Problems of the historical past in the Asian triangle China - Japan - Republic of Korea
From the standpoint of a constructivist approach, the authors of the article analyze the historical narratives that currently dominate in Northeast Asia. Researchers consider memory policy as a tool to influence regional opponents. The article concludes that the chronicling and strengthening of existing contradictions in the interpretation of the problems of the historical past by China, Japan and Korea. The conscious construction of subjective ideas about their history by the three countries, due to the specifics of their identities and mentality in general, is a cornerstone that has a key impact on the formation of certain stereotypes, images of perception of each other, as well as the conduct of an appropriate foreign policy course.
Keywords: politics of memory, national identity, Northeast Asia.
In modern politics, intangible factors of interstate interaction are becoming increasingly important, among which the historical and political space occupies a special place. Increasingly, the domestic and foreign policy agenda of many States traces the tasks of overcoming the ossified problems left by the historical past burdened by one reason or another. In this regard, Northeast Asia, which is one of the most dynamic subregions of the Asia-Pacific region, is of particular interest - it is here that there is an irreconcilable confrontation between the centers of power represented by the PRC, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Mutual political and interethnic dialogue between the countries is significantly complicated due to the presence of unresolved problems of the historical past that arose and became chronic in the first half of the twentieth century. In turn, this leaves a serious negative imprint on the world political situation, since the lack of healthy and non-conflicting interaction between the largest economic and political players in the region and the world on a number of urgent tasks facing the modern global community creates a certain threat to the international and regional security of the Asia-Pacific region, affecting other subregions of East Asia.
Understanding the ongoing socio-political processes and the dominant historical narratives in the Northeast Asia region (NEA) seems appropriate from the standpoint of a constructivist approach, in which special importance is attached to the politics of memory. The founder of memory studies is the French sociologist M. Halbwax, who introduced into science the concept of collective memory as a socially determined phenomenon, where the past is only as a reconstruction, whose rules are set by today's realities <1>.
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<1> Safronova Yu.A. The third wave of memory studies: twenty-three years against the grain // Political Science. 2018. N 3. P. 19.
The Russian researcher K.S. Romanova calls historical memory a focused consciousness reflecting the relevance and significance of information about the past in close connection with the present and the future. She argues that the history written serves the realization of ideological tasks, being a reflection of certain interests of the current government for a specific present <2>.
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<2> Romanova K.S. Discourses of historical memory // Discourse-Pi. 2016. N 3-4. P. 32.
Thus, the modern historian is not a monopolist on the interpretation of the past, politicians, journalists, lawyers, etc. work with him in this field, which turns any story into a "history in the second degree", i.e. "the history of rethinking all the representations of the phenomenon under study" <3>.
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<3> Chekantseva Z.A. Collective memory and history // Teacher of the XXI century. 2015. N 4-2. P. 232.
Certain historical narratives are used to achieve certain political objectives - mainly the task of the vector of constructing the identity of the nation. O.Y. Malinova notes that the object of politics is not the past, but social representations of the past. At the same time, politics works not so much with history as a certain systematic reconstruction of the past, but with collective memory - with socially shared cultural knowledge about the past, based on different sources, as well as characterized by fundamental incompleteness and selectivity <4>.
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<4> Miller A.I. Methodological issues of studying the politics of memory: Collection of scientific tr. / Ed. A.I. Miller, D.V. Efremenko. M.-St. Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriya, 2018. p. 32.
Thus, the politics of memory is a complex specific phenomenon of the historical and political reality of the state and society, forming a certain discourse of the historical past by influencing the collective memory of the nation and pursuing the construction of a national identity corresponding to this discourse in order to achieve domestic and foreign policy objectives. An analysis of the memory policy of a particular state in the context of a constructivist approach seems necessary for effective forecasting of the logic of its behavior in the international arena.
