.


DECISION


In the case there was a violation of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (adopted by six votes "for" at one - "against").


COMPENSATION


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 3,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/411-ramljak-v-croatia .

 

 

Décision de la CEDH du 22 juin 2017 dans l'affaire "Aycaguer (Aycaguer) c. France" (requête n ° 8806/12).

 

En 2012, le requérant a été aidé dans la préparation de la requête. Par la suite, la requête a été communiquée à la France.

 

En l'espèce, le requérant s'est plaint avec succès de la période de stockage des échantillons d'ADN de criminels condamnés, quelle que soit la gravité du crime et en l'absence d'une possibilité d'exiger leur destruction. En l'espèce, il y a eu violation des exigences de l'article 8 de la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés fondamentales.

 

 

 

CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE

 


En 2008, le requérant a été condamné à deux mois d'emprisonnement avec retard dans l'exécution de la peine pour avoir frappé les gendarmes avec un parapluie lors d'une manifestation du syndicat des agriculteurs. Ensuite, le demandeur a reçu l'ordre de subir un test biologique en vue de l'enregistrement dans l'ADN (Fnaeg) base de données informatique nationale des personnes reconnues coupables de certaines infractions (énumérées dans la loi), par lequel le demandeur débouté. Il n'était pas inscrit dans la base de données et a été condamné à une amende pour ce refus de 500 euros.

 


QUESTIONS DE DROIT

 


Quand il s'agit d'un aspect particulièrement important de la vie ou de la personne d'une personne, les limites de la discrétion de l'État sont habituellement restreintes. La protection des données à caractère personnel joue un rôle majeur dans la réalisation du droit de l'individu au respect de sa vie privée, tel qu'énoncé à l'article 8 de la Convention. Ainsi, la législation nationale devrait garantir qu'elle dispose de garanties adéquates.

 

Les considérations ci-après, ont forcé la Cour de conclure qu'en l'absence d'un juste équilibre entre les intérêts publics et privés concurrents dans le cas de l'Etat défendeur a outrepassé les limites de son pouvoir discrétionnaire et que l'ingérence dans le droit du requérant au respect de sa vie privée était disproportionnée.

 

(a) Durée du stockage des données. En 2010, le Conseil constitutionnel français a jugé les dispositions légales pertinentes de la Constitution par rapport à condition que la base de données contestée « pour faire en sorte que la durée de conservation des données personnelles sera proportionnée compte tenu de la base de données dans le but, la nature et / ou la gravité de ces crimes. » En relation avec cette réserve, aucune action spécifique n'a été prise.

 

Selon le Code de procédure pénale de la France, la durée de conservation des échantillons d'ADN ne peut excéder "40 ans" pour les personnes reconnues coupables d'un des crimes énumérés. Cette période maximale devrait être fixée par décret. L'absence d'un décret signifie que la période de 40 ans n'est pas le maximum, mais l'habitude dans la pratique. Ainsi, à l'heure actuelle, la durée du stockage n'est pas différenciée selon la nature et / ou la gravité du crime commis. Cependant, un large éventail de situations différentes, semble être en dehors du champ d'application de cette base de données, couvrant potentiellement les crimes les plus graves (comme les crimes contre l'intégrité sexuelle, le terrorisme, les crimes contre l'humanité et traite des êtres humains).

 

La présente affaire (environ gendarmes non identifiés, qui ont touché un parapluie dans le cadre de l'activité syndicale et politique commerciale) est clairement différent de leur appartenance à de tels crimes graves, comme le crime organisé et les agressions sexuelles.

 

(b) Procédure de retrait. L'accès à une telle procédure n'est prévu que pour les suspects, et non pour les condamnés (comme le demandeur). Cependant, la Cour estime que les personnes condamnées devraient également être autorisées à déposer une requête en radiation des données enregistrées.

 


DÉCISION

 


La violation des conditions de l'article 8 de la Convention (unanimité) a été commise.

 


INDEMNISATION

 


En application de l'article 41 de la Convention. La Cour alloue au requérant 3 000 EUR pour dommage moral.

 

 

 

Source de publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/412-aycaguer-c-france .

 

 

 

 

 

ECHR decision of June 22, 2017 in the case of "Aycaguer (Aycaguer) v. France" (application No. 8806/12).

 

In 2012, the applicant was assisted in preparing the application. Subsequently, the application was communicated to France.

