Strategy as a methodology for dealing with the unknown
Any analysis of the situation, any planning, whether it is realized by analysts or not, always assumes the presence of a kind of "black box": situations that cannot be foreseen today fall into it. Any development is planned in terms of the predicted behavior of future facilities, and the predicted behavior will always differ from the real one.
Moreover, there are always unaccounted-for factors that may turn on at some point, bringing the system into unexpected action. The unknown/uncertainty is the main object of the strategy. This component of the level of our ignorance must be taken into account in any constructions and conclusions. It is in it that the main obstacles and causes of errors are hidden. K. Gray emphasized that the future is difficult to predict and one should not believe phrases about the supposed future.
P. Davis gives a list of the biggest surprises of recent decades, including the Cuban missile crisis, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the economic collapse in East Asia in the late 1990s, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the transformation of China's economy into one of the world's leading, the emergence of breakthrough technologies in China, the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the resistance of the Donbass population to the coup in Kiev, Russia's military participation in the events in Syria.
As we can see, these surprises can be both negative and positive events as a possible tool for dealing with surprises. P. Davis suggests using the idea of complex adaptive systems, when even a minor event can have significant consequences for the system as a whole. In one of his previous works, he and his colleagues put forward the principle: working with uncertainty is adaptation planning. It also defends the idea of abandoning scenarios built for a specific threat, since threats are usually difficult to predict. Today's threats are unlikely to coincide with the threats that will arise fifteen years later. Formatting the future also becomes a solution, which as a result will make it possible to reduce the role of uncertainty, which can be done by supporting factors that contribute to stabilization and reducing the role of factors that create destabilization.
The central role of adaptability in overcoming uncertainty lies in the fact that the role of detailed planning in the case of long-term development options is reduced. Academic performance in such time intervals consists in the ability to adapt to changes. Accordingly, two types of adaptability are defined: operational and strategic. At the same time, strategic adaptability is the ability to change military components easily and quickly, responding to changes in the geostrategic context or national strategy. At the same time, "fast" means several years, and "easy" means using no more than 10% of the military budget for this, not 20-50%. Even these figures show that everyone is capable of change, only adaptability in itself means that change does not mean cardinal destruction.
When transferring business strategies to the military industry, consider a strategic portfolio, since only the presence of a number of components can set the desired level of adaptability. Such a strategic portfolio may include:
the ability to respond to various situations (major wars, low-intensity conflicts, military peacekeeping operations);
formatting the future in principle regions;
strategic adaptability.
Strategic adaptability, in turn, must respond to changes in four fundamental areas:
international security;
Military technology;
the reality of cost, implementation, and organizational behavior;
national priorities reflected in the defense budget and the degree of involvement in conflict situations.
At the same time, military technologies, for example, must take into account both their own changes and those carried out by the enemy.
Capabilities-based planning has become another actively developed option for "dealing with uncertainty". This is planning in conditions of uncertainty, which makes it possible and adequate to a wide range of modern challenges.
Here, as the name itself implies, there is a shift in the definition of a future threat, it is impossible, to the development of protective functions for a universal understanding of a future threat. P. Davis emphasizes the following key points of this type of planning (we are probably talking about a certain preparation for the future, and not just planning):
- a conceptual scheme of planning in conditions of uncertainty, emphasizes flexibility, sufficiency and adaptability of capabilities;
- an analytical scheme with three components: understanding the need for capabilities, evaluating the choice of capabilities at the mission or operation level, choosing the levels of capabilities in a combined scheme that includes other factors (troop management, risk, economic constraints);
- the scheme of the solution emphasizes the "building blocks".
At the same time, the rejection of scenarios based on threats becomes fundamental. Focusing on specific enemies, specific wars, and specific ideas about these wars affects flexibility and adaptability. Therefore, changing the threat leads to the collapse of the entire scenario. The widest possible range of potential threats should be considered, rather than focusing on two or three of them, as was the case during the cold war.
A new source of threats is becoming a crucial point. In response, there is a need to have other capabilities - for example, tools to coerce States that support terrorism.
For each of the selected scenarios, you need to create your own set of needs and opportunities. The "building blocks" proposed under this approach are new. It is the versatility of these blocks that is important, from which protection against various types of threats can be built, and not just from one. Such blocks can be: units, mission operations, operational concepts, resources.
And here there is another argument in favor of such a modular approach. The response to the conflict model has become more complicated, it can involve both traditional hierarchies and modern types of networks.
An important task in this case is the selection of an adequate type of modules, building blocks, with which it will be possible to respond to new types of calls.