Historically, Northeast Asia has developed a complex structure of relations between countries-civilizations, whose national and cultural identities are the product of deep interpenetration and exchange over many centuries. These processes were inevitably accompanied by periods of both relative good-neighborly cooperation and longer episodes of competition and hostility due to fundamental differences in the national interests of each of the actors, which sharply changed their colors depending on a specific time epoch and the current economic and socio-political situation.
Stable mutual antagonism between the players of the region - China, Korea and Japan - arose at the end of the XIX century, when Japan, which carried out a comprehensive modernization during the Meiji Restoration period, embarked on the path of creating a colonial empire in Asia through an aggressive expansionist militarist course, primarily targeting its closest neighbors in the person of China and under its control the protectorate of Korea. The colonization of the Korean state in 1910-1945 (the result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895), the pragmatic military-strategic conflict on Chinese territory in 1931-1945 became the basis for the emergence of the problem of the historical past in the complex of relations between the three actors of the region - this is noted, in particular, by A.A. Batakova <5>.
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<5> Batakova A.A. Problems of the historical past in Japan's relations with the states of East Asia: the end of the XX - beginning of the XXI centuries.: Abstract of the dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. M., 2017. p. 15.
The defeat in the war and the surrender of 1945 proved to be a heavy blow to the Japanese identity of the regional leader - the patron saint of Asia, which for several decades was being constructed under the influence of the economic, military-technical and ideological achievements of the militaristic regime and firmly entrenched in the consciousness of the Japanese nation. However, Japan refused to recognize the loss of leadership and move to the status of a losing rogue state, which happened to Germany in the first years after the end of the war, and decided to re-conquer the Asian region, but now through the implementation of economic expansion rather than military force, which was largely favored by the conclusion of a military alliance with the United States, which assumed the function of ensuring the security of the Japanese state.
Post-war China and Korea, in turn, faced many internal challenges, having dropped out of a full-fledged regional leadership race for quite a long time: In China, the search for a new, stable form of statehood and subsequent socialist construction began, in Korea - a bloody war between North and South, which ended with the division of a historically unified state and the formation of two ideologically polar new ones. However, if such transformations did not come as a big shock to Chinese identity, since the traditional essence of the leading state (China), as well as the corresponding interests and goals remained the same - only the ideological coloring changed, then for the Korean nation the loss of unity became a huge trauma, which acted as a determining factor in shackling the world political influence of the Korean peninsula and the loss of the formative influence on the Northeast Asia region.
It is important that after a long period of Japanese aggression, national resentment was firmly entrenched in the Chinese and Korean consciousness, reinforced by the wounded pride of Asian civilization. This is largely due to the attentive attitude of the peoples of the NEA to their past. Thus, K.S. Sanin noted the traditionally high level of self-awareness in China <6>. V.E. Molodyakov emphasized that in Japan historical memory is also an important and complex element of national self-awareness <7>. In the case of the Republic of Korea, D.V. Streltsov wrote about the preservation of deep historical memory in the context of Korean-Japanese relations, which is one of the obstacles complicating the reconciliation of the two countries <8>.
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<6> Sanin K.A. Problems of the historical past in the relations of the People's Republic of China with the states of East Asia // Comparative Politics. 2015. Vol. 6. N 3. P. 48.
<7> Molodyakov V.E. Historical memory of the Japanese // Yearbook "Japan". 2008. N 37. P. 285.
<8> Streltsov D.V. "Diplomacy of apologies" in the foreign policy of post-war Japan // Yearbook "Japan". 2020. N 49. P. 51.
At the same time, it is noted that after the war, a victimizing component became entrenched in the Japanese consciousness - the nation perceived itself as a victim of both the actions of the militaristic regime and atomic bombing by the United States <9>. Obviously, this could not but affect the strengthening of interethnic misunderstanding and antagonism, which subsequently led to an aggravation of the contradictions that had accumulated over half a century. The problem of the historical past thus became a time bomb, subsequently turning into a key obstacle to interethnic communication, constructive socio-political regional interaction, forming two centers of power - Japan on the one hand, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea on the other - defending their view of the ambiguous events of the collective past and resorting to their mythologization and subjective interpretation both to put pressure on political competitors and for national consolidation.