 

In the case, the applicant successfully complained about the established period of storage of DNA samples of convicted criminals irrespective of the gravity of the crime and in the absence of an opportunity to demand their destruction. In the case there was a violation of the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

 

 

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

 


In 2008, the applicant was sentenced to two months 'imprisonment with a delay in the execution of the punishment for striking the gendarmes with an umbrella during a demonstration of the farmers' union. Then the applicant was ordered to undergo biological testing for the purpose of registration in the national computer database of DNA (FNAEG) for persons convicted of certain offenses (listed in the legislation), from which the applicant refused. He was not registered in the database and was fined for this refusal of 500 euros.

 


ISSUES OF LAW

 


When it comes to a particularly important aspect of someone's life or person, the limits of the discretion of the state are usually narrowed. The protection of personal data plays a major role in the realization of the individual's right to respect for his private life, as embodied in Article 8 of the Convention. Thus, domestic legislation should ensure that it has adequate safeguards.

 

The considerations set out below compelled the Court to conclude that, in the absence of a fair balance between competing public and private interests in the case, the authorities of the respondent State went beyond their discretion and that interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life was disproportionate.

 

(a) Duration of data storage. In 2010, the Constitutional Council of France recognized the provisions of the legislation on the disputed database as being consistent with the Constitution of the country provided that "the length of storage of such personal data will remain proportionate in view of the purpose of the database, the nature and / or severity of these crimes." In connection with this reservation, specific actions were not taken.

 

According to the Code of Criminal Procedure of France, the length of storage of DNA samples can not exceed "40 years" for persons convicted of one of the crimes listed in it. This maximum period should be set by decree. The absence of a decree means that the 40-year period is not the maximum, but the usual in practice. Thus, at present, the duration of storage is not differentiated according to the nature and / or severity of the crime committed. However, a wide range of different situations appear to be within the scope of this database, potentially covering particularly serious crimes (for example, crimes against sexual inviolability, terrorism, crimes against humanity and trafficking in persons).

 

The present case (regarding unidentified gendarmes who were struck by an umbrella in the context of political and trade union activities) is clearly different from those related to such grave crimes as organized crime and sexual assault.

 

(b) Removal procedure. Access to such a procedure is foreseen only for suspects, and not for convicts (such as the applicant). However, the Court considers that convicted persons should also be allowed to file a petition for the removal of stored data.

 


DECISION

 


The violation of the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention (unanimously) was committed.

 


COMPENSATION

 


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

 

 

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/413-aycaguer-v-france .

 

 

Sentenza della Corte EDU del 22 giugno 2017 nella causa Barnea e Caldararu c. Italia (reclamo n. 37931/15).

 

Nel 2015, i richiedenti sono stati assistiti nella preparazione della reclamo. La reclamo è stata successivamente comunicata in Italia.

 

Il caso ha esaminato con successo la denuncia dei richiedenti per la rimozione del bambino dai genitori e il suo riconoscimento come adatto per l'adozione sulla base di condizioni di vita inadeguate in famiglia. Nel caso ci fosse una violazione dei requisiti dell'articolo 8 della Convenzione per la protezione dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali.

 

 

 

CIRCOSTANZE DEL CASO

 


I candidati sono la famiglia Rom. I genitori (i primi due candidati) ei loro quattro figli (altri tre candidati) vivevano nel campo in condizioni inadeguate.

 

Nel giugno 2009, la figlia più piccola è stata collocata in un'istituzione e poi riconosciuta da un tribunale di primo grado nel dicembre 2010. I ricorrenti sono stati criticati principalmente in relazione all'evasione della creazione di adeguate condizioni di vita materiali per il bambino e del suo trasferimento a terzi. Tuttavia, nell'ottobre 2012, la Corte d'appello ha deciso che il bambino dovesse essere restituito alla sua famiglia in sei mesi. I servizi sociali non hanno rispettato questa istruzione e nel novembre 2014 la corte ha esteso la permanenza del bambino nella famiglia affidataria. Nel gennaio 2015, la corte d'appello ha annullato questa decisione, ma ha sostenuto la permanenza del bambino nella famiglia affidataria, in cui la ragazza ha vissuto per sei anni.

 

Infine, nell'agosto 2016, il tribunale di primo grado ha ordinato il ritorno di lei alla sua famiglia. Il bambino è stato restituito alla famiglia nel settembre 2016, che la famiglia ha considerato un'esperienza molto difficile.