One of the options for uncertainty that is worth preparing for is the transition to chaos as a situation in which there is no long-term foresight. This is due to the fact that the behavior of nonlinear systems can no longer be defined in terms of the behavior of their components. The theory of dynamical systems identifies three sources of such unpredictability:
sensitivity to initial conditions;
the deterministic nature of chaos, i.e. long-term unpredictability, which follows from local instability;
sensitivity to control parameters.
Uncertainty/obscurity is not an abnormal phenomenon. On the contrary, this is the norm that any level of management deals with. Therefore, it is very important to look for your own options for working with this phenomenon. For example, D. Gillenspor suggests, like, "delegating" uncertainty to the lower levels of the hierarchy, not making decisions himself, but giving others the opportunity to do so. A model is being formed in which the number of uncertainties at the highest level will decrease due to their redistribution at different levels of the hierarchy.
A strategy for dealing with the unknown can be based on such a set of potential possibilities:
"closing" the unknown (prohibiting the intersection of certain points);
strengthening of its own components, equivalent in strength to the assumed unknown;
Moving the other way;
movement with safety net (mini-movement with exploration ahead);
waiting for the unknown period to change to the known period.
But these are all spatial metaphors for escaping the unknown.
Reality turns out to be more complicated because it involves factors of uncertainty at different levels, not just one.
Strategic analysis determines the possibilities of moving forward, based on the existing points of vulnerability of someone else's system or their own future. A point in the future requires determining the optimal and non-optimal ways to achieve it. It may even be beyond our awareness. It also needs to be "filtered" from the existing layers.
Intelligence analysis, for example, deals with strategic warnings and intentions.
Strategy slows down its movement when approaching the unknown, so it is the unknown that has become the main object of research today, especially in the case of military planning. This becomes one of the main parameters for evaluating models. The authors of this approach, which they called "exploratory", in contrast to the standard approach, in which the base case is highlighted and the rest are analyzed as its derivatives, believe that we have no right to give preference to one of the cases.
What methods are available today to facilitate the transition and work with the unknown? This:
determining trends, drivers, that is, possible variants of constants that will not reliably change in the future;
identification of models implemented in other countries, other fields of knowledge with the "inclusion" of certain factors.
One of the actual methodologies that allows you to look beyond the veil of the unknown is a survey of experts (an option is the Delphi method). After September 11, the Pentagon also used virtual reality assessment methods in an effort to track possible new terrorist activities based on Hollywood products.
P. Davis offers a variant of exploratory analysis, which has the following set of goals: to understand the consequences of uncertainty for a particular problem; to help determine the right strategy and subsequent modifications.
In general, exploratory analysis should help to create flexible, adaptive and high-quality strategies. He studies the consequences of uncertainty, approaching such a direction as the analysis of the scenario space. Since we are dealing with uncertainty, it ceases to be unified, without dividing into types. It is proposed to analyze two types of uncertainties: parametric and structural.
Parametric uncertainty refers to entering a model when we often do not know its exact values. Structural uncertainty is related to the shape of the model and answers the questions, all variables of the real world are included in the consideration.
By conducting a parametric study, it is possible to understand which parameters the model is more sensitive to and which are less sensitive to. We can identify situations in which a parameter becomes important. Probable studies of the role of parameters are also possible.
Exploratory analysis does not so much provide for the situation, as it provides the results of computer modeling, when, by changing the input parameters, we get other results at the output.
The unknown is "dissected" by the strategy gradually. For example, the purely strategic idea of using aviation to destroy the economic potential of the enemy came in the thirties. Then it had to be specified in order to find the critical points of the enemy's economy. In general, there is such a rule: a strategic idea appears before the opportunities for implementation.
Strategy is always a struggle against opposition. Counteraction carries a greater volume of the unexpected than action. For this reason, counteraction is more important than action. We plan the action ourselves, but the opposition lives by other laws.
The collision of action and counteraction can occur in the following possible variants:
blocking of counteraction, that is, an operation was carried out in advance aimed at stopping possible counteraction;
avoiding a collision is an attempt to "miss each other", to postpone the option of a decisive battle;
the actual fight against counteraction;
the transition of the struggle to another sphere (for example, from politics to economics, from military confrontation to political, etc.);
transfer to one's side.
An example of blocking is the information campaign during the coup, the goals of which E. Luttwak defines in two directions: to discourage the desire to fight back by emphasizing his strength; to remove fear, which otherwise would have contributed to the growth of resistance. It's about how different segments of society can be understood. In the second case, it implies the influence on the passive part of the population, who can see their normal future under the new version of government.