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<9> Rose C. Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-Making. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. 253 p.
In general, the following aspects of the problem of the historical past can be distinguished that are present on the political agenda of trilateral relations: the problem of apologies, the problem of Japanese officials visiting the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, the problem of Japanese national history textbooks, as well as the problem of "comfort women" (mainly in the context of Japanese-South Korean relations).
The problem of apologies is the main stumbling block in relations between China - the Republic of Korea and Japan. A.V. Voloshina notes that Beijing is very sensitive to the Tokyo interpretation of events such as the Nanjing massacre of 1937, the activities of the "Detachment 731", as well as an episode of forced exploitation of "comfort women", etc. <10>, which This is also true for South Korea. Since the 1980s, Japan's top officials have repeatedly apologized to the Asian peoples, primarily the PRC and the ROK. Nevertheless, over time, the latter began to express dissatisfaction and demand new, more sincere and meaningful Japanese gestures of reconciliation. This state of affairs is explained by a number of reasons, in particular, the lack of continuity of apology diplomacy in the Japanese establishment, the use of heterogeneous stylistics in such speeches <11>, as well as the progressive desire of the two players to play the "historical card" in solving pressing problems within the framework of bilateral relations with Tokyo in their favor.
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<10> Voloshina A.V. Sino-Japanese relations in the XXI century: problems and prospects // Problems of the Far East. 2015. N 3. P. 42.
<11> Streltsov D.V. Decree. op. pp. 29-61.
E.V. Molodyakova in her research emphasizes that "the Yasukuni shrine as a religious institution represents a part of the historical memory of the people, including soldiers who were against the war, but went into battle on the orders of the state" <12>. Many Japanese here venerate the souls of deceased warriors who died for their homeland, in accordance with Shinto traditions. It is important that the Japanese leaders lobbying for a visit to the temple are also supporters of the position on military history presented at the Yasukuni Yusyukan Memorial Complex, whose museum exposition constructs a positive perception of the war unleashed by the militaristic regime in East Asia.
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<12> Molodyakova E.V. The multidimensional nature of the Yasukuni Shrine problem // Yearbook "Japan". 2007. N 36. P. 59.
The problem of national history textbooks mainly has a Japanese dimension. From time to time, a fierce debate breaks out between the actors on the interpretation of events in Japanese school textbooks concerning episodes of militaristic expansion. It is noted that China and South Korea criticize "the silence in educational texts of the crimes of the Japanese Imperial army, the denial of Japan's responsibility for unleashing the war in Asia and the Pacific, the statements contained in textbooks that the war in Asia was directed against the Western colonial system and had a liberating character, as well as the inclusion in textbooks of a positive assessment of the colonial Japan's policies in East Asian countries." It is important that discussions regarding the content of educational materials are also taking place in Japan itself, becoming one of the tools of confrontation between internal political forces <13>.
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<13> Streltsov D.V. Problems of the historical past in Japan's post-war relations with East Asian countries // Yearbook "Japan". 2014. N 43. P. 19.
The problem of "comfort women" has a serious impact on Tokyo's relations with a number of Asian countries, primarily with the Republic of Korea. It is connected with Japan's recognition of legal responsibility towards women who were involved in forced sexual exploitation at the so-called comfort stations - in brothels that were created specifically to serve Japanese troops in the occupied regions both before and after World War II. Streltsov emphasizes that a significant part of the total number of women involved in the operation of comfort stations (estimated from 20 to 200 thousand) were Korean and Filipino women <14>. The scale of the physical and moral damage caused by such crimes by Japanese servicemen is enormous - since the 1990s, this problem has been regularly put on the agenda of international organizations and institutions whose activities are related to the protection of human rights, in particular the UN <15>, to resolve issues of compensation to the surviving "comfort women".
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<14> Ibid., p. 21.
<15> Batakova A.A. Decree. op. p. 16.