 


QUESTIONI DI LEGGE

 


Nonostante il margine di discrezionalità delle autorità dello Stato convenuto, le autorità italiane hanno omesso di adottare misure adeguate e sufficienti a garantire il diritto del richiedente di risiedere con il loro bambino nel giugno 2009 al novembre 2016, tenuto conto delle condizioni in cui sono stati divisi, e la non esecuzione della Corte d'Appello 2012 anno, prevedendo il ritorno del bambino alla famiglia, che ha violato il diritto dei richiedenti al rispetto della loro vita familiare.

 

In primo luogo, i motivi sui quali il tribunale di primo grado ha rifiutato di restituire la figlia alle ricorrenti e lo hanno ritenuto idoneo per l'adozione non costituivano "circostanze molto eccezionali" che potrebbero giustificare la rottura dei legami familiari. Inoltre, prima del collocamento del minore e della procedura di adozione, le autorità dovevano adottare misure pratiche per consentire alla ragazza di vivere con i candidati.

 

Nessuna accusa di maltrattamenti, abusi sessuali o carenze emotive, altri problemi di salute disturbanti o instabilità psicologica da parte dei genitori sono state fatte in qualsiasi fase del procedimento. Al contrario, le connessioni tra i genitori e il bambino erano particolarmente forti. I candidati potrebbero adempiere alle loro responsabilità genitoriali e non avere un impatto negativo sullo sviluppo del bambino. Inoltre, il primo parere degli esperti ha suggerito di avviare il processo di reintegrazione del bambino nella famiglia.

 

In secondo luogo, dopo la decisione della Corte d'appello nel 2012, il piano per ripristinare i rapporti tra i richiedenti e il minore nei sei mesi raccomandati non è stato rispettato. Il Tribunale di primo grado ha prolungato soggiorno nella casa adottiva e ha ridotto il numero di visite della ragazza e la sua famiglia di quattro all'anno, ha basato la sua decisione sul comportamento del ricorrente e le condizioni di vita fisiche, potenziali difficoltà di reinserimento del minore nella famiglia d'origine e il forte legame che si sono formate nella figlia del ricorrente, nella sala d'attesa famiglia.

 

Il fatto che un bambino possa essere collocato in un ambiente più favorevole per la sua educazione, da solo, non può giustificare la misura obbligatoria di rimozione dalla cura dei genitori biologici. Nel caso di specie, la capacità delle ricorrenti di fornire al proprio figlio sostegno educativo ed emotivo non era un problema ed è stata ripetutamente riconosciuta dalla corte d'appello.

 

In terzo luogo, anche se la decisione del giudice di merito è stata poi invertita nel 2015, la Corte d'appello, tuttavia, ha confermato che riceve l'immissione sulla base del fatto che, in vista della scadenza del tempo, sei anni, in questo caso, formano molto forti legami con la famiglia adottiva, e il ritorno del bambino alle ricorrenti era già inapplicabile.

 

Tuttavia, l'effettivo rispetto della vita familiare richiedeva che la relazione futura tra il genitore e il figlio dovesse essere determinata esclusivamente alla luce di tutti gli argomenti pertinenti e non solo di un semplice periodo di tempo. Nel caso di specie, le motivazioni fornite dai servizi sociali, e successivamente dalle autorità giudiziarie per aver rifiutato il ritorno del minore ai ricorrenti, non erano circostanze "molto eccezionali" che potevano giustificare l'interruzione dei legami familiari.

 

La Corte ha riconosciuto che, in considerazione del passare del tempo e dell'integrazione del minore nella famiglia affidataria, i giudici dello Stato convenuto potevano rifiutarsi di restituirlo. Tuttavia, nel caso di specie, il passare del tempo a causa dell'inerzia dei servizi sociali, all'inizio del processo di recupero della famiglia e le ragioni addotte dal giudice di estendere la collocazione temporanea del bambino, è un fattore determinante nel prevenire la riunificazione dei candidati con il bambino, che si terrà nel 2012.

 


DECISIONE

 


La violazione dei requisiti di cui all'articolo 8 della Convenzione (all'unanimità) è stata commessa.