We see the same methods in the sphere of political struggle, which some researchers define as "political war". Indeed, the ferocity and aggressiveness of the political struggle is very similar to the war.
At the same time, the possible gain in the transition to the future is based, as a rule, on the violation of the current equilibrium. The present is "balanced", it does its best to maintain the existing order. All players and institutions are put in their places, which they will try to keep, not allowing strangers into their area of responsibility. And all those who want to upset the balance are strangers to them.
In such situations, a distinction should be made between a personal and an institutional disorder. Both pose a danger to the imbalance, but often in the post-Soviet space, personal interest turns out to be stronger than any objective movements.
However, institutions are stronger in form than humans, so the former USSR was ready to fight individual dissidents, but did not like any grouping.
However, paradoxically, a tactical victory can really become a strategic loss. E. Luttwak cites an example from the Second World War, when even the loss of three Allied aircraft against two downed German ones was still considered a victory, since the Allies produced three times as many aircraft. There is perhaps a paradoxical option where losing at one level leads to winning at another.
By increasing the level of uncertainty, we get a complex object whose behavior should now be predicted on a large number of levels. The strategy of working with a complex object becomes a complex strategy, which we will set in this way:
the need for inter-level structures (transitions between politics, economics, military affairs, etc.);
maintaining an area at one level allows you to achieve results at another, transform your victories to another level;
similarly, we can talk about losing, which also gives inter-level results;
in strategies for working with such complex objects, priority characteristics change. For example, today the military plans media operations on a par with combat operations due to the dependence of military operations on public thought;
there are equivalent players (strong at all levels) and there are equivalent players (like terrorists) trying to compensate for weakness at one level with strength at another;
In a comprehensive strategy, one of the most important problems is the problem of synchronizing actions at different levels.
Here are examples of the development and implementation of integrated strategies at the State level.
Japan's industry and infrastructure were in a state of ruin after the end of World War II, during which it was defeated, its territory was occupied by American troops. The development of a strategy for the development of high-tech technologies (mechanical engineering, electronics) has made Japan one of the most advanced and well-off countries in the world for ten years. By reducing or removing taxes on work in the relevant industries, the Japanese leadership attracted investments in these areas and achieved outstanding results. Japanese cars and electronics have become the best in the world and have conquered the market.
South Korea followed the path trodden by Japan, and given the lower cost of labor in this country, it quickly achieved success and is now the tenth economy in the world with a population of 50 million people.
Singapore is located in the south of the Malacca Peninsula. A small island state with no significant resources, except for a successful strategic position on the way from East Asia to South Asia and further to Europe. The population is represented by two main ethnic groups - Chinese and Malays. The skillful strategy of the country's economic development by the government of Lee Kuan Yew was aimed at turning Singapore into a financial and trade center of Southeast Asia, as well as attracting foreign investors. The first tactical move was the fight against corruption, which was conducted using the most brutal methods.
Strengthening the judicial system by increasing salaries for judges and introducing the principle of equality of all before the law, including the most senior officials. Next is the training of highly qualified personnel in the best universities in the world. Singapore is currently one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita.
When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, it had 50 million people. highly educated population, developed industry and agriculture, infrastructure, excellent strategic location on the land route between Asia and Europe. No president of Ukraine has been able to develop a strategy for the development of the state - neither economic, nor cultural, nor interstate positioning. As a result, in twenty years the country has slipped to the level of the poorest in Europe, which is torn apart by socio-political and linguistic problems. The country has problems with almost all of its neighbors. The industry has collapsed, and the unique geographical location is not being used.
Here are some examples of the interdependence of different levels, which will allow us to understand the meaning of the "game" in several directions at once. Thus, the researchers found that at a level below $1,000 of GDP per capita, dictators live very well. They are less stable at the level of $1,000 to $4,000. There is no threat to democracy at an income level above $6,055.
Complex strategies (which can be understood as the interaction of strategies) explain the interest in so-called manipulations, they can be interpreted as an attempt to carry out inter-level transitions. In general, the object for management, becoming sharply complicated, will require the development of comprehensive strategies, which was not the case before. As a result, not two, but three types of strategy are formed:
a simple object is one variant of a strategy (for example, military or political);
a complex object (one object in a number of projections) is a complex strategy that involves all levels;
The multiplicity of objects is a grand strategy.