Thus, the problem of the historical past is multidimensional and chronic. Historical narratives are formed as a result of the implementation by Asian actors of an individual policy of memory, appealing to certain events of the historical past in order to achieve domestic and foreign policy objectives. They are designed, firstly, to consolidate the nation around a positive or negative perception of the collective past, and secondly, on the basis of a national response, to create a basis for the implementation of a number of state measures in order to reinterpret historical episodes that have a negative association in the minds of both a particular nation and those whose collective memory shares these episodes.
The confrontational nature of the memory policy in the Asian states under consideration is primarily explained by the significant strengthening of China's economic, military and political power in the first quarter of the XXI century, which directly affected its geopolitical ambitions - the desire to play a leading role not only in the regional, but also in the world political aspect. At the same time, the actions of the Japanese top leadership over the past ten years demonstrate that, despite the prolonged stagnation of the economy, Japan does not intend to give up its status as the leader of the NEA and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as one of the key political actors in the international arena. In the case of South Korea, not everything is so clear: having achieved economic indicators comparable to Japan, Seoul seeks to challenge Tokyo's ambitions, including from a civilizational point of view, however, it is impossible to talk about the presence of a nation-actor with comparable claims to political leadership in the regional and world political dimension. Thus, it makes sense to talk about the current confrontation between the Chinese identity of the "resurgent Celestial Empire" and the Japanese "patron saint of Asia", which manifest themselves, among other things, in memory policies conducted by the actors-nations.
The return of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan to power marked the strengthening of the revisionist course in the field of historical memory under the auspices of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. As A.N. Panov wrote, he is one of the resolute adherents of the philosophy of "right-wing conservatism", which provides for the speedy elimination of the "defeat complex in World War II" and "drawing a line under wartime politics" <16>.
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<16> Panov A.N. Foreign policy priorities of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo // Yearbook "Japan". 2016. N 45. P. 9.
The strategy of S. Abe's memory policy provided for the gradual removal of the problem of "comfort women" from the historical and political narrative. In addition, in a speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2015, he generally repeated the main "apologetic" elements of the statement, at the same time mentioning that Japan's power course was due to the fact that it "attempted to break the diplomatic and economic deadlock" caused by the policies of Western countries <17>. The main leitmotif of his speech was the postulate about freeing the next generation of Japanese from the burden of apologies: "We cannot condemn our children, grandchildren and future generations, which have nothing to do with that war, to further apologies" <18>. In the speech delivered at the ceremony of commemoration of the victims of the war 5 years later, in 2020, the aspect of regret and apologies was completely removed, however, the number of victims of the Japanese people suffered as a result of the atomic bombings, carpet bombing of Tokyo, etc. was emphasized. <19>
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<17> Shinzo A. Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo // Japan.kantei.go.jp. 2020. 14 August.
<18> Ibid.
<19> Shinzo A. Address by the Prime Minister at the Seventy-Fifth National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead // Japan.kantei.go.jp. 2020. 15 August.
Thus, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, there has been a clear trend in Japan's memory policy towards a comprehensive revision of the existing historical narrative, both internally and externally. Despite Abe's premature departure from the post of head of state in September 2020 and the election of Suga Yoshihide, Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) and Prime Minister, it does not seem reasonable to talk about any qualitative changes in the state course in the field of historical memory. So, even before coming to power, E. Suga stated that he would continue the foreign policy course of his predecessor <20>. In autumn 2020 and spring 2021, the Prime Minister sent ritual offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine, thereby continuing the political tradition. All this suggests the complete continuity of Abe's memory policy and Japan's further construction of a revisionist narrative.
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<20> Suga Vows to Continue Abe's Foreign Policies.