 


COMPENSAZIONE

 


Nell'applicazione dell'articolo 41 della Convenzione. La Corte ha assegnato ai ricorrenti 40.000 EUR a titolo di danno non patrimoniale.

 

 

 

Fonte di pubblicazione: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/414-barnea-e-caldararu-c-italia .

 

 

 

 

 

ECHR judgment of 22 June 2017 in the case of Barnea and Caldararu v. Italy (application No. 37931/15).

 

In 2015, the applicants were assisted in preparing the application. The application was subsequently communicated in Italy.

 

The case successfully considered the complaint of the applicants for the removal of the child from the parents and its recognition as suitable for adoption based on inadequate living conditions in the family. In the case there was a violation of the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

 

 

 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

 


The applicants are the Roma family. The parents (the first two applicants) and their four children (three other applicants) lived in the camp in inadequate conditions.

 

In June 2009, the youngest daughter was placed in an institution, and then recognized as a child by the first instance court in December 2010. The applicants were criticized primarily in connection with the evasion of the creation of an adequate material living conditions for the child and transferring it to a third party. However, in October 2012, the Court of Appeal decided that the child should be returned to his family in six months. Social services failed to comply with this instruction, and in November 2014 the court extended the child's stay in the foster family. In January 2015, the appellate court overturned this decision, but supported the child's stay in the foster family, in which the girl lived for six years.

 

Finally, in August 2016, the court of first instance ordered the return of her to her family. The child was returned to the family in September 2016, which the family considered a very difficult experience.

 


ISSUES OF LAW

 


Notwithstanding the limits of the discretion of the respondent Government, the Italian authorities failed to take adequate and sufficient measures to ensure the applicants' right to stay with their child from June 2009 to November 2016, subject to the conditions in which they were separated, and the failure to comply with the decision of the Court of Appeal 2012 year, providing for the return of the child to the family, which violated the applicants' right to respect for their family life.
Firstly, the grounds on which the trial court refused to return the daughter to the applicants and found it suitable for adoption did not constitute "very exceptional circumstances" that could justify the breakdown of family ties. In addition, before the placement of the child and the adoption procedure, authorities had to take practical measures to allow the girl to live with the applicants.

 

No allegations of ill-treatment, sexual abuse or emotional shortcomings, other disturbing health problems, or psychological instability on the part of parents were made at any stage of the proceedings. On the contrary, the connections between the parents and the child were particularly strong. The applicants could fulfill their parental responsibilities and not have a negative impact on the development of the child. In addition, the first expert opinion suggested starting the process of reintegration of the child into the family.

 

Secondly, after the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2012, the plan to restore relations between the applicants and the child in the recommended six months was not fulfilled. The court of first instance extended the stay in the foster family and reduced the number of visits of the girl and her family to four per year, based their decision on the applicants' behavior and physical living conditions, the potential difficulties of reintegrating the child into their own family and the strong ties that the applicant's daughter had in the waiting room family.

 

The fact that a child could be placed in a more favorable environment for her upbringing, by itself, can not justify the compulsory measure of removal from the care of biological parents. In the present case, the applicants' ability to provide their child with educational and emotional support was not a problem and was repeatedly acknowledged by the appellate court.

 

Thirdly, although the decision of the court of first instance was subsequently abolished in 2015, the appellate court nevertheless confirmed the receiving placement on the grounds that, in view of the expiration of time, six years in this case, very strong ties with the foster family were formed, and the return of the child to the applicants was already unworkable.

 

However, effective respect for family life required that the future relationship between the parent and the child should be determined solely in the light of all relevant arguments, and not just a mere passing of time. In the present case, the motives given by the social services, and subsequently by the judicial authorities for refusing the return of the child to the applicants, were not "very exceptional" circumstances that could justify the disruption of family ties.

 

The Court acknowledged that, in view of the passage of time and the integration of the child into the foster family, the courts of the respondent State could refuse to return him. However, in the present case, the expiration of time due to the inertia of social services at the beginning of the process of family reconstruction and the reasons given by the first instance court to extend the temporary placement of the child were decisive factors in preventing the applicants from reuniting with the child, which was due in 2012.

 


DECISION

 


The violation of the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention (unanimously) was committed.

 


COMPENSATION

 


In the application of Article 41 of the Convention. The Court awarded the applicants EUR 40,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

 

 

 

Source of publication: http://espchhelp.ru/blog/415-barnea-and-caldararu-v-italy .