We're probably exaggerating the situation a bit. However, it was the situation with complex objects that led to the emergence of the project approach. There is a serious need to synchronize the states of an object in several directions. Although in some cases synchronization is not necessary. So, in the case of military training, the information object moves ahead of its actual military implementation. At first, the object is present purely informationally and in some political variants, when the reaction of public consciousness to certain variants of the development of the situation is checked. In this case, either rumors or "leaks" of information are used. In total, we have several projections of the object in several directions, each of which is driven by its own strategy. In which areas the object is ahead, in others it is late.
Spaces.
This is a conditional example demonstrating the difference in the movement of an object in different types of spaces. For example, if we take the war in Iraq, then it was completed informatively before the start of hostilities, since S. Hussein was convicted, and no weapons of mass destruction were found, but all this was done within the framework of the media. Diplomatically, the United States went parallel or even ahead of the information object of the war. Public thought is moving in parallel with military successes: if there are none, then there will be no public support.
Chaos.
The level of uncertainty in the modern world is not decreasing, but growing, which causes the development of new types of strategies suitable for conditions of uncertainty. Now chaos is being deliberately introduced in order to move to a pre-designed exit that is beneficial to one of the parties.
It is possible to formulate several general rules for the introduction of chaos as a political tool: introduction into chaos is more profitable for the subject of introduction than for its object; introduction into chaos is safer for an external subject than for an internal one; introduction into chaos can have both a likely manageable result and a less likely uncontrollable result.
The first rule reflects the fact that it is always easier for a player prepared for such an operation to be in it than for someone who gets into it by accident. The system player is always stronger than the random one, and especially in this area. The second rule is quite understandable, since for one player it is political chess, and the other is himself a figure of such a game. The third rule reflects situations of unsuccessful application of chaos (for example, the events in Burma or Venezuela), when counteraction to the introduced chaos was implemented. Although both countries are still in a state of permanent struggle, the result of the planned operation with the introduction of chaos was still not achieved, since order was introduced in response, albeit by violent methods.
Uncertainty is an element of order, only of a different type.
It requires a different level of management tools, but it is possible in principle. Systems for introducing chaos are being developed today.
Less attention is paid to the reverse scheme - the systematics of counterinsurgency. The exception is the book by J. Sharpe and B. Jenkins "Anti-Coup".
Chaos is an unknown, but only for the side that interprets it that way, refusing to interfere. Overcoming chaos requires serious intellectual and material resources. As a matter of fact, crisis management has already been developed in business for this purpose. Chaos as an order dominated by uncertainty requires a special type of strategy. These strategies are fundamentally different from the standard type of strategies.
As an example, we can consider peacekeeping operations, which many countries are currently involved in. A complex object arises that has many projections, the main one of which is an unusual combination of peaceful and military components. We can see the complications of this facility using the example of intelligence requirements for such operations: ■ problems of the civilian sector: changes in the civilian sector are critical for military operations, which are not present in conventional military operations;
new partners and sources: just as military force does not work in isolation from "civil-military" intervention, so intelligence does not work in isolation from other forces;
numerous partners and sources: in addition to qualitative changes, there are also quantitative changes.
Here there are inclusions of completely new parameters, which leads to a fundamental complication of the object (the military tends to control civilian objects). In principle, connecting all new types of objects creates a situation of multidimensionality, since each of these objects plays by its own rules: the military has its own, the civilians have their own. Each of the existing objects can no longer live according to the old laws, and new ones are not formed, since the inertia of the object requires actions according to the old schemes. Due to the novelty of the environment, objects find themselves in a stressful situation and in many ways this general change is characteristic of the modern world.
Another similar example is the intersection of information and economics, which led to the emergence of an information economy, a knowledge-based economy. In the Nobel Lecture by J. Stiglitz says, "The information economy already carries significant consequences for how we think about economic policy, and there will be even greater impact in the future world, undoubtedly more complex than our simple and even complex models suggest."
Overcoming chaos is based on the principles of gradually regaining order in critical areas. However, decisions in this case are very difficult to make, since they involve possible significant losses in other areas. The fall of the USSR (like any other similar example) very clearly demonstrates the lack of such a strategy. Chaos was introduced gradually, destroying the old institutions, which one by one began to cease resistance. They all kept order on their territory, only to suddenly abandon it.
Chaos is a foreign system that makes it difficult for the main system to work.
Uncertainty today has ceased to be a terrible factor that should be avoided by all means. Uncertainty, having become the object of research, has acquired manageability features, thereby becoming one of the components that are taken into account in strategic analysis. New types of threats created the need for a new type of toolkit, which eventually managed to be developed. But the main thing is still a fundamental change in the view, type or format of thinking, as a result of which it was possible to "lassoed" uncertainty in one way or another. Further research will provide a new understanding of the tools for dealing with the unknown.