South Korean memory politics continues to be constituted by the problem of "comfort women." However, despite the stable continuity of the state course in the field of the historical past, during the time in power of ex-President Park Geun-hye, a scandalous event occurred that angered the Korean nation - the signing of an agreement with Tokyo on resolving the problem in bilateral relations. Such a precedent of anti-defamatory practice - attempts to distort the significance of the problem of the historical past in the eyes of the nation in order to achieve short-term diplomatic tasks - was perceived by the South Korean people extremely negatively, demonstrating the strength of the historical memory of Korean society. Upon coming to power, Park Geun-hye's successor, Moon Jae-in, immediately pointed out the incorrectness of this agreement <21> due to the impossibility of revising painful historical pages in the history of the Korean people, suspending its operation <22>. Seoul also followed the path of legal commentary, in 2018. having approved August 14 as the Day of Remembrance of "comfort women" <23>. An important point is the desire of the Republic of Kazakhstan to internationalize this issue: for example, in 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kang Kyung-hwa, announced that South Korea intends to host an international conference on sexual violence in conflict in the first half of 2019. <24> Without any doubt, the uncompromising policies of the memory of Tokyo and Seoul naturally led to a significant deterioration in bilateral relations - the actions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan to cancel the agreement were met extremely negatively in Japan and gave rise to the trade and economic conflict of 2019, which continues to this day. It seems that the degree of conflict between the two identities of the "Asian poles of civilization" will only increase, manifesting itself in trade, economic and socio-political conflicts.
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<21> South Korea's Moon Says 2015 'Comfort Women' Agreement "With Japan "Flawed".
<22> Ibid.
<23> S. Korea commemorates memorial day for "comfort women".
<24> Kistanov V.O. Relations between Japan and South Korea: problems, trends, prospects // Japanese studies. 2019. N 3. P. 37.
China is becoming an important player in the confrontation of historical narratives. After Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, the plans of the top leadership to finally instrumentalize the problems of the historical past in order to achieve domestic and foreign policy objectives became obvious. Thus, the proclamation of the concept of the "Chinese dream" by the new chairman is important. On the news portal of the Communist Party of China, this concept was interpreted, among other things, as "an expression of Chinese collective memory and Chinese history" and in particular a historical narrative about a period of hardship and deprivation, as well as national liberation <25>.
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<25> The Chinese Dream: the Chinese Spirit and the Chinese Way // KPK News Portal.
The main goal of Beijing, which has become the de facto economic and political center of power in the Asia-Pacific region and the whole world, is to regain the status of a great power lost as a result of the "century of humiliation" - a period of prolonged violation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity by Western powers from 1839 to 1949. Memory policy has become one of the top leadership's priority tools to achieve this goal: by promoting the narrative of the "great victory of the Chinese people", mythologizing China's role in World War II, and reformatting the collective memory of both the Chinese nation and the international community, the PRC expects, first, to get rid of the label of a "humiliated and defeated state" It has long been inconsistent with the total Chinese power, and secondly, to justify its right to actively participate in the formation of a new world order that takes into account the results of the Second World War. It is obvious that the influence on the historical and political conjuncture in the complex of relations under consideration is significant - the successful implementation of the Beijing strategy in the field of historical memory will allow the narrative to take a dominant position, suppressing, first of all, the Tokyo discourse of the past and forcing it to adapt to the requirements of the former.
Thus, the study of key historical narratives within the framework of the Asian triangle allows us to draw a general conclusion about the permanence of crisis phenomena in political relations between the three countries. It is important that the policy of memory is one of the key tools for influencing opponents - the consequences of its implementation are expressed both in the economic and socio-cultural spheres: for example, the current crisis in Japanese-South Korean economic cooperation is associated with another clash on the political interpretation of the problems of the historical past. The deterioration of the mutual perception of the nations of the two countries is of key importance, which provokes government circles to take more active foreign policy actions. Qualitative changes in the narrative constructed by the PRC allow us to judge the further chronicling and strengthening of existing contradictions - the problem of the historical past will not be able to completely leave the interaction within the framework of the China-Japan- Republic of Korea triangle, continuing to have a permanent destructive effect on it. The conscious construction of subjective ideas about their history by the three countries, due to the specifics of their identities and mentality in general, is a cornerstone that has a key impact on the formation of certain stereotypes, images of perception of each other, as well as the conduct of an appropriate foreign policy course.
